Intergenerational Cultural Transmission as an Evolutionary Game

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 115-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D Montgomery

We generalize the Bisin-Verdier model of intergenerational transmission to permit an arbitrary number of cultural traits. A key observation—that this model is equivalent to an evolutionary game under replicator dynamics—facilitates our analysis. For two special cases, obtained by restricting the pattern of “cultural distastes” between traits, we demonstrate global stability of the long-run distribution of traits using recent results on stable games and potential games. For the general three-trait case, we show that all three traits survive in the long run only if each trait satisfies an “invasion condition” involving the cultural distaste parameters. (JEL C73, D91, Z13)


2012 ◽  
Vol 430-432 ◽  
pp. 1330-1334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Zhan ◽  
Jian Sha Lu ◽  
Xue Hong Ji

Economic theories of managing resources, traditionally assume that individuals are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the optimal configuration strategy that maximizes their profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that network node users face a choice between two resource strategies in real networked manufacturing resources configuration problem (NMRCP). The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are more demanded than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run.



2021 ◽  
pp. 232102222110243
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Armando García ◽  
Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera ◽  
Jorge Zazueta

In this document, we analyse the strategic complementarity between technological investment and investment in training by workers. We show that, beyond the importance of the answer to the question about which factor determines which, initial minimal conditions in both factors are required to start a long-run social development process. If these minimums are not met, the economy can become a self-satisfied economy, with a social mediocre performance but, at least in the short run, successful from the individual point of view. We consider that either manager of firms as workers are rational agents who make decisions about their future behaviour, considering the current state of the economy, understanding for such, the percentage of innovative and non-innovative firms in the market and the percentage of skilled and unskilled workers in the labour market. While managers decide the best way to invest, workers decide whether to invest or not in the upgrade or in the development of their skills to face the new challenges posed by technological change. The evolution of the economy is summarized in a complex dynamical system represented by a coupled dynamical system very close to the replicator dynamics considered in evolutionary game theory. In this way, we show that the initial conditions play a crucial role to understand the possibilities of future performance of the economy in each country, and, on the other hand, we analyse the conditions that make possible or necessary the intervention of the government in the economy. JEL Codes: C72, C73, O11, O55, K42



2006 ◽  
Vol 06 (02) ◽  
pp. 197-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. KHASMINSKII ◽  
N. POTSEPUN

This paper studies the behavior of replicator dynamics systems under White Gaussian Noise (WGN) perturbations in the Stratonovich form. Long-run behavior is described for the system with two pure strategies. The method of Lyapunov functions is used to find the sufficient conditions for asymptotic stability and strong instability of the pure strategies for the system with arbitrary number of pure strategies. Extinction of strictly dominated pure strategies is proven for any level of the noises.



2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Szabolcs Blazsek ◽  
Alvaro Escribano ◽  
Adrian Licht

Abstract A new class of multivariate nonlinear quasi-vector autoregressive (QVAR) models is introduced. It is a Markov switching score-driven model with stochastic seasonality for the multivariate t-distribution (MS-Seasonal-t-QVAR). As an extension, we allow for the possibility of having common-trends and nonlinear co-integration. Score-driven nonlinear updates of local level and seasonality are used, which are robust to outliers within each regime. We show that VAR integrated moving average (VARIMA) type filters are special cases of QVAR filters. Using exclusion, sign, and elasticity identification restrictions in MS-Seasonal-t-QVAR with common-trends, we provide short-run and long-run impulse response functions for the global crude oil market.



2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.



2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (1B) ◽  
pp. 1019-1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorens A. Imhof
Keyword(s):  


2001 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 206-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyue Jiang ◽  
Viliam Makis ◽  
Andrew K. S. Jardine

In this paper, we study a maintenance model with general repair and two types of replacement: failure and preventive replacement. When the system fails a decision is made whether to replace or repair it. The repair degree that affects the virtual age of the system is assumed to be a random function of the repair-cost and the virtual age at failure time. The system can be preventively replaced at any time before failure. The objective is to find the repair/replacement policy minimizing the long-run expected average cost per unit time. It is shown that a generalized repair-cost-limit policy is optimal and the preventive replacement time depends on the virtual age of the system and on the length of the operating time since the last repair. Computational procedures for finding the optimal repair-cost limit and the optimal average cost are developed. This model includes many well-known models as special cases and the approach provides a unified treatment of a wide class of maintenance models.



2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacek Miȩkisz ◽  
Marek Bodnar

AbstractWe address the issue of stability of coexistence of two strategies with respect to time delays in evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that a microscopic model of evolutionary games with a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (a globally asymptotically stable interior stationary state in the standard replicator dynamics) and with strategy-dependent time delays leads to a new type of replicator dynamics. It describes the time evolution of fractions of the population playing given strategies and the size of the population. Unlike in all previous models, an interior stationary state of such dynamics depends continuously on time delays and at some point it might disappear, no cycles are present. In particular, this means that an arbitrarily small time delay changes an interior stationary state. Moreover, at certain time delays, there may appear another interior stationary state.Author summarySocial and biological processes are usually described by ordinary or partial differential equations, or by Markov processes if we take into account stochastic perturbations. However, interactions between individuals, players or molecules, naturally take time. Results of biological interactions between individuals may appear in the future, and in social models, individuals or players may act, that is choose appropriate strategies, on the basis of the information concerning events in the past. It is natural therefore to introduce time delays into evolutionary game models. It was usually observed, and expected, that small time delays do not change the behavior of the system and large time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of evolutionary games with strategy-dependent time delays, in which payoffs appear some time after interactions of individuals, lead to a new type of replicator dynamics. Unlike in all previous models, interior stationary states of such dynamics depend continuously on time delays. This shows that effects of time delays are much more complex than it was previously thought.



1981 ◽  
Vol 21 (01) ◽  
pp. 63-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Fleming ◽  
Charles P. Thomas ◽  
William K. Winter

Abstract A general multiphase, multicomponent chemical flood model has been formulated. The set of mass conservation laws for each component in an isothermal system is closed by assuming local thermodynamic (phase) equilibrium, Darcy's law for multiphase flow through porous media, and Fick's law of diffusion. For the special case of binary, two-phase flow of nonmixing incompressible fluids, the equations reduce to those of Buckley and Leverett. The Buckley-Leverett equations also may be obtained for significant fractions of both components in the phases if the two phases are sufficiently incompressible. To illustrate the usefulness of the approach, a simple chemical flood model for a ternary, two-phase system is obtained which can be applied to surfactant flooding, polymer flooding, caustic flooding, etc. Introduction Field tests of various forms of surfactant flooding currently are under way or planned at a number of locations throughout the country.1 The chemical systems used have become quite complicated, often containing up to six components (water, oil, surfactant, alcohol, salt, and polymer). The interactions of these components with each other and with the reservoir rock and fluids are complex and have been the subject of many laboratory investigations.2–22 To aid in organizing and understanding laboratory work, as well as providing a means of extrapolating laboratory results to field situations, a mathematical description of the process is needed. Although it seems certain that mathematical simulations of such processes are being performed, models aimed specifically at the process have been reported only recently in the literature.23–31 It is likely that many such simulations are being performed on variants of immiscible, miscible, and compositional models that do not account for all the facets of a micellar/polymer process. To help put the many factors of such a process in proper perspective, a generalized model has been formulated incorporating an arbitrary number of components and an arbitrary number of phases. The development assumes isothermal conditions and local phase equilibrium. Darcy's law32,33 is assumed to apply to the flow of separate phases, and Fick's law34 of diffusion is applied to components within a phase. The general development also provides for mass transfer of all components between phases, the adsorption of components by the porous medium, compressibility, gravity segregation effects, and pressure differences between phases. With the proper simplifying assumptions, the general model is shown to degenerate into more familiar special cases. Numerical solutions of special cases of interest are presented elsewhere.35



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