Research on Strategies of Networked Manufacturing Resources Configuration Based on Evolutionary Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 430-432 ◽  
pp. 1330-1334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Zhan ◽  
Jian Sha Lu ◽  
Xue Hong Ji
Keyword(s):  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Networked Manufacturing ◽  
Evolutionary Mechanisms ◽  
System A ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Existence And Stability ◽  
Manufacturing Resources

Economic theories of managing resources, traditionally assume that individuals are perfectly rational and thus able to compute the optimal configuration strategy that maximizes their profits. The current paper presents an alternative approach based on bounded rationality and evolutionary mechanisms. It is assumed that network node users face a choice between two resource strategies in real networked manufacturing resources configuration problem (NMRCP). The evolution of the distribution of strategies in the population is modeled through a replicator dynamics equation. The latter captures the idea that strategies yielding above average profits are more demanded than strategies yielding below average profits, so that the first type ends up accounting for a larger part in the population. From a mathematical perspective, the combination of resource and evolutionary processes leads to complex dynamics. The paper presents the existence and stability conditions for each steady-state of the system. A main result of the paper is that under certain conditions both strategies can survive in the long-run.

Intergenerational Cultural Transmission as an Evolutionary Game

2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 115-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D Montgomery
Keyword(s):  
Global Stability ◽  
Intergenerational Transmission ◽  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Cultural Transmission ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Potential Games ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Cultural Traits

We generalize the Bisin-Verdier model of intergenerational transmission to permit an arbitrary number of cultural traits. A key observation—that this model is equivalent to an evolutionary game under replicator dynamics—facilitates our analysis. For two special cases, obtained by restricting the pattern of “cultural distastes” between traits, we demonstrate global stability of the long-run distribution of traits using recent results on stable games and potential games. For the general three-trait case, we show that all three traits survive in the long run only if each trait satisfies an “invasion condition” involving the cultural distaste parameters. (JEL C73, D91, Z13)

Institutional Reforms and Interaction of Local Governments

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-33
Author(s):  
Georges Sarafopoulos ◽  
Panagiotis G. Ioannidis
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Discrete Dynamical System ◽  
Period Doubling ◽  
Box Dimension ◽  
Existence And Stability ◽  
The Stability

The paper considers the interaction between regions during the implementation of a reform, on regional development through a discrete dynamical system based on replicator dynamics. The existence and stability of equilibria of this system are studied. The authors show that the parameter of the local prosperity may change the stability of equilibrium and cause a structure to behave chaotically. For the low values of this parameter the game has a stable Nash equilibrium. Increasing these values, the Nash equilibrium becomes unstable, through period-doubling bifurcation. The complex dynamics, bifurcations and chaos are displayed by computing numerically Lyapunov numbers, sensitive dependence on initial conditions and the box dimension.

On the Strategic Complementarity of Skilled Workers and Technological Innovation: Which Determines Which?

2021 ◽  
pp. 232102222110243
Author(s):  
Elvio Accinelli ◽  
Armando García ◽  
Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera ◽  
Jorge Zazueta
Keyword(s):  
Dynamical System ◽  
Initial Conditions ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Skilled Workers ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Short Run ◽  
The Government

In this document, we analyse the strategic complementarity between technological investment and investment in training by workers. We show that, beyond the importance of the answer to the question about which factor determines which, initial minimal conditions in both factors are required to start a long-run social development process. If these minimums are not met, the economy can become a self-satisfied economy, with a social mediocre performance but, at least in the short run, successful from the individual point of view. We consider that either manager of firms as workers are rational agents who make decisions about their future behaviour, considering the current state of the economy, understanding for such, the percentage of innovative and non-innovative firms in the market and the percentage of skilled and unskilled workers in the labour market. While managers decide the best way to invest, workers decide whether to invest or not in the upgrade or in the development of their skills to face the new challenges posed by technological change. The evolution of the economy is summarized in a complex dynamical system represented by a coupled dynamical system very close to the replicator dynamics considered in evolutionary game theory. In this way, we show that the initial conditions play a crucial role to understand the possibilities of future performance of the economy in each country, and, on the other hand, we analyse the conditions that make possible or necessary the intervention of the government in the economy. JEL Codes: C72, C73, O11, O55, K42

An Alternative Approach To User Fee Policy In The Primary Health Care Setting Of Bangladesh.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nazneen Akhter
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Primary Health Care ◽  
Complex Dynamics ◽  
Quality Care ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
User Fees ◽  
Primary Health ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Benefit Principle ◽  
User Fee

The concept of ascribing user fee in health care settings always remained a policy struggle and countries experienced different learning in this regards while implementing user fee at different tiers of health settings. The most exquisite learning among the many country specific evidences related to user fee are the match and mismatch between the equity principle and benefit principle while considering the client perspective. There is an added dimension of quality care which also add more complex dynamics into this concept since the quality care consideration has a double edged perspective both for clients and providers, where which one will get superiority over whom is a great question in health care, especially in the Primary Health care (PHC) of the country. In this reality the appropriate implementation guideline, followed by an appropriate practice of the administrative and management both service oriented and financial are of great importance in this user fee implementation consideration which always remained a challenge in the health care specially in remote care of PHC. This paper attempted a secondary data searching and scoping the available documents of Bangladesh and across the world to find an alternative approach to user fees policy where equity and benefit principle and quality - these three have to be placed in a well-constructed triad in PHC implementation which has been recommended as an alternative policy imperative in approaching user fees for Bangladesh PHC settings.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

scholarly journals Evolution of populations with strategy-dependent time delays

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacek Miȩkisz ◽  
Marek Bodnar
Keyword(s):  
Stationary State ◽  
Time Delays ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Small Time ◽  
Stochastic Perturbations ◽  
New Type ◽  
Novel Behavior

AbstractWe address the issue of stability of coexistence of two strategies with respect to time delays in evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that a microscopic model of evolutionary games with a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (a globally asymptotically stable interior stationary state in the standard replicator dynamics) and with strategy-dependent time delays leads to a new type of replicator dynamics. It describes the time evolution of fractions of the population playing given strategies and the size of the population. Unlike in all previous models, an interior stationary state of such dynamics depends continuously on time delays and at some point it might disappear, no cycles are present. In particular, this means that an arbitrarily small time delay changes an interior stationary state. Moreover, at certain time delays, there may appear another interior stationary state.Author summarySocial and biological processes are usually described by ordinary or partial differential equations, or by Markov processes if we take into account stochastic perturbations. However, interactions between individuals, players or molecules, naturally take time. Results of biological interactions between individuals may appear in the future, and in social models, individuals or players may act, that is choose appropriate strategies, on the basis of the information concerning events in the past. It is natural therefore to introduce time delays into evolutionary game models. It was usually observed, and expected, that small time delays do not change the behavior of the system and large time delays may cause oscillations. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of evolutionary games with strategy-dependent time delays, in which payoffs appear some time after interactions of individuals, lead to a new type of replicator dynamics. Unlike in all previous models, interior stationary states of such dynamics depend continuously on time delays. This shows that effects of time delays are much more complex than it was previously thought.

Practical persistence in ecological models via comparison methods

1996 ◽  
Vol 126 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Stephen Cantrell ◽  
Chris Cosner
Keyword(s):  
Reaction Diffusion ◽  
Basic Question ◽  
Positive Equilibrium ◽  
Uniform Persistence ◽  
Interacting Species ◽  
Attracting Set ◽  
Alternative Approach ◽  
Interacting Populations ◽  
Existence And Stability ◽  
Stable Periodic

A basic question in mathematical ecology is that of deciding whether or not a model for the population dynamics of interacting species predicts their long-term coexistence. A sufficient condition for coexistence is the presence of a globally attracting positive equilibrium, but that condition may be too strong since it excludes other possibilities such as stable periodic solutions. Even if there is such an equilibrium, it may be difficult to establish its existence and stability, especially in the case of models with diffusion. In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the idea of uniform persistence or permanence, where coexistence is inferred from the existence of a globally attracting positive set. The advantage of that approach is that often uniform persistence can be shown much more easily than the existence of a globally attracting equilibrium. The disadvantage is that most techniques for establishing uniform persistence do not provide any information on the size or location of the attracting set. That is a serious drawback from the applied viewpoint, because if the positive attracting set contains points that represent less than one individual of some species, then the practical interpretation that uniform persistence predicts coexistence may not be valid. An alternative approach is to seek asymptotic lower bounds on the populations or densities in the model, via comparison with simpler equations whose dynamics are better known. If such bounds can be obtained and approximately computed, then the prediction ofpersistence can be made practical rather than merely theoretical. This paper describes how practical persistence can be established for some classes of reaction–diffusion models for interacting populations. Somewhat surprisingly, themodels need not be autonomous or have any specific monotonicity properties.

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