The Right of Private Property: Constitutional Evolution

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Veniamin Chirkin
2009 ◽  
Vol 160 (8) ◽  
pp. 228-231
Author(s):  
Hansruedi Walther

A forest owner can only commercialize non-wood products and services within a tightly restricted market niche. On account of free access being permitted to the forest it is impossible to deny to third parties the consumption of many non-wood products and services: everybody has the right to be in the forest for recreation. As a result many non-wood services cannot be commercialized by the forest owner, or not exclusively. What would seem unthinkable elsewhere on private property seems to be taken for granted in the forest: third parties may take products from the forest and even sell them without being the forest owners. For certain nonwood services or products, such as the installation of rope parks or for burial in the forest, the organizer must conclude an agreement with the forest owner or draw up a contract for servitude or benefit. In addition, for these activities a permit from the Forestry Department is necessary. On the other hand, for an itinerant school class or for the production of forest honey neither a binding regulation with the forest owner nor a permit from the Forestry service is necessary, provided that no constructions are erected in the forest. The only exclusive right which remains to the forest owner, besides the sale of his property, is the exploitation of his trees within the legal framework.


2008 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-46
Author(s):  
Bert Govaerts

In 1908 verwierf België de souvereiniteit over de voormalige Congo Vrijstaat, die particulier bezit van koning Leopold II was geweest. De nieuwe kolonie kreeg een soort grondwet, het Koloniale Charter. Artikel 3 daarvan bepaalde dat er in Belgisch-Congo taalvrijheid heerste, maar ook dat de Belgen er dezelfde taalrechten en -bescherming zouden genieten als in het moederland. Uiterlijk tegen 1913 moesten speciale decreten de taalregeling in rechtszaken en in de administratie vastleggen. Die afspraak werd niet gehonoreerd. De decreten kwamen er niet en de kolonie werd in de praktijk exclusief Franstalig. Een klein aantal Vlaamse koloniale ambtenaren verzette zich daar tegen en boekte ook beperkte successen, op plaatselijk niveau. Een doorbraak kwam er pas in de nadagen van de kolonie, toen een Vlaams magistraat, Jozef Grootaert, het recht opeiste om in het Nederlands te vonnissen. Pas na een lang en bitter gevecht, uitgevochten tot op regeringsniveau en mee gekleurd door allerlei persoonlijke motieven, werd uiteindelijk in 1956, meer dan veertig jaar later dan afgesproken, een decreet over het gebruik van de talen bij het koloniale gerecht goedgekeurd. Over een decreet i.v.m. bestuurzaken raakte men het niet meer eens voor de onafhankelijkheid van de kolonie in 1960. In het onafhankelijke Congo was er voor het Nederlands geen (officiële) plaats.________The Case of Judge Grootaert and the struggle for Dutch in the Belgian CongoIn 1908 Belgium acquired the sovereignty over the former Congo Free State, which had been the private property of king Leopold II. The new colony was granted a kind of constitution, the Colonial Charter. Article 3 of this charter provided not only that there would be freedom of language in the Belgian Congo, but also that the Belgians in that country would enjoy the same rights and protection of their language as they had in their motherland. The language regulation for court cases and the administration was to be laid down in special decrees by 1913 at the latest. That agreement was not honoured. The decrees failed to be drawn up and in practice the colony became exclusively French speaking. A small number of Flemish colonial officials resisted against this situation and in fact obtained some limited successes on a local level. A breakthrough finally occurred in the latter years of the colony, when a Flemish magistrate, Jozef Grootaert claimed the right to pronounce judgement in Dutch. Only after a long and bitter struggle that was fought out until the bitter end on a governmental level and that was also characterized by all kinds of personal motives, a decree about the use of languages at the colonial court was finally approved in 1956, more than forty years after it had been agreed. It proved to be no longer possible to reach agreement about a decree concerning administrative matters before the independence of the colony in 1960. In the independent Congo Republic no (official) role was reserved for Dutch.


Ethics ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-204
Author(s):  
Hillel Steiner
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-155
Author(s):  
Erlan Medeubayev

The article deals with the implementation of the complex of political and socio-economic measures of the Soviet state, called the policy of “war communism” in the cities of the Steppes and Turkestan in 1918-1921. Based on materials gleaned from various sources, the author endeavours to explore the processes of socialization and municipalization of private houses and dwellings, the nationalization of private property, which took place in the cities of the KazASSR and tassr; highlight some of the issues related to the subject policy of “war communism” in the cities of Kazakhstan. Various restrictive decrees and orders of the Soviet power in this period, aimed at limiting commodity-money relations and the prohibition of the right to private property put people into a rigid framework of survival. Approved in the sphere of public life, the ideology of “war communism” inevitably left its mark on the life of the city. This ideology was a special sociocultural phenomenon, strengthening other social psychology and ethics which propagandized the need to destroy the old “bourgeois” culture and create a new “proletarian culture”. “War Communism” as opposed to “bourgeois individualism” principles of the socialist community, broske vital foundations of society. A characteristic feature of this period is the legitimization of violence and its use as a universal remedy of solving all problems. Under the pressure of revolutionary changes the sense of justice in society underwent considerable transformation. The right to inviolability of private property was completely ignored. The ruling regime no longer recognized the existing legal mechanisms, replacing them with the amorphous concept of “revolutionary legality.”


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Gindler

The article discusses fascism's place on the political spectrum. At present, there is no consensus among political scientists and economists on that issue, as it has been extraordinarily politicized and distorted during ideological struggles among various currents of socialism. From the very beginning, fascism was depicted by Marxists as belonging to the Right, while Fascists themselves wanted to build a society that transcends the Left-Right paradigm. However, few voices in academia have noted that practical implementation of the fascists’ ideas, inherited from the works of revolutionary and national syndicalists, exhibited predominantly leftist characteristics.The ambiguity of placing fascism in its proper place on the political spectrum can be confidently resolved by applying three primary factors that govern political spectrum polarization: attitude to private property, scope of individual freedom, and degree of wealth redistribution. The article argues that fascism is a particular current of non-Marxian socialism that utilized collectivization of consciousness and wealth redistribution as the main paths toward socialism rather than outright expropriation of private property or means of production. Simultaneously, it is acknowledged that private property rights were inhibited by the fascist state, even though de jure they were permitted.The fascist ideal of the “alternate way” had a logical inconsistency that produced an unstable equilibrium between labor and capital as well as between the man and the state. The politico-economic structure predictably collapsed to the left in the course of building a new society. Therefore, fascism could be correctly called the Right of the Left.


Author(s):  
Michael Pakaluk

The reception of Thomistic political and legal philosophy is considered with respect to what is called ‘political liberalism’. The appeal to a hypothetical state of nature should be rejected, as it misconstrues the social nature of human beings. Aquinas’ account of the origin of political society starts from an interpretation of human nature. On this basis one can account for human rights, the importance of the right to religious liberty, the family as the basic cell of society, civil society as including subsidiary authorities, the importance of private property, and the nature and role of freedom. A key question for the continued flourishing of a free society is what practically enables persons to govern for the genuine good of others.


Hegel's Value ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 105-149
Author(s):  
Dean Moyar

This chapter is a reading of “Abstract Right” that demonstrates the centrality of value and inference to the account. Hegel’s account unfolds private property as the immediate expression of the free will in the external world. When the argument turns toward the use of property, Hegel’s account of value comes to the fore as the universality of property ownership that is implicit in the right to use what one owns. While dealt with only briefly in the published Philosophy of Right, value gets a much more extensive treatment in the 1824–1825 lectures, where it becomes the main concept for understanding the process and result of the alienation of property. The chapter shows that the transition from alienation to contract brings Hegel’s account of mutual recognition to the fore along with an inferential equivalence form of value. Equivalence of value is a central dimension of punishment, but that equivalence can be secured only with the transition to the moral will.


2020 ◽  
pp. 119-126
Author(s):  
Yael Tamir

This chapter explores the differences between nationalists and globalists. The chapter asserts that being a nationalist or a globalist is not a constitutive state of mind; on the contrary, in light of changing circumstances, individuals locate themselves at different points along the global—national (G—N) continuum. The chapter sheds new light on the correlation among education, rationality, and the way individuals position themselves on the G—N continuum. It argues that individuals are better of if they structure their preferences in light of actual risks and opportunities. The chapter also recounts social and economic circumstances affecting a person's scheme of risks and opportunities. The chapter elaborates the discussion concerning moral luck. It also assesses the impact of Lockean proviso, in which individuals have the right to acquire as much private property as they can (mostly land in Locke's days), as long as what they leave behind for others is enough and “as good.”


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-74
Author(s):  
Andrei Marmor

In this short essay I argue that the main insight of Murphy and Nagel’s book, The Myth of Ownership, that people have no right to their pre-tax income, is not supported by their claim that the right to private property is not a natural right. The non-naturalness of the right to private property, I argue, is irrelevant to their moral argument. The plausibility of their moral conclusion derives from the thesis (which they also seem to endorse) that people have a right to the fruits of their labor, maintaining, however, that there is no possible conception, morally speaking, of what the fruits of one's labor are, independent of a system of legal and social norms that constitute the terms of fair bargaining, pricing, etc. People can only have a right to a fair assessment of the added value of their labor, and the latter cannot make any sense independent of the entire system of norms prevailing in the relevant society. I argue that this last conclusion is not affected by the nature of the right to private property.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document