Skills, Efficiency, and Timing in a Simple Attack and Defense Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Dimitri
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Relative Efficiency ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Investment Level ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Relative Notion ◽  
Attack And Defense

In this paper, we consider a simple two-player attack and defense model, focusing on the role of players’ abilities and choice timing. Abilities are divided into skills and efficiency, where the former is an absolute notion and the latter a relative notion of ability. Timing is investigated by comparing players’ investments in a simultaneous and a Stackelberg game. In the simultaneous game, the Nash Equilibrium investment level in attack and defense resources is symmetric, increasing in the skills but non-monotonic in the relative efficiency. In the Stackelberg game, the equilibrium investment levels are asymmetric, increasing in the skills, but with their ranking affected only by the relative efficiency. Therefore, interestingly, players’ choice is mostly characterized by players’ relative efficiency rather than by their skills, in regards to timing.

scholarly journals MAIAD: A Multistage Asymmetric Information Attack and Defense Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Symmetry ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Yang ◽  
Bichen Che ◽  
Yang Zeng ◽  
Yang Cheng ◽  
Chenyang Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Defense Strategy ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Systems Simulation

With the rapid development and widespread applications of Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the corresponding security issues are getting more and more serious. This paper proposes a multistage asymmetric information attack and defense model (MAIAD) for IoT systems. Under the premise of asymmetric information, MAIAD extends the single-stage game model with dynamic and evolutionary game theory. By quantifying the benefits for both the attack and defense, MAIAD can determine the optimal defense strategy for IoT systems. Simulation results show that the model can select the optimal security defense strategy for various IoT systems.

Manufacturing service order allocation in the context of social manufacturing based on Stackelberg game

2018 ◽  
Vol 233 (8) ◽  
pp. 1890-1901
Author(s):  
Wei Guo ◽  
Pingyu Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Service ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Service Cost ◽  
Order Allocation ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Bird Swarm Algorithm

For adapting the socialization, individuation and servitization in manufacturing industry, a new manufacturing paradigm called social manufacturing has received a lot of attention. Social manufacturing can be seen as a network that enterprises with socialized resources self-organized into communities that provide personalized machining and service capabilities to customers. Since a community of social manufacturing has multiple enterprises and emphasizes on the importance of service, manufacturing service order allocation must be studied from the new perspective considering objectives on service cost and quality of service. The manufacturing service order allocation can be seen as a one-to-many game model with multi-objective. In this article, a Stackelberg game model is proposed to tackle the manufacturing service order allocation problem with considering the payoffs on cost and quality of service. Since this Stackelberg game can be mapped to a multi-objective bi-level programming, a modified multi-objective hierarchical Bird Swarm Algorithm is used to find the Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally, a case from a professional printing firm is analyzed to validate the proposed methodology and model. The objective of this research is to find the Nash equilibrium on the manufacturing service order allocation and provide strategies guidance for customer and small- and medium-sized enterprises with optimal service cost and lead time. According to the game process and Nash equilibrium, some rules are revealed, and they are useful for guiding practical production.

scholarly journals Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
King Li ◽  
Kang Rong
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Lab Experiment ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Beauty Contest ◽  
Game Players

Arad and Rubinstein (2012, AER) proposed the 11–20 money request game as an alternative to the P beauty contest game for measuring the depth of thinking. In this paper, we show theoretically that in the Nash equilibrium of the 11–20 game players are more likely to choose high numbers if they are risk-averse rather than risk neutral. Hence, the depth of thinking measured in the 11–20 game is biased by risk aversion. Based on a lab experiment, we confirm this hypothesis empirically.

scholarly journals New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent P. Crawford
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Economic Problem ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
Future Developments ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Game Theoretic

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

scholarly journals Dynamic Pricing Game in a Dual-channel Closed-loop Supply Chain with Heterogeneous Players and Delay Decision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Tao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Delay Decision

Abstract In this paper, we study a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain(CLSC), where the manufacturer wholesales the new product through the traditional retail channel and distributes the remanufactured product via a direct channel established by himself. We focus on developing two dynamic Stackelberg game models under the assumption of the retailer is an adaptive agent and the manufacturer is a bounded rational player with non-delay and delay decisions. The existence and locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is investigated, and also the complex dynamics of each model is illustrated including period-doubling bifurcation, Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, strange attractor and chaotic phenomena. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine the impacts of key parameters on the complex behaviors of the long-run dynamic Stackelberg game and the performance of chain members under various scenarios. The results reveal that the excessively high value of the price adjustment speed of the manufacturer, the consumer discount perception for the remanufactured product as well as the consumer preference degree to the direct channel have adestabilization effect on the Nash equilibrium. Besides, the delay decision adopted by manufacturer no matter in the traditional or direct channel does not always necessarily make the system more stable, but the appropriately delay weights can expand the stability domain of the system. Moreover, the manufacturer would suffer a significant profit loss while the retailer can capture more profits when the dual-channel CLSC system falls into periodic cycles and chaos motions. At last, the variable feedback control method is utilized to eliminate the delayed system chaos.

scholarly journals A Comprehensive Attack and Defense Model for the Automotive Domain

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hutzelmann ◽  
Sebastian Banescu ◽  
Alexander Pretschner
Keyword(s):  
Defense Model ◽  
Attack And Defense

scholarly journals Multiperspective Bus Route Planning in a Stackelberg Game Framework

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Xinyu Liu ◽  
Jie Yu ◽  
Xiaoguang Yang ◽  
Weijie Tan
Keyword(s):  
Service Providers ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Route Planning ◽  
Government Agencies ◽  
Fleet Size ◽  
Bisection Algorithm ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Bus Route Planning ◽  
The Impact

Bus route planning is a challenging task due to multiple perspective interactions among passengers, service providers, and government agencies. This paper presents a multidimensional Stackelberg-game-based framework and mathematical model to best trade off the decisions of multiple stakeholders that previous literature rarely captures, i.e., governments, service providers, and passengers, in planning a new bus route or adjusting an existing one. The proposed model features a bilevel structure with the upper level reflecting the perspective of government agencies in subsidy allocation and the lower level representing the decisions of service providers in dispatching frequency and bus fleet size design. The bilevel model is framed as a Stackelberg game where government agencies take the role of “leader” and service providers take the role of “follower” with social costs and profits set as payoffs, respectively. This Stackelberg-game-based framework can reflect the decision sequence of both participants as well as their competition or collaboration relationship in planning a bus route. The impact of such decisions on the mode and route choices of passengers is captured by a Nested Logit model. A partition-based bisection algorithm is developed to solve the proposed model. Results from a case study in Shanghai validate the effectiveness and performance of the proposed model and algorithm.

The attack and defense games

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roman M. Sheremeta
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Asymmetry ◽  
Attack And Defense ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

Abstract The attack-and-defense game is a game in which an attacker (a group of attackers) has an incentive to revise the status quo and a defender (a group of defenders) wants to protect it. The asymmetry in objectives creates incompatible interests and results in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, this equilibrium could be heavily impacted by behavioral considerations.

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