An Institutional Resource Curse in Argentina and Brazil

Dragonomics ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 153-190
Author(s):  
Carol Wise

This chapter details the incorporation of Argentina and Brazil into China’s internationalized development strategy as its demand for natural resources skyrocketed. In doing so, it considers the effects of institutional weakness and natural resource abundance on economic performance and the ways effective institutions deteriorate during a commodity boom. It proceeds in three sections: the first analyzing the rise of China in Argentina and Brazil post-2000, the second reviewing the developmentalist model both countries implemented during that time, and the third analyzing the resulting institutional erosion.

2020 ◽  
Vol 130 (631) ◽  
pp. 2207-2248
Author(s):  
Amrita Dhillon ◽  
Pramila Krishnan ◽  
Manasa Patnam ◽  
Carlo Perroni

Abstract We look at the formation of new Indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas. Resource rich constituencies fared comparatively worse within new states that inherited a relatively larger proportion of natural resources. We argue that these patterns reflect how political reorganisation affected the quality of state governance of natural resources. We describe a model of collusion between state politicians and resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data between natural resource abundance and post-break-up local outcomes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 148-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bimal Chandra Roy ◽  
Satyaki Sarkar ◽  
Nikhil Ranjan Mandal

Author(s):  
V. Shmat

According to the hypothesis known as the “resource curse”, natural resources abundance is a brake on economic growth of many Third World countries. But is it really so? The author believes there are deeper reasons why the Third World in general – regardless of the amount of raw material resources available in each country – cannot achieve the same level of welfare as the First World. The “resource curse” theory looks for the origins of the resourceful countries’ economic problems in the institutional sphere. But this seems misleading because of excessively narrow “here and now” approach. The economic and socio-political institutions of individual countries are regarded in short periods of time when “curse” declared itself. Its typical manifestations, such as rent-seeking, stagnation or degradation of the institutions, authoritarian power, snowballing public debt and symptoms of Dutch disease, were seen in many Third World countries long before the development of the major sources of raw materials and regardless of the availability or absence of them. Therefore, it seems appropriate to speak of a kind of “three-fold institutional curse” as an explanation of continuing underdevelopment of many countries and territories. Poor national institutions in the Third World countries are not actually caused by the presence or absence of concentrated natural resources. This is the result of prior historical development with series of discrete transitions from one condition to another: from colonial status – to independent statehood; from poverty – to unexpected wealth mostly based on the exploitation of the natural resources. Qualitative transformation of national institutions usually lags far behind. As a consequence, institutional development enters into a state of stagnation (inhibiting or destabilizing economic growth) that can stretch for very long periods of time. The author concludes that the presence or absence of resources, in fact, has no fundamental impact on the nature of socio-economic development of Third World countries. The major reason hindering institutional progress has external nature, that is heavy economic dependence on the First World (coupled with informal political subordination). This circumstance begets the “resource nationalism” by the developing countries – exporters of raw materials and fuel. History of “resource nationalism” provides a useful lesson for Russia whose economy is features by growing dependency on resources. Acknowledgement. The article has been supported by a grant of the Russian Science Foundation. Project № 14-18-02345.


Author(s):  
Stephen Emerson ◽  
Hussein Solomon

Resource conflict and environmental degradation are in reality two-sides of the same security challenge coin. Both address the issue of natural resource abundance and scarcity and how societies deal with these challenges and their implications, but from vastly different perspectives. While the first addresses access and control over existing natural resources in terms of resource competition, the second addresses the environmental impact of declining or the misuse of resources. Regardless of the perspective, however, both present a serious threat to African peace and stability through their ability to generate and sustain violent conflict, fuel corruption or undermine governance. Moreover, some of these types of conflicts are the most difficult to resolve given the life or death nature of the stakes involved for individuals and entire communities.


2013 ◽  
Vol 734-737 ◽  
pp. 3337-3341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhin Bin Li ◽  
Hong Juan Deng ◽  
An Shun Cheng

The interrelationship between natural resource and economic development, hasn't reached an agreement. Some economists believe that rich natural resources promote economic growth. On the contrary, some economists think that rich natural resources hinder economic growth. Based on previous studies, this paper studies the relationship between natural resource and economic growth in our country. We try to explain the "Curse of Resources" through an example of Shanxi. Finally, we give some policy recommendations to avoid the "Curse of Resources".


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arshad Hayat ◽  
Muhammad Tahir

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to investigate the contingency effect of natural resource abundance on the foreign direct investment (FDI)–growth relationship in a nonlinear (threshold) model.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the fixed effect threshold model for panel data with annual frequency for 83 countries and estimate threshold level of natural resource abundance that split the sample and change the FDI–growth relationship.FindingsThe results show that FDI has a strong positive impact on the economic growth of the host country if the host country's natural resources export is below the statistically significant estimated threshold. However, this FDI-induced economic growth is watered-down if the countries natural resources export is larger than the estimated threshold.Originality/valueThe results show that FDI has a strong positive impact on the economic growth of the host country if the host country's natural resources export is below the statistically significant estimated threshold. However, this FDI-induced economic growth is watered-down if the countries natural resources export is larger than the estimated threshold. The results are robust for alternative indicators of natural resources, i.e. natural resources rents.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 517-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cockburn ◽  
Martin Henseler ◽  
Hélène Maisonnave ◽  
Luca Tiberti

AbstractThis special issue contributes to the natural resource economics literature by shining a light on the specific challenges and opportunities faced by developing countries that have recently become dependent on natural resources or are particularly exposed to climate change. It is composed of five studies on countries from all regions of the developing world, involving a variety of natural resources and policy issues. Four of the five studies illustrate how computable general equilibrium models are particularly well-suited, despite their relatively limited past use, to the analysis of natural resources. All five studies are led by researchers based in these countries, providing unique insights into the specific local context. The studies underscore the extreme vulnerability that the introduction of significant natural resource revenues and climate change can create in developing countries. They also show how the choice of appropriate policies to avoid the resource curse varies according to country-specific economic conditions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omar Al-Ubaydli ◽  
Kevin McCabe ◽  
Peter Twieg

AbstractSeveral scholars have argued that abundant natural resources can be harmful to economic performance under bad institutions and helpful when institutions are good. These arguments have either been theoretical or based on naturally occurring variation in natural resource wealth. We test this theory by using a laboratory experiment to reap the benefits of randomized control. We conduct this experiment in a virtual world (Second Life™) to make institutions more visceral. We find support for the theory.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamid Kordbacheh ◽  
Seyedeh Zahra Sadati

Purpose The natural resources curse theory argues the higher dependency on natural resources leads to many socio-economic problems. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between corruption and banking soundness and also to compare the extent of this effect between the two groups of rich and poor in natural resources countries. Design/methodology/approach To this aim, the authors apply a panel data set comprised of 98 countries from 2012 to 2015. Findings The results show that nations with a higher level of corruption have poorer banking soundness. The authors also find that by considering the resource curse theory and the effect of natural resource rents in the model, the adverse impact of corruption on banking soundness is more substantial in countries with a higher natural dependency level (rich in natural resources). Originality/value Though studies have been conducted on corruption and banking soundness, this paper, by using resources curse theory, articulates that corruption is one of the most critical factors affecting banking soundness and has a destructive effect on the health of the banking system and the economy of almost all countries, especially in natural resource-based economies. This study will appeal to banks authorities, governments, policymakers, oversight financial institutions and those who have a vested interest in regulating financial crimes globally. They can prevent financial and banking crises by cooperating in the fight against corruption worldwide.


Author(s):  
Chris Armstrong

What constraints does justice impose on our appropriation, or our holdings, of natural resources? This chapter examines several competing answers to that question. It rejects right-libertarian and minimalist views on resource justice, and instead argues in favour of an egalitarian approach. It then moves on to address some important challenges to an egalitarian theory of resource justice. For instance, it is sometimes argued that the ‘resource curse’ shows that natural resource endowments make little difference to economic growth. If so, egalitarian interest in their distribution is misplaced. The chapter shows how egalitarians should respond to this challenge. It also addresses objections from relationist scholars of global justice, and from those who believe that individual nations or states might have special claims over the resources they control.


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