The Athenaeum

Author(s):  
Michael Wheeler

When it was founded in 1824, the Athenæum broke the mold. Unlike in other preeminent clubs, its members were chosen on the basis of their achievements rather than on their background or political affiliation. Public rather than private life dominated the agenda. The club, with its tradition of hospitality to conflicting views, has attracted leading scientists, writers, artists, and intellectuals throughout its history, including Charles Darwin and Matthew Arnold, Edward Burne-Jones and Yehudi Menuhin, Winston Churchill and Gore Vidal. This book is not presented in the traditional, insular style of club histories, but devotes attention to the influence of Athenians on the scientific, creative, and official life of the nation. From the unwitting recruitment of a Cold War spy to the welcome admittance of women, this lively and original account explores the corridors and characters of the club; its wider political, intellectual, and cultural influence; and its recent reinvention.

Author(s):  
Ivan T. Berend

In the year after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the historian and critic Lewis Mumford made a dramatic attack on the insanity of the nuclear age. In his article entitled ‘Gentlemen: You are Mad!’, Mumford said: ‘We in America are living among madmen. Madmen govern our affairs in the name of order and security’. According to Mumford, the modern superweapon society, for all its technological supremacy, was unable to recognise the looming disaster. People were sleepwalking towards the abyss of atomic war. The Cold War arms race created and served to maintain what Winston Churchill termed ‘the balance of terror’. By the end of the 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union had more than enough nuclear weapons to withstand a first strike and still be able to retaliate. This article explores how mutual assured destruction (MAD) was reflected and refracted in European culture and society from 1950 to 1985, and shows how film and fiction played a key role in highlighting the potential effects of MAD – a global nuclear holocaust.


Author(s):  
William Klinger ◽  
Denis Kuljis

This groundbreaking biography of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia presents many startling new revelations, among them his role as an international revolutionary leader and his relationship with Winston Churchill. It highlights his early years as a Comintern operative, the context for his later politics as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The authors argue that in the 1940s, between the dissolution of the Comintern and the rise of NAM, Tito's influence and ambition were far wider than has been understood, extending to Italy, France, Greece and Spain via the international communist networks established during the Spanish Civil War. The book discloses for the first time the connection between Tito's expulsion from the Cominform and the Rome assassination attempt on the Italian Communist Party leader, Palmiro Togliatti — the man who had plotted to overthrow Tito. The book offers a pivotal contribution to our understanding of Tito as a figure of real, rather than imagined, global significance. The book will reward those who are interested in the history of international Communism, the Cold War and the Non-Aligned Movement, or in Tito the man — one of the most significant leaders of the twentieth century.


1953 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 1041-1057
Author(s):  
Fred Greene

Since the outbreak of the Korean War, the free world has made erratic but continuous progress in its effort to achieve military parity with the Communist bloc. Success in this enterprise and the realization of a “situation of strength” would bring to the fore the problem of serious negotiations with Soviet Russia. Several analysts, including Winston Churchill, have already made strong pleas for reviving the “lost art” of diplomacy as a means of obtaining some settlement of the Cold War.Speaking in a somewhat different military context, before the U.S.S.R. developed the atomic bomb but prior to the Western rearmament effort, Churchill observed:We may be absolutely sure that the present situation cannot last…. It is not only here in Europe that there are these iron curtains, and point s of actual collision… I believe it right to say that the best chance of avoiding war is … to bring matters to a head with the Soviet Government, and, by formal diplomatic processes, with all their privacy and gravity, to arrive at a lasting settlement.


2016 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Harker

Abstract Posterity has not been kind to the Australian-born polymath Jack Lindsay (1900–1990), a self-confessed ‘odd man out’ who published over one hundred and seventy books across a range of genres. This article asks what Lindsay wrote, why it has been forgotten and why we should care. It restores to view Lindsay's politico-cultural trajectory from his conversion to Marxism in 1936. It argues that Lindsay's searching and sceptical Marxism was a source of his prolific creativity and that he evolved a distinct and sometimes eccentric Marxist theoretical framework – a system with the concept of alienation at its core – within which his individual works are most legible. It argues that Lindsay's theoretical Marxism is not reducible to that of ‘British Communism’ or the ‘Old Left’, but exceeded and was mostly in tension with the Marxism of his party and its Soviet models, despite his political affiliation. It explains that Lindsay's oeuvre sank gradually from mainstream cultural visibility through the Cold War and that his conflicted but ongoing CP and Soviet-facing alignment alienated him from an emerging New Left with which he actually shared much theoretical ground. Estranged from his own party and largely dismissed by the New Left, his project disappeared through the cracks that opened during the traumatic realignments of the British Left in the post-1956 decade and remains largely absent from accounts of Marxist thought in Britain today. But though in many ways flawed, Lindsay's central project – tracing the processes of alienation through social formations, sifting human history for moments of resistance to that alienation, and attempting to prefigure a society in which values of creative production and communication are generalized across society as a whole – speaks loudly to ever-sharpening problems and deserves revisiting now.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Young

Josip Tito first met a leading British statesman, in August 1944, when he had discussions in Naples with Winston Churchill about the future of the Yugoslav resistance movements.1 After the war however the Yugoslav communist leader did not meet another leading statesman from the West until September 1952. The visitor on that occasion was Churchill's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. Between the two dates there had been remarkable changes in Anglo-Yugoslav relations. In the years 1944–1948, as the world slipped towards Cold War, the British aid given to Tito's guerillas in wartime seemed to have been wasted; Yugoslavia apparently became firmly rooted in the Soviet bloc. Many now argue that Churchill ought to have supported other Yugoslav resistance groups who were supporters of the Yugoslav monarchy and, presumably, more pro-western. British support for Tito during the war, however, had logical force: Tito was popular with his countrymen and able to unite them, a capable leader who knew how to use the geography of his country against its enemies, and a man who was ultimately able to liberate Yugoslavia without large-scale Soviet assistance.2 And, in 1948, to the surprise of many in the West he proved that he was no mere Russian puppet either. He opposed attempts from Moscow to extend its influence over Yugoslav government and politics and, in June, was expelled by Stalin from the Soviet-led ‘Cominform’ Faced by economic blockade from the East, Tito turned increasingly to the West for support. In November 1951 he took a major step by accepting American military aid. As yet there were limits to his western commitment: he was still a communist, on poor terms with some of his western neighbours (especially Italy), and determined, whilst accepting western aid, to keep his distance from both power blocs. But it seemed that he could be won over securely to the West in the long-term. Recently released British files on the Eden visit reveal much about the state of Tito's relationship with the West at this time.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 286-298
Author(s):  
Brynn Hatton

This article analyzes artistic interpretations of the AK-47 and M16 by two contemporary collectives based in Vietnam, The Propeller Group and Le Brothers (active 2006-present and 2008-present). The American-made M16 and the Soviet-made AK-47 rifles were both mass-produced in the 1950s and popularized during the Cold War, and served as shorthand visual cultural cues signaling political affiliation with either bloc. By returning to these loaded icons of violence and political solidarity, and employing tactics of Third Cinema films and manifestoes of the late 1960s in which gun imagery and metaphors are pervasive, both artist collectives decouple the iconic rifles from their historical entrenchments and open up new spaces for reimagining political kinship in the era of transnationalism by way of globalized capitalism.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-112
Author(s):  
Milan Jazbec

Summary A survey on equal opportunities in the Slovene diplomatic service was conducted during 2009. A thorough empirical research, where the sample included 630 persons employed in the Slovene diplomatic service, of whom 235 (37.3 per cent) responded to the questionnaire, indicated five main determinants of inequality: political affiliation; personal grudges; personal preference; age/generation grouping; and gender. The determinants that affect employees and are based on their gender include a combination of professional and private life, working abroad, and time spent working. The project produced a number of policy recommendations, which were gradually taken into account within the Slovene diplomatic system.


Author(s):  
Olli Seuri

Kekkonen and Power. The Image of Urho Kekkonen in Helsingin Sanomat’s References to the 1960s This article explores the history of President Urho Kekkonen as it appeared in the pages of daily newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat (HS). His history is produced in different sections and historical references in every-day work of a newspaper. Separate pieces of representations produced by writers, editors and interviewees construct the image which is as much about representing and remembering as it is about forgetting and omitting. This article’s material is limited to references to the 1960s in the HS’s volumes of 2008 and 2013. The sample is limited in order to analyse the idea of “different types of Kekkonen” in Finnish history culture. This study shows that the image of Kekkonen constructed in these references to 1960s is that of a powerful president. For example, young Kekkonen, Prime Minister Kekkonen, and the frail President after 25 years reign, are all omitted. Representations and meanings in these newspaper references are limited to Kekkonen, his legacy, and influence in public and private life in the 1960s and 1970s. In this study’s material Kekkonen is a progressive force in the modernization period of the 1960s Finland. Also, the legacy of Kekkonen and his foreign policy are strong in HS’s references. The debate concerning Cold War shows the dynamism of the image of the past of President Urho Kekkonen and his lasting relevance to Finnish history culture. His legacy and history can be used for various lines of argument. Different emphasis leads to different, even opposing, views and visions. The public debate over Cold War and Kekkonen represents a broader aspect, noticed earlier by historian Henrik Meinander (2010): The debate concerning the legacy of President Urho Kekkonen is a debate of Cold War Finland and Finland’s position between the East and the West.Kekkonen vallankäyttäjänä ja vallankäytön välineenä. Urho Kekkosen historiakuva Helsingin Sanomien 1960-lukuviittauksissa  Artikkelissa selvitetään, millainen historiakuva presidentti Urho Kekkosesta muodostuu Helsingin Sanomien (HS) 1960-lukuviittauksista vuosien 2008 ja 2013 lehdissä. Sanomalehden tuottama historiakuva syntyy päivä päivältä lehden eri osastoissa historiaa koskevissa jutuissa ja historiaviittauksissa. Kekkosen historiakuva on yksittäisistä paloista rakentuva, valikoitu esitys siitä, mikä Kekkosessa on vielä 2000-luvulla merkityksellistä. Se kertoo sekä HS:n valinnoista että suomalaisesta historiakulttuurista.HS:ssa 1960-lukuviittauksista muodostuu kuva Urho Kekkosesta presidenttinä ja vallankäyttäjänä. Otoksen rajaus nostaa esiin erityisesti Torstin (2012) määrittelemän ” 1960-luvun ja kuulentojen sukupolven” Kekkosen. Viittauksissa painottuvat modernisoituva 1960-luvun Suomi sekä 1960–1970-lukujen lännen ja idän välillä tasapainotellut kylmän sodan Suomi. Historiakuvan rakentuminen perustuu aina valintoihin ja historian käyttöön eli muistamisen ohella rajaamiseen ja unohtamiseen. HS:n 1960-lukuviittauksissa ei ole nuorta Kekkosta, ei pääministeri Kekkosta eikä sairauden vuoksi valtaoikeuksistaan luopuvaa Kekkosta. Jäljelle jää vahva vaikuttaja, jonka elämäntyötä arvioidaan niin henkilökohtaisen kuin julkisenkin kautta. Kekkosen merkitys HS:ssa ja suomalaisessa historiakulttuurissa näkyy hänen presidenttiajan perinnössään mutta myös siinä, kuinka hänen perintöään arvioidaan yhä uudelleen. Kekkosen historiakuvaan liittyvä poliittinen ulottuvuus paljastuu etenkin niissä tapauksissa, joissa Kekkosta tai häneen liitettyjä merkityksiä käytetään erilaisten argumenttien tukena. Erilaisilla painotuksilla Kekkonen taipuu HS:ssa erilaisiin asentoihin. Kuten Meinander (2010) on huomioinut, on keskustelu Kekkosesta myös keskustelua kylmän sodan Suomesta ja Suomen paikasta idän ja lännen välissä.


Author(s):  
Melvyn P. Leffler

This chapter charts a middle road between traditional and revisionist scholars on the Cold War and highlights how ambiguities and uncertainties influenced the behavior of both Washington and Moscow. It reveals that the Yalta agreements were vague, purposefully so, because Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill were seeking to pave over their differences, sustain the wartime alliance, and establish a framework for postwar cooperation. Once victory was assured, the impulse to cooperate waned as new circumstances and new fears intensified mutual distrust and catalyzed unilateral moves to insure security. These actions were coupled with harsh condemnations of one another's treachery. Yet neither the Americans nor the Russians really wanted to antagonize the potential rival; they wanted to seize upon ambiguities in the wartime agreements to enhance their respective notions of security. By engaging in rhetorical overkill, leaders in both capitals made compromise and accommodation more difficult. Few Americans, however, understood how their own rhetoric, charges, and actions contributed to the collapse of the wartime alliance.


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