People of the Borderland between the Russian State and the Ottoman Empire: A New Book by D.V. Sen'

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
James H. Meyer

The history of Muslim populations in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union is long and varied. In a Pew–Templeton poll conducted in Russia in 2010, 10 percent of respondents stated that their religion was Islam, while Muslims also make up a majority of the population in six post-Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Muslims have long lived in regions across Russia, with far-flung communities ranging from distant outposts of Siberia to western cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were more Muslims in the Russian Empire than there were in Iran or the Ottoman Empire, the two largest independent Muslim-majority states in the world at the time. Historically, the Muslim communities of Russia have been concentrated in four main regions: the Volga–Ural region in central Russia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. While Muslim communities across former Soviet space share both differences and similarities with one another with regard to language and religious practices, their respective relations with the various Russian states that have existed over the years have varied. Moreover, Russian and Soviet policymaking toward all of these communities has shifted considerably from one era, and one ruler, to another. Throughout the imperial and Soviet eras, and extending into the post-Soviet era up to the present day, therefore, the existence of variations with regard to both era and region remains one of the most enduring legacies of Muslim–state interactions. Muslims in Russia vary by traditions, language, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and practices, and with respect to their historical interactions with the Russian state. The four historically Muslim-inhabited regions were incorporated into the Russian state at different points during its imperial history, often under quite sharply contrasting sets of conditions. Today most, but not all, Muslims in Russia and the rest of the former USSR are Sunni, although the manner and degree to which religion is practiced varies greatly among both communities and individuals. With respect to language, Muslim communities in Russia have traditionally been dominated demographically by Turkic speakers, although it should be noted that most Turkic languages are not mutually comprehensible in spoken form. In the North Caucasus and Tajikistan, the most widely spoken indigenous languages are not Turkic, although in these areas there are Turkic-speaking minorities. Another important feature of Muslim–state interactions in Russia is their connection to Muslims and Muslim-majority states beyond Russia’s borders. Throughout the imperial era, Russia’s foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Iran was often intimately connected to domestic policymaking toward Muslim communities inside Russia. While this was a less pronounced feature of Moscow’s foreign policymaking during the Soviet era, in the post-Soviet era, policymaking toward Muslims domestically has once again become more closely linked to Russia’s foreign policy goals.


Author(s):  
Anri Robertovich Chediya

The subject of this article is the policy and ruling techniques of the Ottoman Empire in Western Caucasus as a whole, and Abkhazia in particular, implemented due to expansion of military and economic presence of the Russian Empire in Caucasus in the early XIX century. Such methods include bringing local population (mostly representative of aristocracy – princes and noblemen) to the side of the Ottoman Empire for returning their dominance in the countries and cities (fortresses), considered by the Sublime Porte as the territories of their authority, and unlawfully annexed by the Russian Empire (namely the Principality of Abkhazia). This resulted in clash of interest of both superpowers that unfolded in Abkhazia and neighboring Circassia in the early XIX century. The scientific novelty consists in introduction into the scientific discourse of previously unpublished sources from the Ottoman State Archive of the President of the Republic of Turkey, as well as the Russian State Military-Historical Archive, which shed light on the methods of Ottoman control over the territories of Western Caucasus (Principality of Abkhazia, Circassia), as well as on the complicated questions regarding the clash of interests of the Russian and Ottoman empires in the region. The relevance of this work is substantiated by usage of both, Russian and Ottoman unpublished archival materials for describing the Ottoman ruling techniques in the region.


Author(s):  
Olga Ye. Petrunina ◽  
◽  

The paper deals with the problem of whether the national feelings of diplomats of foreign origin in the Russian diplomatic service in the nineteenth century influenced their performance of their duties. Two diplomats of Greek origin were selected as subjects of research: Angelo Mustoxidi (1786-1861) and Constantine Bazili (1809-1884), who served for many years as consuls in Macedonia and Syria, which were multi-ethnic areas of the Ottoman Empire, where the interests of the Greek population overlapped with the interests of other peoples. The study of their own impressions of the Greeks, the assessment of their work activities by contemporaries and later researchers suggest how their attitudes towards their compatriots influenced their activities. Striving to do their duty to defend the interests of Russia in their region, they could not overcome quite natural sympathies for their compatriots. This did not contradict the state interests of Russia in the 1830s, since at that time the national movements of the Sultan's other Christian subjects did not compete with the Greeks, and the consuls were supposed to patronize Christians regardless of their ethnicity. However, towards the middle of the century the situation began to change. As the nationalist movements of the Balkan Slavs and Middle Eastern Arabs were gaining strength and were increasingly attracting the attention of the Russian state and society, the national feelings of the Greek consuls began to conflict with the priorities of Russian foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Tatyana Bazarova ◽  

Introduction. In January 1701, Prince D.M. Golitsyn was sent to Sultan Mustafa II for ratification of the Peace Treaty of Constantinople (July 3, 1700). He became the first Petrine diplomat sent to the Sublime Porte with the rank of grand ambassador. Methods and materials. The comprehensive study of archival sources (Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts), comparison of the data they contain with published materials make it possible to analyze the mission of Golitsyn in the context of the policy of Peter I towards the Ottoman Empire in the early 18th century. Analysis. Due to the hostilities by Narva, the dispatch of the embassy was delayed. The ambassador delivered the ratification of the peace treaty five months later than the agreed date. Golitsyn was the first Russian diplomat to wear a French dress during ceremonies at the Ottoman court. Besides, he not only followed the established ambassadorial custom, but also took into account the experience of his Western European colleagues. In addition to the ratification, Golitsyn had other tasks, the main of which was the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Sublime Porte. The conditions on which the ambassador was supposed to sign the agreement were fixed in a special instruction. The analysis of that instruction and reports of the ambassador showed that for Peter I the priority was not the development of mutually beneficial trade with the Ottoman Empire, but the opportunity to withdraw his fleet from the Azov to the Black Sea. Delivery of goods by Turkish ships or by dry route was considered only as an addition to the Russian Black Sea shipping. The conditions set in the instruction did not give to Golitsyn the opportunity to negotiate with the Sublime Porte, which categorically prohibited the entry of European ships into the Black Sea. Results. The sending of a grand ambassador by the tsar to the Ottoman sultan marked the transition of relations between the two states to a new level. Besides, a precedent was created for the reception of high-ranking Peter’s diplomats by the Sublime Porte.


2020 ◽  
Vol 61 (12) ◽  
pp. 37-63
Author(s):  
Yaroslav Valentinovich Pilipchuk ◽  

of the East Circassians ancestors of the Kabardinians to the territory of the former Western Alanya can be dated to the time after the invasion of Timur 1395-1396. The design of Kabarda as a principality can be dated to the first half of the 15th century. The division of Kabarda into Idarey, Kaitukoi, Tlachtostan, Dzhelyakhstan can be dated to the first half of the XVI century. Kabarda in this era becomes one of the leading forces in the North Caucasus. Kabardinians competed with the Great Nogai Horde for control of the Astrakhan Khanate. Temryuk Idarov in 1563 attracted Nogais and Russians in his confrontation with the Ingush. Kabardians of Idarey to confront the Crimean Tatars and Kumyks in the XVI century. They were allies of Russians. The Idaroviches use the Russians in the confrontation with the Kumyks and Crimean Tatars, and they themselves take part in the Livonian War and the Russian campaigns against various Caucasian rulers. Ties of Kabardians and with Nogais are made. Kabardinians of Kaitukoi are guided by the Crimean Khanate and the Small Nogai Horde. Circassian expansion to the east leads to the fact that the Karachais, Balkars, part of the Ossetians and Chechens are under the control of the Kabardinians. In the struggle for hegemony in the North Caucasus, the Kabardinians in the 16th –17th centuries face with the kumyks. None of the parties managed to win a convincing victory and they mutually exhausted each other. Kabardinians were the guides of Russian influence in the 17th century in the North Caucasus and their helped Russians in the Russian-Qizilbash conflict in 1651–1653. Kabardinians actively support the Russians against the Crimean Tatars in the 17th century. The significance of the Battle of Kanzhal is greatly exaggerated in Kabardinian historiography. We can talk about the participation of 20 thousands of Crimean Tatars in the battle and the death of a fourth of them in the battle. The defeat of 1708 only temporarily weakened the Crimean Tatars. Crimean Tatars make revenge hikes to Kabarda and devastate the region in the 10-ies and 20-ies of XVIII century. The Kabardinians victories under Baksan (1729) and Chеrеshty (1731) helped to stop the Crimean Tatar advance. Kabarda there were the Baksan and Kashkatau parties oriented to the Russians and Crimeans in the 18th century. They sought to win over external forces in order to secure subjectivity in foreign policy relations. The anti-Russian position of the Kabardinians set up the construction by Russians of the Mozdok fortress. Key words: Kabarda, Lesser Kabarda, Great Kabarda, Idarey, Kaitukoi, Crimean Khanate, Russian state, Great Nogai Horde, Lesser Nogai Horde, Ottoman Empire


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