Pharmacist Activity in the United States: View of a Japanese Government Regulator and Pharmacist

2005 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 644
Author(s):  
Kiyohito Nakai
2021 ◽  
pp. 58-75
Author(s):  
Eiji Hotori

This chapter aims to identify the real drivers of financial deregulation in Japan. Japan’s financial deregulation drivers clearly changed over time. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the liberalization of capital movement in Japan caused an administrative shift from its conventional rigid regulatory regime. From the mid-1970s, a rapid increase of Japanese government bonds issuances, as well as financial innovation, acted to remove the barriers between the banking and the securities businesses. From the mid-1980s, the pressure from the United States, as well as from domestic depositors and banks, urged the Japanese financial authorities to liberalize the financial market. It is evident that the drivers of financial deregulation in Japan in the 1980s were not only the pressure from abroad (as generally accepted), but that the deregulation was also driven by domestic interests including fiscal reasons.


2017 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 114-126
Author(s):  
Jaewoo CHOO

In 2016, a scandal that involved President Park Geun-hye and her confidante shook the country. Cases of bribery, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, illegal persecution of dissenters and so on surfaced. Confidence in Park’s leadership began to waver when she closed the chapter on ‘comfort women’ issue with Japan in December 2015 without public consultation. The deal was unacceptable to the Korean public in the absence of a formal apology from the Japanese government. The speed with which President Park sealed the agreement with the United States to deploy Thermal High Altitude Area Defence also took the country by surprise. These foreign affairs endeavours have wiped out her diplomatic success achieved in 2015.


2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Mauch

This article reproduces in its entirety a recently discovered document pertaining to the Draft Understanding between Japan and the United States that establishes the existence of hitherto unknown communication between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburōō. It challenges the long-standing historical consensus that Nomura worked independently of Tokyo in preparing the Draft Understanding. It reassesses Nomura's role in the confused process that led the Japanese government to conceive of the Draft Understanding as an American proposal and stresses the extent to which Navy Minister Oikawa Koshirōō was responsible for bringing the Draft Understanding to the point that it actually offered a chance at rapprochement. Finally, it investigates Oikawa's supine failure to act on his true responsibilities. In short, this article revises our understanding of a fateful step on the Japanese navy's path to Pearl Harbor.


2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mai Thang ◽  
Hoang Van Doan

This article approaches from a legal history perspective to discover the effects of advanced laws in Western such as Germany, France, the United States on Japanese law in the modern era. Thereby, the authors clarify the ways of integrating foreign law and decode the choices, decisions of the Japanese government. This paper also focuses on analysis areas of the Japanese legal system that have been affected by the Western laws as well as clarifies the factors of foreign law integration and reasons of  the success of the Japanese legal system when it integrates laws from different legal systems of the West as well as the harmonious combination of traditional Japanese elements with extrinsic progress values. It shows the valuable experiences for Vietnam in the process of building and perfecting the current legal system..


2021 ◽  
Vol 57 (03) ◽  
Author(s):  
HURNG-YU CHEN

After Japan occupied Taiwan from the Quin Dynasty in 1895, the Japanese government immediately held talks with Spain to delimit the sea boundary between Spain and Japanese Taiwan. According to the Convention between Japan and Spain in 1895, the sea boundary of both countries was in the middle of the navigable channel of Bashi. For it did not refer to the longitude and latitude, thus it resulted in confusion when the United States negotiated a peace treaty with Spain. What is the meaning of “in the middle of the navigable channel of Bashi?” In the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain in 1898, Spain ceded the Philippines archipelagoes to the south of 20∘ North latitude to the United States. In fact, the Batanes Islands are located at 20–21∘ North latitudes. Geographically, the Batanes Islands were not included in the Treaty of Paris. This paper will focus on the reasons why did not Spain cede the territory to the north of 20∘ North latitude to the United States? And, it also discussed the problems of the legal status of the Batanes Islands and the rights of claim by Taiwan.


2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Takeshi YAMAMOTO

It is perhaps a little known fact that Henry Kissinger mentioned Japan several times in his [in]famous “Year of Europe” speech of 1973. He intended to include Japan in the “New Atlantic Charter”, making it a US-EC-Japan triangular framework in the hope of preventing Japan drifting in an undesirable direction during the era of détente. Europe, and France in particular, however, disliked Kissinger’s initiative because they perceived it to be a US attempt to dominate its allies. Instead, the EC proposed direct negotiations with the Japanese government leading to a bilateral Japan-EC declaration in order to avoid America being at the top of the triangle. Japan faced with a dilemma. In the end, the idea of bilateral Japan-EC and US-EC declarations along with a trilateral US-EC-Japan declaration proved impossible due to a deterioration in US-EC relations. The Japanese government had to retreat not only from the Kissinger exercise but also from the idea of a bilateral declaration with the EC because pursuing the latter without a US-EC declaration would, it was feared, be perceived as anti-American behaviour.


Author(s):  
Andrew Schmitz ◽  
Manhong Zhu ◽  
David Zilberman

AbstractThe Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) was concluded on October 5, 2015, by twelve countries that include the United States, Japan, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Under the TPPA, Japan will partially liberalize its five politically sensitive agricultural subsectors: (1) rice, (2) beef and pork, (3) wheat and barley, (4) sugar, and (5) dairy, none of which contain any genetically modified (GM) content. Under full liberalization, Japanese producers in these subsectors will lose (e. g., rice producers will lose over $6 billion and beef producers will lose over $2 billion). Excluding butter, the trade impact of the TPPA on the Japanese government will be negative because of tariff and resale-revenue losses. Our empirical results provide the full effects of complete trade liberalization. However, because the TPPA negotiations of 2015 resulted in only partial trade liberalization, our results can be easily modified to deal with the degree to which trade distortions are removed for each of the above agricultural subsectors. In terms of producers who lose from trade liberalization, the Japanese government will provide compensation.


Asian Survey ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 843-864 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chijiwa Yasuaki

When the Iraq War began in 2003, the Japanese government declared support for the United States without a new U.N. Security Council resolution. However, this was not followed by direct logistical support. By using the two-level games theory, this article suggests reasons behind Japan's decision.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-141
Author(s):  
Iguchi Takeo

AbstractAt the final phase of the negotiations in the fall of 1941, the Japanese government set a deadline of 30 November to reach a modus vivendi with the United States. After the failure of several proposals, on 6 December, Roosevelt sent a telegram directly to the emperor proposing further negotiations. This article draws on the author's extensive publications in Japanese to demonstrate that the Japanese Army intercepted Roosevelt's telegram and secretly decoded it before it reached the emperor and the Foreign Ministry had to amend the Memorandum to preclude further negotiation. The Army and the Foreign Ministry, which succumbed to the Army, further interfered with the transmission of the Final Memorandum, and confused the Japanese embassy's handling. Its delivery was made after the commencement of the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Foreign Minister Tōgō, facing prosecution in 1945, falsely shifted blame for the delay to the embassy in Washington, and the Foreign Ministry has released misleading documents to strengthen that accusation.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document