Bureaucratic Rents and Political Institutions

1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Rent Seeking

Abstract Molti studi sul rent-seeking si concentrano sull’azione di gruppi organizzati che si trovano all’esterno della struttura governativa e sul comportamento dei politici per favorire tali interessi.Viene, in genere, trascurata l’attività di rent-seeking da parte dei membri del governo, su cui si sofferma invece il presente studio, estendendo anche l’analisi al comportamento burocratico nell’ambito dei sistemi istituzionali non democratici.II principale risultato è che il diverso successo delle attività di rent-seeking della burocrazia può essere spiegato dai vincoli istituzionali imposti dai diversi sistemi. Le relazioni tra politici (che autorizzano le spese dei burocrati) e burocrati sono piu strette in un sistema non democratico rispetto a quanto possano esserlo in un sistema democratico, nel quale quindi il processo di rent-seeking diventa comparativamente più difficile.

scholarly journals Urban Conflict, Rent Seeking, and Corruption Economic and Political Institutions in a Historical Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 96
Author(s):  
Marie-Christine THAIZE CHALLIER
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Social Unrest ◽  
Abuse Of Power ◽  
Medieval France ◽  
Limiting Property ◽  
Urban Conflict ◽  
Commitment Problems

This paper is an empirical analysis to explore the relationships between urban conflict and both rent seeking and corruption. It examines social disturbances in medieval France through a sample of twelve towns examined over the period 1270-1399 in a real context of informational asymmetries, commitment problems, and issues indivisibilities. As regards the economic corruption class, it is found that townspeople rebel more often and more intensely against the extortion of funds carried out by policy makers than against the embezzlement of a part of these funds. As to the political corruption class, the findings highlight that abuse of power against municipalities is identified in more social unrest than influence peddling against these local institutions. Furthermore, it is shown that rent-seeking-related policies (like arbitrary actions limiting property rights, economic rules-based policies, and targeted political measures) have less influence on urban conflict than corrupt policies do. These findings produce insights that apply beyond the historical context and analysis of the paper. Situations presenting over-indebted towns despite overtaxed people disturb also modern democracies.

Fractionalization and Economic Freedom

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 158-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jac C. Heckelman ◽  
Bonnie Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Economic Freedom ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Ethnic Fractionalization ◽  
Marginal Impact ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
The Impact

Diversity is often thought to create conflict and harm economic institutions. We hypothesize, however, that the impact of diversity on economic institutions is conditional on political institutions, and may be negative in some settings but positive in others, due to differences in the nature of rent seeking in different regimes. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the impact of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on economic freedom, conditional on the level of political rights. We find that the marginal impact of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization on economic freedom is positive in the most democratic nations and that the marginal impact of ethnic fractionalization is negative in the most autocratic nations. Our results suggest that the nature of the relation between diversity and economic institutions may be more complicated than prior literature conveys.

scholarly journals Rent-Seeking. Zur politischen Theorie des neoklassischen Fundamentalismus

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (96) ◽  
pp. 419-436
Author(s):  
Stephan Elkins
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Substantial Reduction ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Productive Activities ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Economic Process ◽  
Specific Selectivity ◽  
Political Intervention ◽  
Specific Interests ◽  
Adequate Analysis

The concept is concerned with economic inefficiency and stagnation contrived by government intervention into the economic process. The prospect of profiting from political intervention encourages rational actors to shift their efforts from productive activities to political manipulation, inducing a substantial reduction in aggregate levels of social welfare. This leads to the conclusion that the restoration of society's productive capacities requires wresting the economy from the clutches of the state occupied by special interests. The author criticizes this analysis on account of an inadequate political theory based on the framework of neoclassical economics. Moreover, the notion that »depoliticization of the economy« could provide asolution to the problem of »rent-seeking« is shown tobe inconsistent and sociologically naive. An adequate analysis of the problems related to »rent-seeking« should to take the specific selectivity of political institutions, which favours specific interests and policy issues, as its starting point.

Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 377-389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Reiter ◽  
Allan C. Stam
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Probit Model ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Multivariate Probit ◽  
Marketplace Of Ideas ◽  
Regime Legitimacy ◽  
Nation States ◽  
War Outcomes ◽  
The Relationship

How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability.

Peran Pengawasan Internal Dalam Menghindari Kutukan Sumber Daya Alam

Liquidity ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Andilo Tohom
Keyword(s):  
Natural Resources ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Rich Country ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Indonesian Government ◽  
The World ◽  
Policies And Programs ◽  
The Right

Indonesia is one of many countries in the world so called resource-rich country. Natural resources abundance needs to be managed in the right way in order to avoid dutch diseases and resources curses. These two phenomena generally happened in the country, which has abundant natural resources. Learned from Norwegian experiences, Indonesian Government need to focus its policy to prevent rent seeking activities. The literature study presented in this paper is aimed to provide important insight for government entities in focusing their policies and programs to avoid resources curse. From the internal audit perspective, this study is expected to improve internal audit’s role in assurance and consulting.

Global Restructuring, Knowledge and Learning

2004 ◽  
pp. 66-76
Author(s):  
E. Hershberg
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Lower Cost ◽  
International Competitiveness ◽  
Value Chains ◽  
Global Competitiveness ◽  
Global Restructuring ◽  
Intensive Exploitation ◽  
High Road

The influence of globalization on international competitiveness is considered in the article. Two strategies of economic growth are pointed out: the low road, that is producing more at lower cost and lower wages, with increasingly intensive exploitation of labor and environment, and the high road, that is upgrading capabilities in order to produce better basing on knowledge. Restrictions for developing countries trying to reach global competitiveness are formulated. Special attention is paid to the concept of upgrading and opportunities of joining transnational value chains. The importance of learning and forming social and political institutions for successful upgrading of the economy is stressed.

Inter-country inequality as a dynamic process and the problem of post-industrial development

2018 ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. M. Grigoryev ◽  
V. A. Pavlyushina
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Industrial Development ◽  
Modern World ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Development Level ◽  
The World ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Post Industrial

The phenomenon of economic growth is studied by economists and statisticians in various aspects for a long time. Economic theory is devoted to assessing factors of growth in the tradition of R. Solow, R. Barrow, W. Easterly and others. During the last quarter of the century, however, the institutionalists, namely D. North, D. Wallis, B. Weingast as well as D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, have shown the complexity of the problem of development on the part of socioeconomic and political institutions. As a result, solving the problem of how economic growth affects inequality between countries has proved extremely difficult. The modern world is very diverse in terms of development level, and the article offers a new approach to the formation of the idea of stylized facts using cluster analysis. The existing statistics allows to estimate on a unified basis the level of GDP production by 174 countries of the world for 1992—2016. The article presents a structured picture of the world: the distribution of countries in seven clusters, different in levels of development. During the period under review, there was a strong per capita GDP growth in PPP in the middle of the distribution, poverty in various countries declined markedly. At the same time, in 1992—2016, the difference increased not only between rich and poor groups of countries, but also between clusters.

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