Stability Analysis of Low Carbon Product Price Game Model with Double Delay

2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (8) ◽  
pp. 142-149
Author(s):  
Na Han ◽  
Yanhui Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Stability Analysis ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Product ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Price Game

scholarly journals Dynamic Analysis of Duopoly Price Game Based on Low-Carbon Technology Sharing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Fengshan Si ◽  
Zhengkun Yan ◽  
Jing Wang ◽  
Daoming Dai
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Technology Research ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Price Game ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Technology Level

Taking the carbon emissions per unit product as the standard to measure the low-carbon technology level of the enterprise, this article analyzed how the technology supplier enterprises realize low-carbon production and achieve a win-win situation for both supply and demand through technology sharing through technology research and development. Based on the positive effect of low-carbon technology level on product demand, we studied the optimal pricing strategy and the optimal low-carbon technology level in the technology supply enterprises under the Stackelberg game in 3 conditions (i.e., without technology research and development or technology sharing, with technology research and development but no technology sharing, and with both technology research and development and technology sharing). We also drew a comparative analysis of the optimal product price, the optimal low-carbon technology level, and the optimal profit in the three scenarios. Besides, by constructing a delayed differential price game model, we studied the equilibrium strategy of price competition between technology supply and demand companies and the local asymptotic stability of the game system at the equilibrium point. In addition, the effects of delay strategy on game equilibrium strategy, the influence of the degree of adjustment of decision variables on the stability of the game system, and the stability of the game system on the evolution trend of the game are also explored. By comparing and analyzing the game results of the oligopoly enterprises in the stable system and the unstable system, it confirmed that the system instability usually causes serious harm to the enterprise.

scholarly journals A Dynamic Price Game Model in a Low-Carbon, Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Return Rates and Fairness Concern Behaviors

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. 1978 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Mengnan Shi ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Adjustment ◽  
Stable Region ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Return Rates ◽  
Dynamic Price ◽  
Price Game ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
Parameter Values

In this paper, we developed a dynamic price game model for a low-carbon, closed-loop supply chain system in which (1) the manufacturer had fairness concern and carbon emission reduction (CER) behaviors, and market share and profit maximization were their objectives, and (2) the retailer showed fairness concern behaviors in market competition and provided service input to reduce return rates. The retailer recycled old products from customers, and the manufacturer remanufactured the recycled old products. The effects of different parameter values on the stability and utility of the dynamic price game model were determined through analysis and numerical simulation. Results found that an increasing customer loyalty to the direct marketing channel decreased the stable region of the manufacturer’s price adjustment and increase that of the retailer. The stable region of the system shrank with an increase of CER and the retailer’s service level, which expanded with return rates. The dynamic system entered into chaos through flip bifurcation with the increase of price adjustment speed. In the chaotic state, the average utilities of the manufacturer and retailer all declined, while that of the retailer declined even more. Changes to parameter values had a great impact on the utilities of the manufacturer and retailer. By selecting appropriate control parameters, the dynamic system can return to a stable state from chaos again. The research of this paper is of great significance to participants’ price decision-making and supply chain operation management.

scholarly journals An Extenics-Based Scheduled Configuration Methodology for Low-Carbon Product Design in Consideration of Contradictory Problem Solving

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 5859
Author(s):  
Shedong Ren ◽  
Fangzhi Gui ◽  
Yanwei Zhao ◽  
Min Zhan ◽  
Wanliang Wang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Product Design ◽  
Information Flow ◽  
Element Model ◽  
Flow Diagram ◽  
Directed Network ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Product ◽  
Feedback Information ◽  
Configuration Methodology

Low-carbon product design involves a redesign process that requires not only structural module modification, but more importantly, generating innovative principles to solve design contradictions. Such contradictions include when current design conditions cannot satisfy design requirements or there are antithetical design goals. On the other hand, configuration tasks in the reconfiguration process are interdependent, which requires a well-scheduled arrangement to reduce feedback information. This study proposes an effective configuration methodology for low-carbon design. Firstly, configuration tasks and configuration parameters are designated through quality characteristics, and the directed network along with the associated values of configuration tasks are transformed into the design structure matrix to construct the information flow diagram. Then, the Extenics-based problem-solving model is presented to address design contradictions: low-carbon incompatibility and antithetical problems are clarified and formulated with a basic-element model; extensible and conjugate analysis tools are used to identify problematic structures and provide feasible measures; the Gantt chart of measures execution based on the information flow diagram is constructed to reduce feedback and generate robust schemes with strategy models. The methodology is applied to the vacuum pump low-carbon design, the results show that it effectively solves contradictions with innovative design schemes, and comparative analysis verifies the performance of Extenics.

Towards low-carbon product architecture using structural optimization for lightweight

2015 ◽  
Vol 83 (5-8) ◽  
pp. 1419-1429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin He ◽  
Wen Tang ◽  
Shan Huang ◽  
Shuangchao Hou ◽  
Hongxia Cai
Keyword(s):  
Structural Optimization ◽  
Product Architecture ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Product

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategy and Carbon Emission Abatement under Cap-and-Trade Regulation Considering Social Learning

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bin Chen ◽  
Man Yu
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
High Price ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Cap And Trade ◽  
Carbon Product ◽  
Trade Regulation ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
Period 2

In an uncertainty market, social learning plays a significant role in obtaining information to make better decisions. Under cap-and-trade regulation, this paper aims to investigate firms’ pricing and carbon emission abatement issues considering the impact of social learning. This paper establishes a two-period model in a market consisting of a manufacturer and heterogeneous consumers. The manufacturer produces two alternatives (ordinary product and low-carbon product) and makes decisions on sales prices and carbon emission abatement levels. Consumers make decisions on whether and which product to buy. Consumers are not sure about their valuations of products and have the opportunity to discover their true valuation by social learning. The results show that the emission abatement level on ordinary product is affected by the pricing strategy for both types of products. However, the emission abatement level on low-carbon product is only affected by its own pricing strategy. It also shows that social learning lowers the emission abatement level on ordinary product, whereas it improves the emission abatement level on low-carbon product when charging a high price for low-carbon product. Moreover, the price of ordinary product in period 1 is no less than that in period 2. In contrast, the price of low-carbon product in period 2 is higher than that in period 1.

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