scholarly journals How Do We Decide Which of Two Case Formulations Is Correct? Commentary on Westerman and Critchfield et al.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-108
Author(s):  
Stanley B. Messer

This commentary takes a meta-view of the articles in this module by Westerman (2021a), and by Critchfield, Dobner-Pereira and Stucker (2021a), which offer two overlapping but also different formulations of the same case. It raises the question of whether there is only one true formulation of a clinical case (correspondence theory), or whether any one of several would qualify as accurate (coherence theory). A third alternative is that the truth-value of a formulation is a function of its ability to predict which therapist interventions will most help the client (pragmatic theory). A study is described in which the relative accuracy of two different formulations of the same case was put to the test in predicting which therapist interventions led to client progress. I propose that the current authors compare the pragmatic value of their formulations in a similar manner.

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Via Linda Siswati

Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy that reflects, radically and integral about the nature of knowledge itself. This writing aims to understand: (1) understanding of knowledge and science in etymology and terminology. (2) the difference of science, knowledge and religion in epistimology. (3) the extent of science in Islam. (4) the basic characteristics of science. (5) truth theory. (6) sources of knowledge. (7) the boundaries of science (8) the structure of knowledge. The results of this paper are: (1) science is from Arabic, 'alima. The meaning of this word is knowledge. And science in terminology is the whole conscious effort to investigate, find, and improve human understanding from various aspects of reality in human nature and we know (2) The location of the difference is the science is a summary of a collection of knowledge or the result of knowledge and facts, The order of faith or order of belief in the existence of something absolute outside man, in accordance and in line with the order of faith and order of worship. (3) The principal features of science are as follows: (a) Systematic, (b) Authenticity, (c) Rationality, (d) Objectivity, (e) Verifiability, (f) Communality. (4) The theory in a theory of truth there are 3 namely: Correspondence Theory, Coherence Theory, Theory of Pragmatism. (4) The source of human knowledge uses two ways of obtaining correct knowledge, first through rationality and secondly through experience. (5) Science limits its exploration to human experience, hence science begins on exploration of human experience and ceases to human experience, and that is the limit of knowledge. (6) Science is essentially a collection of knowledge that explains the various natural phenomena that allow humans to perform a series of actions to master these symptoms based on existing explanations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Via Linda Siswati

Philosophy of science is a branch of philosophy that reflects, radically and integral about the nature of knowledge itself. This writing aims to understand: (1) understanding of knowledge and science in etymology and terminology. (2) the difference of science, knowledge and religion in epistimology. (3) the extent of science in Islam. (4) the basic characteristics of science. (5) truth theory. (6) sources of knowledge. (7) the boundaries of science (8) the structure of knowledge. The results of this paper are: (1) science is from Arabic, 'alima. The meaning of this word is knowledge. And science in terminology is the whole conscious effort to investigate, find, and improve human understanding from various aspects of reality in human nature and we know (2) The location of the difference is the science is a summary of a collection of knowledge or the result of knowledge and facts, The order of faith or order of belief in the existence of something absolute outside man, in accordance and in line with the order of faith and order of worship. (3) The principal features of science are as follows: (a) Systematic, (b) Authenticity, (c) Rationality, (d) Objectivity, (e) Verifiability, (f) Communality. (4) The theory in a theory of truth there are 3 namely: Correspondence Theory, Coherence Theory, Theory of Pragmatism. (4) The source of human knowledge uses two ways of obtaining correct knowledge, first through rationality and secondly through experience. (5) Science limits its exploration to human experience, hence science begins on exploration of human experience and ceases to human experience, and that is the limit of knowledge. (6) Science is essentially a collection of knowledge that explains the various natural phenomena that allow humans to perform a series of actions to master these symptoms based on existing explanations.


Author(s):  
Richard L. Kirkham

Two distinctly different kinds of theories parade under the banner of the ‘pragmatic theory of truth’. First, there is the consensus theory of C.S. Peirce, according to which a true proposition is one which would be endorsed unanimously by all persons who had had sufficient relevant experiences to judge it. Second, there is the instrumentalist theory associated with William James, John Dewey, and F.C.S. Schiller, according to which a proposition counts as true if and only if behaviour based on a belief in the proposition leads, in the long run and all things considered, to beneficial results for the believers. (Peirce renamed his theory ‘pragmaticism’ when his original term ‘pragmatism’ was appropriated by the instrumentalists.) Unless they are married to some form of ontological anti-realism, which they usually are, both theories imply that the facts of the matter are not relevant to the truth-value of the proposition.


Philosophy ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 61 (237) ◽  
pp. 295-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. J. C. Smart

It is characteristic of realists to separate ontology from epistemology and of idealists to mix the two things up. By ‘idealists’ here I am mainly referring to the British neo-Hegelians (‘objective idealists’) but the charge of mixing up ontology and epistemology can be made against at least one ‘subjective idealist’, namely Bishop Berkeley, as his wellknown dictum ‘esse ispercipi’ testifies. The objective idealists rejected the correspondence theory of truth and on the whole accepted a coherence theory. The qualification is needed here because H. H. Joachim, in The Nature of Truth, found the coherence theory unable to deal with the problem of error.


Author(s):  
Crispin Wright

Every student of English-speaking analytical metaphysics is taught that the early twentieth century philosophical debate about truth confronted the correspondence theory, supported by Russell, Moore, the early Wittgenstein and, later, J.L. Austin, with the coherence theory advocated by the British Idealists. Sometimes the pragmatist conception of truth deriving from Dewey, William James, and C.S. Peirce is regarded as a third player. And as befits a debate at the dawn of analytical philosophy, the matter in dispute is normally taken to have been the proper analysis of the concept.No doubt this conception nicely explains some of the characteristic turns taken in the debate. Analysis, as traditionally conceived, has to consist in the provision of illuminating conceptual equivalences; and illumination will depend, according to the standard rules of play, on the analysans’ utilizing only concepts which, in the best case, are in some way prior to and independent of the notion being analyzed — or, if that's too much to ask, then concepts which at least permit of some form of explication which does not in turn take one straight back to that notion.


2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-216
Author(s):  
Antonius Widyarsono

Abstrak: John Langshaw Austin menjadi terkenal sebagai filosof Lingkaran Oxford yang menekankan pentingnya tuturan performatif. Namun dalam artikelnya “Truth” (1950) ia menggunakan teori korespondensi dalam memahami masalah kebenaran. Austin mengkritik Strawson yang menggunakan teori deflasioner tentang kebenaran berdasarkan analisis mengenai pentingnya tuturan performatif. Dalam tulisan ini akan dijelaskan mengapa Austin lebih memilih teori korespondensi dari pada teori deflasioner dalam memahami kebenaran. Juga akan ditunjukkan sumbangan khas Austin yang membarui teori korespondensi umum yang menggunakan metafora “cermin” dan “peta” realitas dengan menekankan sifat konvensional ide korespondensi. Menurut penulis, hal ini merupakan suatu usaha yang serius dan berguna dalam mengartikulasikan cara kita menggunakan simbol-simbol bahasa yang ditentukan secara sewenang-wenang untuk merepresentasikan realitas dunia.   Kata-kata Kunci: Kebenaran, teori korespondensi, teori koherensi, teori deflasioner, teori tindak-tutur, aspek ilokusioner bahasa, tuturan deskriptif, tuturan performatif, konvensi deskriptif, konvensi demonstratif.   Abstract: John Langshaw Austin is an “Ordinary Language Philosopher” of Oxford, who is famous for emphasizing the importance of performative statements. In his article, “Truth” (1950), however, he used correspondence theory for understanding the problem of truth. Austin criticized Strawson, who uses the deflationary theory of truth that is compatible with the analysis of performative utterances. This article will explain why Austin chooses the correspondence theory of truth rather than deflationary one. It will also elaborate Austin’s specific contribution in changing the version of the correspondence theory, which uses the metaphor of “mirroring” or “mapping”’ the world, to a conventional correspondence theory. It is, in my opinion, a serious and notable attempt to articulate our use of arbitrary symbols in the representation of brute reality. Keywords: Truth, correspondence theory, coherence theory, deflationary theory, speech-act theory, the illocutionary aspect of language, descriptive utterance, performative utterance, descriptive convention, demonstrative convention.


2016 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas Champollion

Donkey sentences have existential and universal readings, but they are not often perceived as ambiguous. I extend the pragmatic theory of homogeneity in plural definites by Križ (2016) to explain how context disambiguates donkey sentences. I propose that a semantic theory produces truth value gaps in certain scenarios, and a pragmatic theory fills these gaps in context-dependent ways. By locating the parallel between donkey pronouns and definite plurals is located in the pragmatics rather than in the semantics, I avoid problems known to arise for some previous accounts according to which donkey pronouns and definite plurals both have plural referents (Krifka 1996; Yoon 1996). I sketch an extension of plural compositional DRT (Brasoveanu 2008) that delivers the required truth value gaps by building on concepts from error-state semantics and supervaluation quantifiers. 


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Margit Ronkay

Mihály Polányi critiques theories of knowledge that seek to define and justify knowledge on an objective basis. For him, gaining knowledge and justifying knowledge can only be explained in the personal dimension, as knowledge cannot be thought of without a person who knows. If anyone seeks to address the boundaries of his or her knowledge, s/he will arrive at the act of personal trust. The final possibility of justification is the clause “because I think so.”  Yet Polányi distinguishes the personal dimension from the subjective dimension: while personal knowledge leads towards truth, subjective knowledge leads towards failure. Personal knowledge joins two poles, the internal world of the person and the outer world of reality. This meeting point prevents personal knowledge from becoming subjective. Knowledge that comes together in this framework is a responsible decision which joins a person’s subjective ideas to reality and transforms it into personal knowledge. The paper examines Polányi’s concept of truth and compares it to other theories of it (correspondence theory, coherence theory, Taski’s semantics theory).


Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni

Some of the many ways that sentences with non-referring terms, such as “witch,” “Frodo,” and “casts spells,” are induced to have truth values are sketched. Three models are the axiomatic model, the fiction model, and the perception model. The general point is that the methods that we use to discover the truth values of sentences with referring terms can be generalized to sentences with non-referring terms. Even though truth-value inducing, in general, does not force a truth value on every sentence in a discourse, a commitment to bivalence is preserved by the use of expressions of ignorance. It’s also argued that traditional truth-conditional semantics should not be required to describe language-world relations. How adopting the coherence theory of truth for certain classes of sentences with non-referring terms avoids traditional objections to coherence views of truth is described.


Author(s):  
Ralph Walker

The coherence theory holds that truth consists in coherence amongst our beliefs. It can thus rule out radical scepticism and avoid the problems of the correspondence theory. Considerations about meaning and verification have also pointed philosophers in the same direction. But if it holds all truth to consist in coherence it is untenable: there must be some truths that do not, truths about what people believe. This causes problems for traditional coherence theories, and also for verificationists and anti-realists. The admission of a grounding class of truths that do not consist in coherence also raises the question why there should be such systematic agreement between these. This cannot properly be explained by anything that is said within the theory whose truth is constituted by coherence with the grounding class. Kant saw this problem, and postulated “things as they are in themselves.” Others dismiss it; but that is not satisfactory.


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