scholarly journals Internal Migration and Public Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele G. Giuranno ◽  
Rongili Biswas

Abstract This paper studies the relation between internal migration and public spending on public goods. We describe centralized public policy when a central government is comprised of elected representatives from local electoral districts. Internal migration determines the median voter in the districts. The median voters decide the equilibrium policy through bargaining. We find the conditions under which voters’ mobility results in larger or smaller public spending. Furthermore, the distance between the actual size and the efficient size of government spending depends on the way internal migration changes the distribution of income within and between districts.

Author(s):  
Mark Liptrott

This chapter evaluates the UK government strategy to promote electronic voting through the public policy process as an integral part of the e-government agenda to enhance participatory democracy. It argues that the formulation of the present policy is flawed as it lacks a diffusion strategy to enhance the likelihood of policy adoption. The electoral modernisation policy arose from concerns regarding the falling voter turnout at elections and is being introduced via local authorities through a series of voluntary pilot schemes. If issues influencing local authority pilot participation are not resolved e-voting may be permanently rejected by local elected representatives and so will not be available to citizens. This author identifies variables influencing pilot participation and suggests a revised public policy model incorporating selected diffusion concepts at the formulation stage of the linear policy process. The model is used to propose recommendations to enhance the likelihood of voluntary adoption of a policy introduced by central government for voluntary implementation by local government.


INFO ARTHA ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-27
Author(s):  
Azwar Iskandar ◽  
Rahmaluddin Saragih

The purpose of this paper is to assess spending efficiency of regional governments in Indonesia on health and education during the fiscal decentralization period year of 2010-2017. Relying on a sample of 33 provinces as regional government, this paper compute efficiency scores adopting nonparametric frontier that estimated by Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to study spending inefficiency. Results of the paper show that in west regions, Bali, Bangka Belitung, DI Yogyakarta, Jawa Tengah, and Kep. Riau relatively most efficient in public spending both on health and education in period of study. DKI Jakarta and Jawa Barat have efficient score on health, and Bengkulu has efficient score on education. On the other hand, in east regions, Gorontalo, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Timur and Sulawesi Utara were also most efficient in public spending on health and education services. Maluku and Sulawesi Tenggara have efficient score on health, and Kalimantan Selatan, Maluku Utara, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Sulawesi Barat have efficient score on education. The results show that provinces in east regions of Indonesia were relatively more efficient in public spending both on health and education for promoting equal distribution of income


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-243
Author(s):  
Livio Di Matteo ◽  
Thomas Barbiero

There is considerable evidence that the size of the public sector can influence an economy’s rate of economic growth. We investigate public sector spending of central governments and economic performance in two G7 countries over the long-term, Canada and Italy. Their economic performance has diverged in the last 25 years and it is worth investigating whether the size of government was a contributing factor. We find that in both the case of Canada and Italy the size of central government spending directly affects the performance of their economies in an inverse U-shaped relationship known as a Scully/BARS Curve. These results suggest that along with modifying current central government size, other levels of governments may need to shrink their own spending. The fact that the amount spent by government on pensions as a percentage of GDP in Italy is nearly 4 times that in Canada may partly explain the higher level of Italy’s public debt as well as an indirect contributing factor to economic stagnation in the last 25 years.


2009 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aline Schniewind ◽  
Markus Freitag ◽  
Adrian Vatter

AbstractThe inauguration of Germany's grand coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) raises questions about the public policy performance of a coalition of ideological opposite. This paper turns attention to influence of coalition governments on the size of government in the German Laender from 1992 to 2005. We investigate whether grand coalitions at the sub-national level in Germany systematically affect government spending for education (including cultural affairs) and internal security. The article argues that the effects of grand coalitions on the size of the public sector are moderated by partisan politics but sometimes in unexpected ways. For example, government spending in the field of education is reduced when leftist parties are powerful in the Laender.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-80
Author(s):  
Adhipradana Prabu Swasito

Fluctuation in local government revenue will shift local government spending. This study aims to identify and analyze the response of local government spending policies to an increase or decrease in transfer funds from the central government (Balance Fund) and local own revenue (known as Pendapatan Asli Daerah). The study utilizes data from provincial governments throughout Indonesia for the 2010-2019 period. This study finds that local government spending policies are more responsive to increases or decreases in local government revenues in the form of DAU, meaning that there is a flypaper effect phenomenon. In addition, this study also found that the decline in DAU also caused a contraction in public spending, which means that there is no asymmetrical flypaper effect.   Kenaikan atau penurunan pendapatan pemerintah daerah akan meningkatkan atau menurunkan belanja pemerintah daerah Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengidentifikasi dan menganalisis respons kebijakan belanja pemerintah daerah terhadap kenaikan atau penurunan dana transfer dari pemerintah pusat (Dana Perimbangan) dan Pendapatan Asli Daerah. Penelitian menggunakan Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa kebijakan belanja  pemerintah daerah lebih responsif terhadap kenaikan atau penurunan penerimaan daerah berupa DAU, artinya ada fenomena flypaper effect pada kebijakan belanja publik di Indonesia. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa  penurunan penerimaan daerah berupa DAU juga menyebabkan kontraksi pada belanja publik, yang artinya flypaper effect yang ada tidak bersifat asimetris.      


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel N. Shaviro

Recent U.S. tax cuts, to the extent that they involved a principled, long-term policy view, seem to have been aimed at shrinking the size of government. The idea apparently was to force eventual spending discipline, even (or perhaps especially) with respect to Social Security and Medicare, by turning reduced tax revenues into a political fact on the ground that would be difficult to reverse. In fact, however, the idea that the tax cuts would make the government smaller seems to have rested on spending illusion, or confusion between the actual size of government, in terms of its allocative and distributional effects, and the observed dollar flows that are denominated ‘taxes’ and ‘spending’.Given the long-term budget constraint, which holds that government inflows and outlays must ultimately be equal in present value, and the huge preexisting fiscal imbalance, the tax cuts are likely to be paid for, in the main, through some combination of future tax increases and cuts to Social Security and Medicare. (Other government spending cuts, relative to the case where the tax cuts were not enacted, are likely as well, but cannot contribute nearly enough.) To the extent that the 2001 through 2003 tax cuts lead to future tax increases, the combined effect is likely to make the government bigger both allocatively and distributionally. To the extent that Social Security and Medicare spending bear the brunt, the government still gets larger in the sense of increasing redistribution from younger to older generations, although Medicare cuts might decrease the size of government allocatively.


2003 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 699-728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bumba Mukherjee

This article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government—proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP—in multiparty legislatures. The author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure. Conversely, as the size of the majority party grows from a bare-minimum majority to above the supermajority level, it has a nonlinear, specifically “cube” effect on central government expenditure. Panel data on central government expenditure from 110 countries are used to test these arguments. The results corroborate the theoretical claims and are robust in regression models where fixed-effects were introduced and endogeneity was corrected. Finally, an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher government spending on subsidies and transfers but to lower spending on public goods.


Author(s):  
John Matsusaka

An extensive literature seeks to measure the effect of the initiative and referendum on public policies. Several conclusions emerge: The initiative and referendum have different effects on policy. Requiring popular approval of fiscal policies (mandatory referendums) results in lower expenditure, taxes, and debt. The initiative process gives voters more power and results in policies closer to the median voter preference; this often has reduced spending (American states, Swiss cantons), but sometimes has increased spending (cities). The initiative is associated with more socially conservative policy choices. Spurious correlation is a concern in many studies, and more research on causality is needed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 717-753
Author(s):  
Emily C. Marshall ◽  
James W. Saunoris ◽  
T. Daniel Woodbury

This paper extends the current literature by considering the existence of the flypaper effect internationally, with donor countries supplying foreign aid to recipient countries. The flypaper effect refers to the empirical anomaly associated with intergovernmental grants stimulating government expenditures more than can be explained by a pure income effect. The results reveal evidence of flypaper behavior such that for recipient countries one dollar of foreign aid raises public spending by $0.21-$0.42, whereas an equal increase in domestic income raises government expenditures by only $0.09-$0.16. Furthermore, we exploit variation in political institutions across countries and find that the flypaper effect is most pronounced in less democratic countries and find no flypaper effect in more democratic countries. This suggests that government officials are more likely to behave as expected by the median voter model when they are held accountable. Furthermore, countries with proportional, rather than majority/plurality, voting mechanisms do not display flypaper behavior.


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