scholarly journals PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN BULGARIA. TAKE 3

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 50-58
Author(s):  
Pavel Kandel ◽  

The article analyzes the preconditions, course and outcome of this year third consecutive elections to the National Assembly (14th November) and of the Head of State (14th November to 11th November). The epilogue of the protracted political crisis caused by the inflexibility of the leadership of the new «protest parties» (ETN, DB and «Stand Up Bulgaria...») resulted in their loss of both people’s trust and a significant number of parliamentary seats. The «We continue the change» movement hastily put together by two Harvard graduates Kiril Petkov and Asen Vasilev, both former ministers of the interim cabinet who proved themselves sensible managers, turned out to be able to respond to surviving hopes of the electorate for changes for the better. They were backed both by the President and external partners (Washington and Brussels). The President’s upright behavior in a complex situation ensured his re-election for a second term thus demonstrating obvious superiority over his main electoral contender. Based on the tough lessons learned by the hapless former leaders of the protest, the new movement changed the course of action, and Petkov managed to form a coalition government with the participation of socialists, although the same could have been achieved immediately after the first elections. The rather diverse new cabinet faces difficult tasks of tackling the pandemic in a country with a majority actively advocating against vaccination, of putting an end to the corrupt practices of the former regime whose members still retain strong political positions, and of starting economic and social recovery. These challenges do not promise an easy or a long life to the government. The general conclusion that can be drawn from the recent developments is that brought to power on the tide of a mass protest political amateurs might be able to play the role of a battering ram against a rotten regime but they turn out to be less competent in effectively exercising their authority. It remains only to believe that the government that has got to work will be able to prove the opposite.

Significance It is as yet unclear whether the police officer in question acted alone, although he apparently once worked for former Interior and Justice Minister Miguel Rodriguez Torres, who, the government claims, is linked to the CIA and whose arrest has reportedly been ordered. The death toll in ongoing anti-government protests continues to rise, now totalling an estimated 75 since April. The failure of the Organization of American States (OAS) to agree a resolution on Venezuela at its General Assembly has emboldened Caracas while demonstrating the inability of the regional body to determine a course of action that can help to resolve the country’s political crisis. Impacts Violence will continue as the opposition relies on protests to weaken the government and erode participation in the assembly elections. Each protest-related death is serving to entrench a paralysing cycle of demonstration and repression. As the OAS flounders, the United States will likely move unilaterally to impose new sanctions on Venezuelan officials. Changes to military figures in the government will deepen political rifts between different elements and factions in the security sector. Yesterday's attack suggests that, in the event of a serious military intervention, this would be violent and bloody.


Significance It also looked at government-proposed amendments to another law aiming to reduce the scope for tax evasion in the Aqaba Special Economic Zone. Recent developments including the pandemic, an April political crisis between King Abdullah and his half-brother Prince Hamzah and now the Gaza conflict have highlighted popular dissatisfaction driven by economic grievances. Impacts Tourism should start to recover in late 2021, but revenue is unlikely to return to pre-pandemic levels until 2024 at the earliest. Forecast economic growth of 2-3% over the next four years leaves little scope for improvement in living standards. Without a strong economic recovery, the government will struggle to bring down an unemployment rate that has reached 24%.


Afrika Focus ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dirk Beke

Shortly after the independence of the Congo, the political crisis engendered by the conflict between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba was accompanied by a serious constitutional crisis. The first Congolese constitution was almost a complete imitation of the Belgian constitution. It established a parliamentary regime with a politically accountable Prime Minister and a non-accountable President as Head of State. The confusing rubric that 'The Head of State appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister' was quickly misused by national and international opponents of Lumumba to persuade Kasavubu to remove him from power. A full and contextual analysis of the constitution, however, shows that dismissal is linked to several other formal procedures and political conditions. Every presidential decision, including the dismissal of the Prime Minister and of Ministers, has to be countersigned by a Minister. Furthermore, it can be deduced clearly from the whole constitutional model that dismissal of the Prime Minister can only take place when the government has been outvoted in parliament. The conclusion is that, in contradiction to the contrived interpretations of some advisers and Belgian jurists, the deposition of Lumumba was unconstitutional. At any rate, Kasavubu's unconstitutional act seriously damaged Lumumba's political position and placed him in a difficult situation of legal defence against it.KEY WORDS : Congo, Constitution, Lumumba, Politics 


Significance Crackdowns against the political opposition have increased as the government tries to stifle political dissent. The constitution mandates presidential and national assembly elections by late November, but the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila, appears unwilling to leave office despite reaching his term limit. Impacts Tshisekedi's return will raise the stakes in the country's political crisis. Instability or political violence risks shattering DRC's fragile economic recovery. The UN could expand the mandate of its mission in the DRC depending on the outcome of the political process.


Author(s):  
Alexander Pavlenko ◽  

Influence of Yugoslavia’s collapse, as well as of external factors on Kosovo’s separation from Serbia is explored in this article. Particular features of Kosovo’s internal policy development and problems with a full international recognition of its independence are also highlighted. The problem of Kosovo’s status within the diplomacy of “power poles” in modern international relations system in the context of NATO’s war against Yugoslavia in 1999 is underlined. Kosovo is a multi-party parliamentary representative democratic republic. The State is governed by legislative, executive and judicial institutions which derive from the Constitution adopted in June 2008, although until the Brussels Agreement, North Kosovo was largely controlled by institutions of the Republic of Serbia or parallel institutions, funded by Serbia. The legislative power in Kosovo is held by Parliament. The executive authority is vested in the Government, headed by Prime Minister. The President is Head of State and represents the unity of the people, elected every five years, indirectly by the National Assembly, in a secret ballot by a two thirds majority of all deputies of the Assembly. Key trends in Serbian policy towards Kosovo after the democratic transformation of its political system and in conditions of Serbia’s aspirations for European integration was examined. The process of Kosovo’s recognition has shown that Kosovo is an irreversible reality and an essential factor for peace and stability in the Balkan region. This could be best proved by the recognition of Kosovo among all neighboring countries (except Serbia), by the vast majority of the countries in the region and the Euro-Atlantic community.


Afrika Focus ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 16 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 61-69
Author(s):  
Dirk Beke

The Deposition of Lumumba by Kasavubu, some Constitutional Considerations Shortly after the independence of the Congo, the political crisis engendered by the conflict between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba was accompanied by a serious constitutional crisis. The first Congolese constitution was almost a complete imitation of the Belgian constitution. It established a parliamentary regime with a politically accountable Prime Minister and a non-accountable President as Head of State. The confusing rubric that ‘The Head of State appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister’ was quickly misused by national and international opponents of Lumumba to persuade Kasavubu to remove him from power. A full and contextual analysis of the constitution, however, shows that dismissal is linked to several other formal procedures and political conditions. Every presidential decision, including the dismissal of the Prime Minister and of Ministers, has to be countersigned by a Minister. Furthermore, it can be deduced clearly from the whole constitutional model that dismissal of the Prime Minister can only take place when the government has been outvoted in parliament. The conclusion is that, in contradiction to the contrived interpretations of some advisers and Belgian jurists, the deposition of Lumumba was unconstitutional. At any rate, Kasavubu’s unconstitutional act seriously damaged Lumumba’s political position and placed him in a difficult situation of legal defence against it.


2020 ◽  
pp. 14-29
Author(s):  
Lyubov Prokopenko

The article considers the political aspect of land reform in the Republic of Zimbabwe. The problem of land reform has been one of the crucial ones in the history of this African country, which celebrated 40 years of independence on April 18, 2020. In recent decades, it has been constantly in the spotlight of political and electoral processes. The land issue was one of the key points of the political program from the very beginning of Robert Mugabe’s reign in 1980. The political aspect of land reform began to manifest itself clearly with the growth of the opposition movement in the late 1990s. In 2000–2002 the country implemented the Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP), the essence of which was the compulsory acquisition of land from white owners without compensation. The expropriation of white farmers’ lands in the 2000s led to a serious reconfiguration of land ownership, which helped to maintain in power the ruling party, the African National Union of Zimbabwe – Patriotic Front (ZANU – PF). The government was carrying out its land reform in the context of a sharp confrontation with the opposition, especially with the Party for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by trade union leader Morgan Tsvangirai. The land issue was on the agenda of all the election campaigns (including the elections in July 2018); this fact denotes its politicization, hence the timeliness of this article. The economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe in the 2000–2010s was the most noticeable phenomenon in the South African region. The analysis of foreign and domestic sources allows us to conclude that the accelerated land reform served as one of its main triggers. The practical steps of the new Zimbabwean president, Mr. Emmerson Mnangagwa, indicate that he is aware of the importance of resolving land reform-related issues for further economic recovery. At the beginning of March 2020, the government adopted new regulations defining the conditions for compensation to farmers. On April 18, 2020, speaking on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the independence of Zimbabwe, Mr. E. Mnangagwa stated that the land reform program remains the cornerstone of the country’s independence and sovereignty.


Author(s):  
Farouk El-Hosseny ◽  
Patrick Devine

Abstract The intersection between foreign investment and human rights is gaining attention, as is evident from an increasing number of investment treaty awards analysing legal issues relating to human rights. In the recent International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitration of Bear Creek v Peru, Philippe Sands QC posited, in a dissenting opinion, that the investor’s contribution to events—ie protests against its allegedly adverse environmental impact and disregard of indigenous rights, namely resulting from its ‘inability to obtain a “social licence”’—which led to the unlawful expropriation of its investment, was ‘significant and material’. He further noted that the investor’s ‘responsibilities are no less than those of the government’ and found that damages should thus be reduced. Last year, the Netherlands adopted a new model bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which allows tribunals to ‘take into account non-compliance by the investor with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ when assessing damages. These recent developments shed light on how states and tribunals, as part of their decision-making process, can take into account human rights in practice, and crucially in respect of damages analyses. By first dissecting the concept of contributory fault, then shedding light on the intersection of investment treaty law and human rights, as elucidated in recent jurisprudence, this article questions whether there now exists a gateway for human rights obligations (soft or hard) in the investment treaty arbitration realm through the concept of contributory fault.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 94
Author(s):  
Madalena Meyer Resende ◽  
Anja Hennig

The alliance of the Polish Catholic Church with the Law and Justice (PiS) government has been widely reported and resulted in significant benefits for the Church. However, beginning in mid-2016, the top church leadership, including the Episcopal Conference, has distanced itself from the government and condemned its use of National Catholicism as legitimation rhetoric for the government’s malpractices in the fields of human rights and democracy. How to account for this behavior? The article proposes two explanations. The first is that the alliance of the PiS with the nationalist wing of the Church, while legitimating its illiberal refugee policy and attacks on democratic institutions of the government, further radicalized the National Catholic faction of the Polish Church and motivated a reaction of the liberal and mainstream conservative prelates. The leaders of the Episcopate, facing an empowered and radical National Catholic faction, pushed back with a doctrinal clarification of Catholic orthodoxy. The second explanatory path considers the transnational influence of Catholicism, in particular of Pope Francis’ intervention in favor of refugee rights as prompting the mainstream bishops to reestablish the Catholic orthodoxy. The article starts by tracing the opposition of the Bishops Conference and liberal prelates to the government’s refugee and autocratizing policies. Second, it describes the dynamics of the Church’s internal polarization during the PiS government. Third, it traces and contextualizes the intervention of Pope Francis during the asylum political crisis (2015–2016). Fourth, it portrays their respective impact: while the Pope’s intervention triggered the bishops’ response, the deepening rifts between liberal and nationalist factions of Polish Catholicism are the ground cause for the reaction.


2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 117-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Salvador Martí i Puig ◽  
Macià Serra

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to analyze three key issues in current Nicaraguan politics and in the political debate surrounding hybrid regimes: de-democratization, political protest, and the fall of presidencies. First, it analyzes the process of de-democratization that has been taking place in Nicaragua since 2000. It shows that the 2008 elections were not competitive but characteristic of an electoral authoritarian regime. Second, it reflects on the kind of regime created in Nicaragua under Daniel Ortega’s mandate, focusing on the system’s inability to process any kind of protest and dissent. Third, it examines the extent to which the protests that broke out in April 2018 may predict the early end to Ortega’s presidency, or whether Nicaragua’s political crisis may lead to negotiations between the government and the opposition.


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