North Korea in 2019

Asian Survey ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-78
Author(s):  
John Delury

This was a year of transition in North Korea, as leader Kim Jong Un held firm to his strategic shift of putting “all efforts” into economic development in the face of ongoing international sanctions. Kim’s summit diplomacy with the US and South Korea stalled, while ties improved markedly with China and modestly with Russia. The US and South Korea resumed downsized joint military exercises and North Korea resumed short-range missile testing.

Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This chapter looks at South Korea’s response to the US ‘pivot’. It takes stock of the post-war division of the peninsula and its consequences for the international alignment of both North and South. It considers how the ‘economic miracle’ in South Korea led to growing competition with Japan and greater synergies with China. It looks at the degree to which North Korea threatens stability in the region, and to what extent its demonisation justifies a major US presence in close proximity to China. The chapter discusses whether resurgent China is seen as a threat to South Korean interests or chiefly viewed through the prism of mutual economic benefit; and contrasts alleged concerns about China with those provoked by Japan. It concludes that while South Korea has continued to step up its military collaboration with the US, it has not become a cheerleader for pushing back against China and has not signed up to a US strategy to contain China.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dohee Kim ◽  
Uk Heo

This study investigates what factors affect Republic of Korea (South Korea)–United States (ROK–US) relations based on a theoretical framework, using event data created by content analysis from 1990 to 2011. South Korea’s economic development led to democratization, which resulted in elite changes. New progressive elites interpreted national interests differently and demanded changes in ROK–US relations. Accordingly, the ROK–US relationship was tense during the progressive administrations. ROK’s economic development attracted more trade with the US, which enhanced the bilateral relationship due to heightened interdependence. By contrast, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)–US relationship and the trade between ROK and China did not significantly affect ROK– relations, meaning ROK’s relationship with other countries does not affect ROK–US relations.


Significance This followed Pyongyang’s breach of its 17-month moratorium on missile testing with two volleys on May 4 and May 9, each personally supervised by Kim and both including short-range ballistic missile launches. Impacts Kim has given Washington until the end of the year to rethink its stance; that is possible but unlikely. Pyongyang’s new missile may be able to penetrate South Korean missile defences. South Korea will persevere with cooperation efforts for now, despite Pyongyang’s rebuffs.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 247-259
Author(s):  
Yong-Shik Lee

Abstract North Korea is currently one of the most impoverished countries with a history of famine, but the country has a significant potential for economic development that could lift its population from poverty. Neighbored by some of the largest and most advanced economies in the world (South Korea, Japan, and China) and endowed with abundant mineral resources, industrial experience, and a history of successful economic development in the past, North Korea can embark on the path to rapid economic development, as its southern counterpart (South Korea) did so successfully since the 1960s. Yet, the successful economic development of North Korea requires a comprehensive approach, including obtaining a fund for development; normalizing relations with the West and the neighboring countries; improving its human rights conditions; prioritizing key industrial development; and reforming its political-economic system. This note discusses the comprehensive approach necessary for the successful economic development of North Korea.


Significance Harris visited Singapore and Vietnam, both of which figure heavily in US security policy in the region. In Singapore, she weathered criticism of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. In Hanoi, she proposed talks about a strategic partnership, which would mean a significant upgrade to relations with Vietnam. Impacts The Afghanistan withdrawal will make alliances and US reliability central issues in upcoming elections in Japan and South Korea. Japan will strengthen its emerging security cooperation with India, shoring up its defence in the west of the Indo-Pacific region. To test US commitment to the region after the Afghanistan withdrawal, China and North Korea will be increasingly provocative.


2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vito D'Orazio

Since 1976, the militaries of the United States and South Korea have been holding routine joint military exercises (JMEs) for the purposes of military training and deterrence against North Korea. These exercises are frequently cited as a cause of tension on the peninsula, causing North Korea to escalate its conflictual rhetoric and behavior. I empirically assess this claim using new data on US-ROK JMEs and machine-coded event data collected by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System. The findings show that North Korea does not systematically escalate its conflictual rhetoric or behavior during or near the occurrence of JMEs. The results hold for both low- and high-intensity exercises and for rhetoric that has the United States and South Korea as its target.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272097218
Author(s):  
Jordan Bernhardt ◽  
Lauren Sukin

A number of proposals for reducing tensions with North Korea have discussed alterations to the program of joint military exercises (JMEs) that South Korea holds. North Korea has also repeatedly called for a reduction or secession of JMEs. Would limiting or halting JMEs be a useful concession for securing a reduction of tensions on the peninsula? We argue that JMEs do not deter North Korea but, instead, provoke provocative rhetoric and actions, demonstrating that North Korea views JMEs as a serious threat to its security. In this paper, we establish a relationship between JMEs and North Korea’s actions. In response to a JME, North Korea can issue warnings or threats as well as take costly signals such as conducting missile or nuclear tests. Using new data on JMEs and North Korean behavior, we find that North Korea systematically responds with aggression to South Korean JMEs. Moreover, we find that the intensity of North Korea’s responses to JMEs is driven by the severity of the threat particular exercises pose, indicating that North Korea responds to JMEs as serious security threats.


2020 ◽  
pp. 142-180
Author(s):  
Francine R. Frankel

North Korea’s attack against South Korea evoked an immediate military response from the United States, under a UN command, to draw the line against communist expansion in Asia. Once the Chinese entered the war on the side of North Korea, India could not sustain its policy of nonalignment on the merits but began to practice nonalignment as an informal version of neutrality justified as its commitment to seek peace in the nuclear age. When Mao prolonged the war in an effort to win total victory and force the United States out of Asia, India’s bias toward China in the United Nations met with the US decision to exclude India from the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China, paving the way for China to assert its position as a great power.


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