Strong Boards and Risk-taking in Islamic Banks

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 135-180
Author(s):  
Sabur Mollah ◽  
Michael Skully ◽  
Eva Liljeblom
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Srairi ◽  
Khawla Bourkhis ◽  
Asma Houcine

Purpose The motivation of the study is to shed further light on the question of whether the governance structure of Islamic banks (IBs) has an impact on the efficiency and risk of Islamic banks operating in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after the global financial crisis and during the period 2010–2018. This study aims to examine the extent of governance structure on the efficiency and risk of IBs as the effect of the financial crisis has been less on IBs. In addition, the authors are interested in the GCC region as it represents the hub of Islamic finance. Design/methodology/approach In this study, the authors examine how the banking governance structure affects the risk-taking and performance of IBs in the GCC countries between 2010 and 2018. The authors construct a banking governance index (CGI) composed of sub-indices for the board structure, risk management, transparency and disclosure, audit committee, Sharia supervisory board and investment account holders. Unlike the majority of previous studies, bank performance is measured with technical efficiency scores using a data envelopment analysis and the authors use a comprehensive CGI. Findings The results show that IBs in GCC countries adhere to 54% of the attributes covered in the CGI. The authors also note a lack of disclosure regarding the investment account holders and the audit committee. As well, the results indicate that bank governance is positively associated with risk-taking and bank efficiency. Banking risk is influenced by the Sharia board and risk management while bank efficiency is affected by the characteristics of the board structure and investment account holders. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that has developed a comprehensive governance index for IBs in GCC countries that includes a wide range of governance dimensions. The study contributes to the literature on governance in the banking sector by simultaneously examining its impact on the risk-taking and efficiency of IBs and recognizes the dynamic relation between these three variables for IB.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1367-1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rim Ben Selma Mokni ◽  
Mohamed Tahar Rajhi ◽  
Houssem Rachdi

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate determinants of risk-taking in Islamic banks and conventional banks located in the MENA region. Design/methodology/approach The empirical study covers a sample of 15 conventional and 15 Islamic banks for the period 2002-2009. The authors estimate models using both generalized least square random effect and generalized method of moments system approaches. Findings The results of the empirical analysis show that the determinants’ risk-taking significance varies between Islamic and conventional banks. Originality/value The main aim is to develop a comprehensive model that integrates macroeconomic determinants, industry-specific determinants, and bank-specific determinants. This paper performs a comparison of the risk-taking between two different banking systems in the MENA region.


Author(s):  
Amal AlAbbad ◽  
M. Kabir Hassan ◽  
Irum Saba

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study whether the characteristics of the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) can influence the risk-taking behaviors of Islamic banks. Design/methodology/approach The data on governance were collected from 70 Islamic banks’ annual reports across 18 countries for the period from 2000 to 2011 to investigate the relationship between SSB’s characteristics including size, busyness and foreign board and the Islamic banks’ risk activities. Findings The size of SSB and the proportion of busy board in SSB positively and significantly influence Islamic banks’ asset return and insolvency risks. Foreign members are more effective in monitoring banks’ Shariah compliance. Further analysis provides some evidence that most of the findings on the associations between the SSB structure and bank risk are derived from countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council where Shariah governance is ruled internally at the bank level. Practical implications There is a need for better Shariah board characteristics in place that complement with other governance mechanisms to well comprehend the main purpose of Islamic banks. Originality/value SSB board busyness and foreign characteristics appear to influence the risk-taking behaviors of Islamic banks.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafik Harkati ◽  
Syed Musa Alhabshi ◽  
Salina Kassim

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of economic freedom and six relevant subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the Malaysian dual banking system. It also aims to make a comparative analysis between Islamic and conventional banks operating in this dual banking sector. Moreover, the study is an effort to enrich the existing literature by presenting empirical evidence on the argument that the risk-taking behavior of the two types of banks is indistinguishable given that they operate in the same regulatory environment. Design/methodology/approach Secondary data of all banks operating in the Malaysian banking sector are collected from FitchConnect database, in addition to the economic freedom index from Foundation Heritage for the period 2011–2017. Generalized least squares technique is employed to estimate the influence of economic freedom and the six relevant subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks. Findings The level of economic freedom influenced risk-taking behavior within the banking sector as a whole, conventional and Islamic banking sectors negatively during the study period (2011–2017). Risk-taking behavior of conventional and Islamic banks is similar. However, conventional banks turn to be less influenced by economic freedom level as compared to Islamic banks. Practical implications The government and regulators may benefit from the results by rethinking and setting the best economic freedom index that better serves the stability of the banking system, and lessens banks’ risk-taking inclination. Originality/value To the present time, this paper is thought to be of a significant contribution. Given the argument that Islamic and conventional banks behave in the same way. This is one of the first attempts to address this issue in light of the influence of economic freedom and six subcomponents of it on the risk-taking behavior of banks operating in a dual banking system.


2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabur Mollah ◽  
M. Kabir Hassan ◽  
Omar Al Farooque ◽  
Asma Mobarek

Author(s):  
Sabur Mollah ◽  
Michael T. Skully
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 117-128
Author(s):  
Haileslasie Tadele ◽  
Baliira Kalyebara

The lessons from the 2008 global financial crisis show that excessive risk taking and governance failures contribute to the failure of several banks. As a result, the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and risk taking has been the subject of many studies. However, extant studies report inconclusive results. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the relationship between CEO power and bank risk in the UAE using data over the period of 2015–2018 and a sample of 19 UAE banks. The study uses a Pearson pairwise correlation to analyze the relationship between CEO power and bank risk. In addition, a two-tailed t-test is used to examine the differences between conventional and Islamic banks in terms of CEO power and risk-taking. The results of the study show that CEO power measured using CEO duality and CEO tenure reduces risk. Furthermore, the paper indicates that larger boards and higher CEO ownership tend to increase risk. The study also reports that conventional banks have higher return variability, larger boards and powerful CEOs than Islamic banks. However, Islamic banks tend to have higher non-performing finances than conventional banks. The study provides important insights on the relationship between CEO power and bank risk and concurs with earlier studies. The findings can be of interest to policy makers and can be used as input data for the development of corporate governance mechanisms. Shareholders can also use the survey results as input when appointing a CEO for their banks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-181
Author(s):  
ARIF HUSSAIN ◽  
DR. ALAM REHMAN ◽  
AQSA SIDDIQUE ◽  
HASEEB UR REHMAN

This study is about the impact of ownership structure on bank risk taking with comparison between conventional banks and Islamic banks of Pakistan. Z-Score and SDROA are used as risk taking variables. While managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and block holders were taken as proxies for ownership structure. Ten private commercial banks and four Islamic banks were randomly selected and data have been collected from annual reports of these banks from 2010 to 2016. The result suggested that all the proxies of ownership structure i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership and block holders have significant positive impact on Z-Score. On the other hand using SDROA as proxy for risk taking the proxies of managerial ownership has significant positive impact on SDROA and institutional ownership has significant negative impact on SDROA of banks in Pakistan. On the other hand foreign ownership and block holders have insignificant impact on SDROA. The result of BankID is significant which shows that ownership structure has significant impact on bank risk taking in conventional banks while in Islamic banks ownership structure doesn’t have any significant impact on bank risk.


Author(s):  
Alam I. Asadov

The unwillingness of contemporary Islamic banks to undertake real business risks has left many to ponder on whether the objectives laid down by the industry's founders have been realized. The need for real risk taking by Islamic banks is critical to justify the profits they earn in the forms of margins, rents, or service charges. This chapter analyzes issues relating to ownership risk (ḍamān al-milkiyyah) in Islamic banking by examining three of its popular products, namely Murabahah (mark-up sale), Ijarah (leasing), and Musharakah Mutanaqisah (diminishing partnership). Following close scrutiny, the chapter concludes that principles of ownership risk as laid down in Fiqh Muamalat (law of transactions) are violated in each of the studied products. Unfortunately, the problem extends beyond these products to include a number of other Islamic financial products. The author calls for closer attention to this important Shari'ah concept of ownership risk in designing Islamic finance products and offers some policy recommendations to improve the current situation.


Author(s):  
Mehdi Mili ◽  
Sami Abid

Purpose This paper aims to examine risk-taking in Islamic banks by exploring moral hazard and owner/manager agency problems simultaneously. Design/methodology/approach The authors propose to estimate a model of bank risk-taking that includes both franchise value and ownership structure as explanatory factors of bank risk. Findings The results show that franchise value is an important determinant of Islamic bank risk-taking. Banks with high franchise values are less likely to take risks than banks with low franchise value. In contrast, outside block holders have, at best, limited influences on bank risk-taking. Originality/value This paper conducts the first empirical examination of the relationship between managerial risk preferences and Islamic banks ownership. The authors examine simultaneously the effect of franchise value and owner/manager problem on Islamic bank risk taking behavior. They consider separately the impact on total risk, systematic risk and bank specific risk.


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