scholarly journals JUSTIFYING LIBERAL RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, CRIMINALIZATION, AND HOLISTIC RETRIBUTIVISM

2015 ◽  
Vol 56 (132) ◽  
pp. 495-520
Author(s):  
Alfonso Donoso
Keyword(s):  
Retributive Justice ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Normative Models ◽  
Models Of Democracy ◽  
The Ideal

ABSTRACT In this article I explore whether liberal retributive justice should be conceived of either individualistically or holistically. I critically examine the individualistic account of retributive justice and suggest that the question of retribution – i.e., whether and when punishment of an individual is compatible with just treatment of that individual – must be answered holistically. By resorting to the ideal of sensitive reasons, a model of legitimacy at the basis of our best normative models of democracy, the article argues that in modern liberal democracies, punishment of an offender A for f is compatible with just treatment of A only if punishment of an individual for f can be legitimate in A's and A's fellow citizens' eyes. Only once retributive justice is understood in this holistic fashion the imposition of punishment can be made compatible with just treatment of individuals.

scholarly journals Conceptualizing and Measuring the Quality of Democracy: The Citizens’ Perspective

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 22-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieter Fuchs ◽  
Edeltraud Roller
Keyword(s):  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Subjective Quality ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Quality Of Democracy ◽  
Objective Measurements ◽  
Objective Quality ◽  
Instrument Measuring ◽  
Normative Models ◽  
Models Of Democracy

In recent years, several measurements of the quality of democracy have been developed (e.g. Democracy Barometer, Varieties of Democracy Project). These objective measurements focus on institutional and procedural characteristics of democracy. This article starts from the premise that in order to fully understand the quality of democracy such objective measurements have to be complemented by subjective measurements based on the perspective of citizens. The aim of the article is to conceptualize and measure the subjective quality of democracy. First, a conceptualization of the subjective quality of democracy is developed consisting of citizens’ support for three normative models of democracy (electoral, liberal, and direct democracy). Second, based on the World Values Survey 2005–2007, an instrument measuring these different dimensions of the subjective quality of democracy is suggested. Third, distributions for different models of democracy are presented for some European and non-European liberal democracies. They reveal significant differences regarding the subjective quality of democracies. Fourth, the subjective quality of democracy of these countries is compared with the objective quality of democracy based on three indices (electoral democracy, liberal democracy and direct popular vote) developed by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. Finally, further research questions are discussed.

Bridging Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory

2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 887-902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandru Volacu
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Current State ◽  
The World ◽  
Normative Models ◽  
The Ideal

Many of the recent methodological debates within political theory have focused on the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction. While ideal theorists recognise the need to develop an account of the transition between the two levels of theorising, no general proposal has been advanced thus far. In this article, I aim to bridge this conceptual gap. Towards this end, I first reconstruct the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction within a simplified two-dimensional framework, which captures the primary meanings usually attributed to it. Subsequently, I use this framework to provide an algorithm for the bidirectional transition between ideal and non-ideal theory, based on the incremental derivation of normative models. The approach outlined illuminates the various ways in which principles derived under highly idealised assumptions might be distorted by the circumstances of our current world and illustrates the various paths which we can pursue in moving from our current state of the world to an ideal one.

scholarly journals Icelandic politics in light of normative models of democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vilhjálmur Árnason
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Nationalist Discourse ◽  
Classical Liberal ◽  
Working Practices ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Normative Models ◽  
Extensive Involvement ◽  
Liberal Perspective ◽  
Models Of Democracy

Icelandic politics are analysed from the perspectives of three normative models of democracy: the liberal, republican and deliberative democratic theories. While the Icelandic constitution is rooted in classical liberal ideas, Icelandic politics can be harshly criticized from a liberal perspective, primarily because of the unclear separation of powers of government and for the extensive involvement of politics in other social sectors. Despite strong nationalist discourse which reflects republican characteristics, rooted in the struggle for independence from Denmark, republicanism has been marginal in Icelandic politics. In the years before the financial collapse, Icelandic society underwent a process of liberalization in which power shifted to the financial sector without disentangling the close ties that had prevailed between business and politics. The special commission set up by the Icelandic Parliament to investigate the causes of the financial collapse criticized Icelandic politics and governance for its flawed working practices and lack of professionalism. The appropriate lessons to draw from this criticism are to strengthen democratic practices and institutions. In the spirit of republicanism, however, the dominant discourse about Icelandic democracy after the financial collapse has been on increasing direct, vote-centric participation in opposition to the system of formal politics. While this development is understandable in light of the loss of trust in political institutions in the wake of the financial collapse, it has not contributed to trustworthy practices. In order to improve Icelandic politics, the analysis in this paper shows, it is important to work more in the spirit of deliberative democratic theory.

Torture and Liberal Democracy: Response to Levey

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEVEN LUKES
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Deep Insight ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Hands On ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Ideal

I am really grateful to Geoffrey Brahm Levey for his critical comments, which push me to try to make clear, first, why I claim that torture is not susceptible of democratic accountability in liberal democracies; secondly, where I believe the residue of deep insight in the Durkheimian argument lies; and thirdly, why I think we cannot rightly speak, or even whisper, of torture as a lesser evil.Torture and democratic accountability. Levey argues that torture can be rendered collectively accountable and that it is not different from other cases of political dirty hands on the democratic front. It could be subject to judicial oversight, for example, by ‘torture warrants’ in the manner of Dershowitz, or by the government or relevant minister being held accountable after the fact. He adds that states do not conceal torture because it is ‘inherently anti-democratic or unpopular’; on the contrary, today it appears ‘only too popular and open to democratic endorsement’.But I do not mean to equate democracy and popularity. Democracy is not simply majority rule; majorities can tyrannize over minorities and individuals, who need protection on democratic grounds. ‘Democracy’ names an ideal and we could either, like Schumpeter, revise the ideal in a ‘realistic’ direction or, like Dahl, while retaining the ideal as background, characterize real political systems as approximations to it, using other terms, such as ‘polyarchy’. Either way, one of the things which makes a modern state more rather than less democratic is the extent to which it incorporates institutional arrangements and mechanisms that secure a range of basic rights, protecting all, especially the most vulnerable, from arbitrary abuses of power.

Sortition and Mini-Publics

2020 ◽  
pp. 227-246
Author(s):  
David M. Farrell ◽  
Peter Stone
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Institutional Reform ◽  
Descriptive Representation ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Positive Sense ◽  
Negative Sense ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
The Ideal

In recent decades liberal democracies have begun to experiment with sortition—the selection of citizens by lottery for engagement in political or policy discussions. A notable development has been the emergence of randomly selected deliberative mini-publics that can take different forms. These have occurred in the context of wider debates in political theory over the potential of deliberative democracy, and also from a desire to bring citizens into the heart of debates over constitutional and institutional reform. We develop a normative case for sortition focused on how it can contribute in a negative sense—helping to shield the process of selecting officials from forces that could compromise it—and also in a positive sense in how it can deliver more effectively on the ideal of descriptive representation. We then consider empirical evidence of how the most significant examples of sortition today (the citizens’ assemblies) have performed against those normative ideals.

scholarly journals Finding common ground

2020 ◽  
pp. 147488512096992
Author(s):  
Lochlan Morrissey ◽  
John Boswell
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
The Common ◽  
Contemporary Context ◽  
The Ideal

Deliberative democrats have abandoned the ideal of consensus in favour of a range of different, more realistic alternatives. But these alternatives provide little anchorage to guide or even evaluate deliberative practice – something acutely problematic given the contemporary context of accelerating polarization in many advanced liberal democracies. In this article, we turn to Stalnaker’s account of the ‘common ground’ – the shared pool of information that is agreed upon by the parties to a discourse – to reassert a distinct ideal standard for democratic deliberation which remains malleable enough to apply across messy contexts of real-world political contestation and debate. Our account offers an appropriate normative yardstick by which to assess deliberative practices across different discursive contexts, as well as impetus for further experimentation and innovation in efforts towards democratic renewal and reform.

Equality of Opportunity and Global Justice

2020 ◽  
pp. 35-52
Author(s):  
Gillian Brock
Keyword(s):  
Global Justice ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Liberal Democracies ◽  
The World ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Different Parts ◽  
The Ideal

The ideal of fair equality of opportunity is widely endorsed as a central commitment within liberal democracies. Given its domestic importance, the attempt to extend the ideal to the global sphere may seem to be required for those committed to our equal moral standing. The extension to the global sphere faces many important challenges, not least because there can be very different conceptions of valuable opportunities and favored social positions in different parts of the world. This chapter explores whether there are robust ways around this issue and argues that there are. More importantly, this chapter shows that underlying our convictions about global equality of opportunity lies a tangle of related intuitions that often get confused. When these are identified, they can be rewoven into a coherent account which entails important reforms in a number of domains.

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