scholarly journals NEW CRIMES AND OLD PROCEDURES: Can the new Sexual Offences Bill deliver on its promises?

Author(s):  
Lisa Vetten

In 1996 Dullah Omar, the then-Minister of Justice, established a project committee in the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) to investigate sexual offences against children. Eleven years later, having widened the scope of the legal reforms to include adults, the National Assembly finally passed the muchdelayed Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Bill (SO Bill 10 Nov 06 (SOBPC06)) on 23 May 2007. The Bill is ambitious, its objects being: ‘To afford complainants of sexual offences the maximum and least traumatising protection that the law can provide, to introduce measures which seek to enable the relevant organs of state to give full effect to the provisions of this Act and to combat and, ultimately, eradicate the relatively high incidence of sexual offences committed in the Republic’ (Sexual Offences Bill 2006: 9). This article briefly sets out some of the Bill’s content and then examines whether or not the Bill, in its current form, does indeed meet the high aims set for itself.

Author(s):  
Zingaphi Mabe

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, is regarded as one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. As the supreme law in South Africa, it applies to all law and conduct. All South African laws must be consistent with the Constitution. Where there is an alleged violation of constitutional provisions, that law or conduct must be evaluated to establish whether or not it is consistent with the values of an open and democratic society based on fundamental human rights such as human dignity and the right to equality.The Insolvency Act and section 27 in particular which is the focus of this paper must be consistent with the Constitution. Section 27(1) provides:"No immediate benefit under a duly registered antenuptial contract given in good faith by a man to his wife or any child to be born of the marriage shall be set aside as a disposition without value, unless that man's estate was sequestrated within two years of the registration of that antenuptial contract."This section protects benefits arising from an antenuptial contract and given by a man to his wife or to a child born of their marriage, from being set aside as dispositions without value during sequestration proceedings. The same protection is not afforded however, to benefits given by the wife under an antenuptial contract. This also excludes benefits given by those in a same sex marriage, and limits the benefits available to children born of that form of marriage.As the right to equality in section 9 of the Constitution seeks to provide equal benefits before the law to persons in the same or similar positions by prohibiting unfair discrimination, the limitations in section 27 render it vulnerable to constitutional review.As the Insolvency Act has not been amended as a whole to accommodate the equality provisions in the Constitution, in its current form, section 27 seems to violate section 9(3) of the Constitution on the grounds of sexual orientation, marital status and birth.However, certain proposals have been made in the report by the South African Law Reform Commission on the Review of the Law of Insolvency to develop section 27 to comply with the Constitution. Further developments have been proposed by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Developments in its presentations to the Labour Market Chamber in 2003 and 2006.This paper examines section 27 of the Insolvency Act as it currently reads, within the context of the right to equality in section 9 of the Constitution. Current developments in respect of section 27 will be considered to illustrate progress made in reforming the section and whether the reform measures proposed will protect all those affected by the discrimination arising from section 27.The discussion opens with a consideration of the current dispensation and the question whether section 27 violates section 9(3) of the Constitution. Current developments will then be discussed in the light of the current proposals.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 524
Author(s):  
Tongat Tongat

A paradigm shift in the state of life—especially post the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 amendments—have not been fully understood  properly. Up to now—included in the lawless life—is still a gap between the paradigm and its implementation . This paradigmatic gap visible example of the lack of a comprehensive implementation of the basic principles of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 in a national criminal law reform ( draft Code of Criminal Law ) . The draft Code of Criminal Law as one form of national criminal law reform is seen has not fully represent constitution demands. Prohibiting the   use of analogy in criminal law is still seen at odds with the provisions of Article 1 ( 3 ) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945. The gap is not only paradigmatic potential to cause difficulties in its application, but also potentially the cancellation clause in the legislation  concerned.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-58
Author(s):  
Dwiyana Achmad Hartanto

The legal consequences of Constitutional Court Decision Number 46/PUU-VIII/2010 perspective of national law reform are a progressive development of the law. The ruling granted part of the petition for judicial review of Article 2 (2) and Article 43 (1) of Law Number 1 in 1974 concerning Procurement of Articles 28B (1) and (2), and Article 28 D (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The review of Article 2 (2) of the Marriage Law is not granted because the Constitutional Court is of the opinion that marriage registration is not a marriage restriction, but an orderly form of administration. Material review Article 43 (1) of the Marriage Law is granted by the Constitutional Court so that the child is a legal child. The Constitutional Court's decision on the unofficial marriage has positive and negative implications. One of the positive implications is the recognition of the child's relationship status with his biological father as long as it can prove the relationship and have a negative impact because it creates a sense of calm for the offender unofficial marriage (nikah sirri) and increase the quantity.  Akibat hukum putusan MK No.46/PUU-VIII/2010 perspektif pembaharuan hukum nasional merupakan pembangunan hukum progresif. Putusan tersebut mengabulkan sebagian permohonan pengujian materiil pasal 2 (2) dan pasal 43 (1) UUP terhadap pasal 28B (1) dan (2), serta  pasal 28D (1) UUD NRI tahun 1945. Pengujian materiil pasal 2 (2) UUP tidak dikabulkan karena Mahkamah Konstitusi berpendapat pencatatan perkawinan bukan pembatasan perkawinan, melainkan bentuk tertib administrasi. Pengujian materiil pasal 43 (1) UUP dikabulkan MK, sehingga anak tersebut berstatus  anak sah. Fenomena nikah sirri menurut penulis, putusan MK mempunyai implikasi positif dan negatif. Berdampak positif adanya pengakuan status hubungan anak dengan ayah biologisnya sepanjang dapat membuktikan hubungan tersebut dan berdampak negatif karena menimbulkan rasa tenang bagi pelaku nikah sirri dan bertambah kuantitasnya. DOI: 10.15408/jch.v5i1.4691


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-279
Author(s):  
Sharron FitzGerald ◽  
Maggie O’Neill ◽  
Gillian Wylie

The Republic of Ireland is a good case study to highlight the problems associated with uncritical appeals to criminal law as the only appropriate tool to tackle demand and protect sex workers from harm. In 2017, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act came into force in the Republic of Ireland (hereafter Ireland) making it a criminal offence to purchase sex in the jurisdiction. Ireland’s decision to introduce Swedish-style laws followed a protracted public campaign instigated in 2009 by the Irish and radical feminist inspired neo-abolitionist organisation, Turn off the Red Light. In this article, we confront and de-centre the Turn off the Red Light campaign’s hegemonic narrative that the criminal rather than social justice responses provide a more effective vehicle for sex workers’ empowerment. Undertaking our intervention in Irish feminist prostitution politics as a ‘politics of doing’ social justice through our separate and combined research, we extend our analysis by invoking Nancy Fraser and Barbara Hudson’s theoretical work on social and restorative justice. We wish to develop a theoretical framework that can serve as a roadmap for restorative social justice – the process of achieving rights, recognition and redistribution through relational, reflective and discursive interventions in sex work research, policy and practice. We argue that by ‘thinking’ sex workers’ positionality in social relations differently, the ‘doings’ of restorative social justice for sex workers can begin or take place.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
David McQuoid-Mason

The practice of “ukuthwalwa” has been described as a “mock abduction” or an “irregular proposal” aimed at achieving a customary law marriage. It has been said that ukuthwalwa may be used for a number of purposes, such as: (a) to force the father to give his consent; (b) to avoid the expense of a wedding; (c) to hasten matters if the woman is pregnant; (d) to persuade the woman of the seriousness of the suitor’s intent; and (e) to avoid payment of lobolo. At common law the courts have stated that ukuthwalwa should not be used “as a cloak for forcing unwelcome attentions on a patently unwilling girl”, and have held that abduction by way of  ukuthwalwa is unlawful. However, it has been suggested that if there is a belief by the abductor that the custom of ukuthwalwa was lawful the abduction would lack fault, and that if the parents or guardians consented to the taking it would not be abduction, because abduction is a crime against parental authority. Where the parents or guardians consent to the abduction the crime may amount to assault or rape. Some of these potential lacunae in the law seem to have been addressed by the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007. There has recently been public outrage about the practice of ukuthwalwa in the Eastern Cape in which girls between the ages of 12 and 15 years of age were being abducted and forced into marriages against their consent. This aspect of ukuthwalwa is a breach of the common law and the repealed section of the Sexual Offences Act (s 9 of the SexualOffences Act 23 of 1957. It is also completely contrary to the Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996) and the Sexual Offences Amendment Act (Chapters 2 and 3 of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act). Part of the problem may be that some rural communities think that cultural practices trump constitutional rights, whereas according to the law the reverse applies.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suhayfa Bhamjee

The purpose of any legislation is to safeguard the welfare of society. Any law that fails to do that cannot justify its existence. In S v Acting Regional Magistrate, Boksburg: Venter ((CCT 109/10) [2011] ZACC 22; 2011 (2) SACR 274 (CC)) the question of nullity of the particular wording of section 69 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act (32 of 2007, hereinafter “the Act”) and its subsequent constitutionality, were in question. The court had to decide whether to confirm the ruling of the SouthGauteng High Court, Johannesburg (Case No A11/2010) that the particular wording of the section was inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, or whether it could apply the various rules of interpretation and save the section from invalidity.


2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine Benedet

This article surveys rape law reform efforts in Canadian criminal law by mapping these changes onto the decisions of the Alberta Court of Appeal. First, the article outlines how decisions in the 1970s and 1980s reflected ideas and assumptions about sexual offences. It then traces how these ideas were challenged in law reform efforts in 1983 and 1992. Next the article turns to the definition of non-consent and the Ewanchuk case, and how the reasons at the Court of Appeal reflect evolving attitudes to sexual assault. Finally, the article ends with reflections on sexual assault law following the Ewanchuk decision.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 689-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciara Molloy

Based on Carol Smart's observation that rape law reform as lobbied for by the feminist movement during the 1970s and 1980s failed to achieve any meaningful change, this article seeks to examine the nature and implications of rape law reform in the Republic of Ireland from the 1980s to the present day. During the 1980s the conceptualization of rape changed from a proprietorial crime to a violation of individual bodily integrity due to feminist lobbying efforts and the emergence of a victim-centered approach in the criminal justice system. Though this changing conceptualisation has led to significant attitudinal change, particularly surrounding the issues of acquaintance and marital rape, procedural change has failed to secure higher conviction rates. In particular, this article demonstrates that the legal reforms achieved in the 1980s potentially resulted in a 2% decrease in rape conviction rates by 2007. When compared to England/Wales, conviction rates as distinctive from prosecution rates in Ireland remain chronically low. This indicates that any legal reforms must take account of the institutional bias ingrained the Irish criminal justice system against female rape complainants, which has continuing relevance for Irish legislation pertaining to sexual violence such as the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2017. Overall this article suggests that rape is an exceptional crime and needs to be reassessed as such.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-102
Author(s):  
PJ Schwikkard

Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 defines rape in the following terms: ‘Any person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally, commits an act of sexual penetration with a complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape.’ This paper focuses on one component of the definition, namely fault. It is argued that a mistaken but unreasonable belief in consent should not be recognised as a defence and that a normative approach could soften the focus on the behaviour of the complainant and send a clear signal that our commitment to constitutional values requires us to take due care in our interactions with others. The argument is made with full awareness that law reform is a very small cog in addressing the scourge of rape.


Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna Botha

The last two years have been challenging for the South African Parliament (comprising the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces). Some of the issues experienced include: wide-ranging disruptions during the President’s 2015 State of the Nation Address; the forceful removal of Members of Parliament (members) from the parliamentary Chamber by the police; cell-phone signal jamming in the Chamber; a failure by the Assembly to fulfil its constitutional obligations in terms of sections 55(2) and 181(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 by not holding the President accountable to the Public Protector’s findings in the Nkandla saga ; members ignoring the rulings of the Speaker and the Chairperson of the NCOP; a challenge to the legitimacy of Parliament’s broadcasting policy and rules (Primedia) and the use of various forms of “unparliamentary” language by members in Parliament (Chairperson of NCOP). Whilst confrontation and robust debate in Parliament are not uncommon and to be expected, incidents such as these are becoming more frequent and have required the repeated intervention of the Courts.The Constitutional Court judgment in Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly raises important questions concerning the nature and scope of the parliamentary privilege in section 58(1)(b) of the Constitution. It also demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining a balance between the importance of upholding the guarantee of freedom of speech in Parliament, on the one hand, and the need to ensure internal order and discipline during parliamentary sittings, on the other. There have been a number of recent judgments concerning the internal functioning of Parliament. These judgments illustrate that the South African Constitution is a work in progress and that our constitutional jurisprudence is maturing. As recently observed by retired Constitutional Court Justice, Sandile Ngcobo, “This is not a bad thing … Our Constitution is still a young one and through constitutional adjudication it will generate constitutional rules and principles that will form the core of our constitutional law”. The purpose of this note is to explore the constitutional principles underlying parliamentary privilege, with specific reference to the decision in Democratic Alliance.


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