scholarly journals Western European Military Practices and Technologies in Ukraine in XVIII Century

2019 ◽  
pp. 183-202
Author(s):  
Oleksii Sokyrko

The “Military Revolution”, which became a concentrated manifestation of Europe’s political leadership during the XVIIth – XVIIIth centuries, produced new realities in the military sphere: regular armies, subordinated and held by centralized states, unified arms and clothing, division into types of military forces, special drill and education for soldiers and officers. Leadership in military technology consisted of fortifications and artillery that developed in the direction of increasing technical capacity, unification and standardization of new weapons. New approaches to the organization of the armed forces changed the character of wars. If in the XVIIth century East and West of Europe had a kind of parity in their military achievements and technologies, then in the XVIIIth century it finally moved to the West. In this context, an important issue is how Western European achievements were spread in Ukraine, in particular the Cossack Hetmanate, whose military-political model was clearly structured for military purposes. The analysis of these influences and borrowings shows that they were heterogeneous in nature. In the Cossack army, elements of the regular troop duty and sentry service and even drill instructions were gradually being appeared. The Cossack starshyna (officials) faced with the practice of the regular army during the Russian imperial wars. However, all these influences were episodic and spontaneous, without changing the essence of the military institutions of the Hetmanate. In artillery, technical innovations were implemented more actively, but were hampered by lack of funding. In the fortification area, the control of which was completely transferred to imperial power, Western technologies and specialists, were used by metropolitan power in their own defensive projects. It is significant that the acquaintance and borrowing of any military innovations in the XVIIIth century occurred almost exclusively through Russian mediation. This tendency was fully in line with the gradual loss of the Hetmanate’s sovereignty, the destruction of its army.

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
J.C. Sharman

This article critiques explanations of the rise of the West in the early modern period premised on the thesis that military competition drove the development of gunpowder technology, new tactics, and the Westphalian state, innovations that enabled European trans-continental conquests. Even theories in International Relations and other fields that posit economic or social root causes of Western expansion often rely on this “military revolution” thesis as a crucial intervening variable. Yet, the factors that defined the military revolution in Europe were absent in European expeditions to Asia, Africa, and the Americas, and conventional accounts are often marred by Eurocentric biases. Given the insignificance of military innovations, Western expansion prior to the Industrial Revolution is best explained by Europeans’ ability to garner local support and allies, but especially by their deference to powerful non-Western polities.


Author(s):  
M.B. Magulov

This article examines the historical and military-historical research of Soviet, Kazakh and Russian scientists, the history of the creation of the armed forces on the territory of Kazakhstan, their formation and development. In Soviet historiography, the development of all national republics, especially their military history, was interpreted through the prism of the history of Russia or the Russian people. For many years, materials from this period (from the beginning of the 20th century until the collapse of the USSR) were not covered in the historical literature. For ideological reasons, the colonial policy of the Russian Empire was hushed up, especially during the First World War, when the "eastern aliens" were not drafted into the regular army, were used only in rear work, because the ruling elite did not trust them with weapons. This period has now begun to be viewed in a different way on the basis of new sources and began to acquire new content. At the same time, the author is guided by such a principle of scientific knowledge as historicism, consistency, comparatively comparable analysis and generalization.


2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Barton C. Hacker

Military revolutions are a normal consequence of the central role of military institutions in complex societies. They have everywhere occurred regularly, if infrequently; they are scarcely limited to Western Europe, or even to the modern world. This essay discusses recent writings on two military revolutions in the ancient world, both centered on the military horse: first, its domestication and its role in pulling war chariots; second, the transition from horse driving to horse riding in battle. The chariot revolution of the second millennium BC profoundly reshaped warfare and transformed polities all across Eurasia. The cavalry revolution of the first millennium BC proved equally transformative and far longer lasting. Despite the controversy that has come to surround the concept of military revolution, it may still be fruitfully applied to important aspects of the large-scale historical interactions between societies and their armed forces.


2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-74
Author(s):  
Marjolein 't Hart

With the following two contributions the International Review of Social History hopes to focus scholarly attention on a rather neglected theme: the labour conditions of the ordinary foot soldiers in rebel armed forces. Although quite disparate in time, social setting, and method, both articles deal with the position and circumstances of common soldiers; both study these soldiers during a period of civil war; and both deal with rebel forces that were ultimately to emerge victorious and eventually be transformed into a regular army. Erik Swart's contribution on the soldiers in the army of the northern Netherlands is set in the late sixteenth century, just after the start of Holland's war of independence. Within a couple of years, the military underwent a comprehensive process of professionalization. The consequences for ordinary soldiers were far reaching: lower wages, fewer privileges, fewer rights, and an obligation to carry out digging work and other forms of manual labour. By contrast, their predecessors (the Landsknechts) had enjoyed a significantly higher status, with a system of organization not much different from that of nineteenth-century trade unions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 117-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Burak Kadercan

Why are some states more willing to adopt military innovations than others? Why, for example, were the great powers of Europe able to successfully reform their military practices to better adapt to and participate in the so-called military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while their most important extra-European competitor, the Ottoman Empire, failed to do so? This puzzle is best explained by two factors: civil-military relations and historical timing. In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of an institutionally strong and internally cohesive army during the early stages of state formation—in the late fourteenth century—equipped the military with substantial bargaining powers. In contrast, the great powers of Europe drew heavily on private providers of military power during the military revolution and developed similar armies only by the second half of the seventeenth century, limiting the bargaining leverage of European militaries over their rulers. In essence, the Ottoman standing army was able to block reform efforts that it believed challenged its parochial interests. Absent a similar institutional challenge, European rulers initiated military reforms and motivated officers and military entrepreneurs to participate in the ongoing military revolution.


Author(s):  
Clifford J. Rogers

Throughout the period c. 1350–1650, warfare was endemic in European society, and most rulers and members of the political elite were deeply involved with the maintenance and use of armies and navies. Wars and the development of the “military art” (tactics, strategy, and other aspects of the conduct of war) are interesting subjects for historical inquiry in their own right. But since the mid–20th century students of warfare and military organizations, reflecting broader trends in the discipline of history, have tended to focus less on the details of fighting than on the social history of those who served in the armed forces (a large and relatively well-documented population). Archival studies, drawing on voluminous administrative records, have provided masses of information about topics such as recruitment, supply, soldiers’ living conditions and social backgrounds, and structures of command and control. Since 1956 much of this work has been tied in one way or another to a grand debate about a “Military Revolution” in the Reformation period. Some see this Military Revolution as resulting from technical-tactical change (particularly the rising importance of gunpowder weapons, both handguns and artillery, and then the new style of fortifications developed to resist cannon) and leading to major political and social changes, particularly linked to the rise of the modern state structure. This is true both of broad surveys and of the extensive literature on the development of the various national armed forces of Europe within the period.


2006 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Storrs

The early modern era saw important changes in the character of warfare in Europe, including the development of larger, permanent armies and navies. Historians have studied many key aspects of what some call the “military revolution”, whose character and timing have become a matter of debate; but some important features of these emerging military communities remain largely unexplored. One subject which has not attracted the attention it merits is that of the health of soldiers and sailors and of medical provision in the new armies and navies. The issue has not been entirely neglected, either generally, or as it relates to specific states, but focused studies are rare. This is unfortunate, not least because of the importance attached to the issue of sickness and medical provision by contemporaries, and the value of medical provision as a sort of test case by which to measure the effectiveness of medical services and hence to contribute to the “military revolution” debate. For some historians the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the first significant efforts to develop a structure of military and naval hospitals; for others, however, the extent of illness and the inadequacy of medical support services before the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic era suggests that many states failed to meet the organizational challenge posed by the growth of standing armed forces in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What follows is an investigation of the extent and nature of illness, and the effectiveness of medical provision in the armies and navies of one major player of the period, Spain in the reign of the last Habsburg, Charles II (1665–1700).


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 683-709
Author(s):  
Aleksander Bołdyrew ◽  
◽  
Karol Łopatecki ◽  

The aim of the article is to show the way of adaptation of the military potential of the Crown to the Tatar threat, which first emerged in 1468. In connection with the particular geopolitical situation we present the dissimilarity of military reforms from those in Western Europe. In order to prevent Tatar raids, a standing frontier army (obrona potoczna or Permanent Defense) was formed. In the 1520s, an innovative strategy was developed which involved creating two defense lines with a very deep reconnaissance, 500 kilometers east of Lviv, already on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The consequence of applying the new model of defense was a new type of armed forces developed approximately two decades later, the cossack cavalry. The article presents a phenomenon of the creation a unified, in terms of weaponry, light cavalry, the process of which took place in the 1540s and 50s. Earlier the troops had consisted of soldiers differently equipped and armored and using various horses. Out of this chaos there emerged more unified units, which was the result of experiences of south-east borderline defense. The article emphasizes it was neither commanders-in-chief nor political and governmental factors that played a key role in the tactical innovation was mid-level commanders (starosts, rotmistrzes). It was their experiments with different types of arms that brought about a revolution in the rearmament and uniformity of the cavalry. The paper indicates that the main originator of the transformations was the starost of Bar and Trembowla Bernard Pretwicz. A clear influence of political decisions and strategic concepts on the final transformations in the warfare tactics should be noted.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaushik Roy

AbstractDuring the seventeenth century, the East India Company (EIC) was a minor power in South Asia, repeatedly defeated in battle. However, this changed rapidly, beginning in the 1750s, as the EIC started projecting power from its coastal enclaves into the interior. One after other, the indigenous powers were defeated and destroyed. This article argues that the EIC’s military success was not merely the result of importing the military institutions that emerged in western Europe: there was no military revolution in early modern South Asia. Rather, the EIC blended imported British military institutions and techniques with South Asia’s indigenous military traditions, creating a hybrid military establishment in which South Asian manpower, animals, and economic resources were crucial. The article focuses on the construction of the EIC’s military establishment by concentrating on three spheres: military technology, manpower management, and logistics.


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