The hybrid military establishment of the East India Company in South Asia: 1750–1849

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaushik Roy

AbstractDuring the seventeenth century, the East India Company (EIC) was a minor power in South Asia, repeatedly defeated in battle. However, this changed rapidly, beginning in the 1750s, as the EIC started projecting power from its coastal enclaves into the interior. One after other, the indigenous powers were defeated and destroyed. This article argues that the EIC’s military success was not merely the result of importing the military institutions that emerged in western Europe: there was no military revolution in early modern South Asia. Rather, the EIC blended imported British military institutions and techniques with South Asia’s indigenous military traditions, creating a hybrid military establishment in which South Asian manpower, animals, and economic resources were crucial. The article focuses on the construction of the EIC’s military establishment by concentrating on three spheres: military technology, manpower management, and logistics.

2006 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stana Nenadic

The expansion of the British military establishment from c. 1730 to 1830 is well known, as is the large numbers Scots and particularly highlanders who formed the British officer class. There is a common assumption—in some respects well founded—that the army had a beneficial impact on the political and economic experience of Scotland. This article offers an alternative interpretation through a focus on the social and cultural implications for highland gentry families of having so many male kin engaged in one particular career. The first two sections examine the scale and increasing attractions of military employment relative to other career destinations, notably farming, the legal profession and trade via urban business apprenticeship. Two generations with different motivations are compared, and the importance of the loss of practical farming and commercial expertise is noted. The next section explores the impact of military employment on relationships within families, particularly between officers and their father or elder brother, but also on relationships with female kin and on the broader processes of family formation through marriage. Of particular significance was the tendency towards teenage recruitment among the highland officer class, which removed boys from the influence of family and gave rise to reckless behaviour, extreme individualism and conspicuous consumption, posing major problems for gentry families and estates. The article concludes that although the military profession was a valuable short-term route for disposing of sons in a gentlemanly manner, the impact on their families and on the highlands could be highly disruptive. Yes, there was success and material benefits for a lucky few, but also tragedy, failure and family discord for many.


2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Barton C. Hacker

Military revolutions are a normal consequence of the central role of military institutions in complex societies. They have everywhere occurred regularly, if infrequently; they are scarcely limited to Western Europe, or even to the modern world. This essay discusses recent writings on two military revolutions in the ancient world, both centered on the military horse: first, its domestication and its role in pulling war chariots; second, the transition from horse driving to horse riding in battle. The chariot revolution of the second millennium BC profoundly reshaped warfare and transformed polities all across Eurasia. The cavalry revolution of the first millennium BC proved equally transformative and far longer lasting. Despite the controversy that has come to surround the concept of military revolution, it may still be fruitfully applied to important aspects of the large-scale historical interactions between societies and their armed forces.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-684
Author(s):  
Erik Odegard

In February 1665, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) agreed to equip 20 ships for the Dutch fleet, six of which were specifically named Indiamen. This article will focus on this episode as the culmination of 25 years of VOC involvement in the Republic’s wars in Europe. During this period, the VOC acted at times as a sixth admiralty board. This article will argue that the ships that the VOC provided in 1665 should not be seen as armed merchantmen, but rather as a distinct type of warship. Drawing on fleet lists and armament figures, the case is made that the VOC provided important support for the fleet. In addition, it is argued that the VOC followed the technical changes in Dutch warship design in this period. The inability to cope with the risk of battlefleet strategy, not technical changes, forced the VOC out of its role as sixth admiralty.


2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-38
Author(s):  
Manas Dutta

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of research on the history of the colonial armies in South Asia in general and the Madras Presidency in particular. This has been further accentuated with the emergence of the new military history that explicates the social composition and the diverse recruitment procedures of the Madras Army, hitherto unexplored under the East India Company around the first half of the nineteenth century in India. In fact, the very concept of raising an army battalion in the subcontinent underwent change to meet the potential challenges of the other European authorities, which existed during that time. The very composition of the Madras Army and its diverse recruiting policies made the presidency army capable of handling the emerging threat and maintaining the trading interests in the subcontinent of the East India Company. The Madras Army looked upon the epitome of disciplined military tradition since its inception. This article argues how the social composition and recruiting procedures came to be conglomerated to form a distinct military establishment in south India under the company rule.


2019 ◽  
pp. 183-202
Author(s):  
Oleksii Sokyrko

The “Military Revolution”, which became a concentrated manifestation of Europe’s political leadership during the XVIIth – XVIIIth centuries, produced new realities in the military sphere: regular armies, subordinated and held by centralized states, unified arms and clothing, division into types of military forces, special drill and education for soldiers and officers. Leadership in military technology consisted of fortifications and artillery that developed in the direction of increasing technical capacity, unification and standardization of new weapons. New approaches to the organization of the armed forces changed the character of wars. If in the XVIIth century East and West of Europe had a kind of parity in their military achievements and technologies, then in the XVIIIth century it finally moved to the West. In this context, an important issue is how Western European achievements were spread in Ukraine, in particular the Cossack Hetmanate, whose military-political model was clearly structured for military purposes. The analysis of these influences and borrowings shows that they were heterogeneous in nature. In the Cossack army, elements of the regular troop duty and sentry service and even drill instructions were gradually being appeared. The Cossack starshyna (officials) faced with the practice of the regular army during the Russian imperial wars. However, all these influences were episodic and spontaneous, without changing the essence of the military institutions of the Hetmanate. In artillery, technical innovations were implemented more actively, but were hampered by lack of funding. In the fortification area, the control of which was completely transferred to imperial power, Western technologies and specialists, were used by metropolitan power in their own defensive projects. It is significant that the acquaintance and borrowing of any military innovations in the XVIIIth century occurred almost exclusively through Russian mediation. This tendency was fully in line with the gradual loss of the Hetmanate’s sovereignty, the destruction of its army.


2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tonio Andrade

Over the past few years, this journal has hosted a debate central to world history and historical sociology: Joseph M. Bryant’s bold assault on the revisionist model of global history and the revisionists’ equally trenchant defense. A key point of disagreement concerns Europeans' relative military advantages vis-a-vis Asians. Both sides cite literature from historians’ Military Revolution Model, but each takes different lessons from that literature. The revisionists see a slight military imbalance in favor of Europe but deny that it reflects a general European technological lead. Bryant believes that the European technological lead is significant and reflects a more general modernizing trend. This article tries to resolve the disagreement by appealing to data from East Asia. First, it argues that recent work in Asian history points to what we can call a Chinese Military Revolution, which compels us to place the European Military Revolution in a larger, Eurasian context: not just western European but also East Asian societies were undergoing rapid military change and modernization during the gunpowder age. Second, it adduces evidence from a new study of the Sino-Dutch War of 1661-1668 (a war that both Bryant and the revisionists cite, each, again, taking divergent lessons) to come to a more precise evaluation of the military balance between China and western Europe in the early modern period: western cannons and muskets didn’t provide a discernible advantage, but western war ships and renaissance forts did. The article concludes that the revisionists are correct in their belief that Asian societies were undergoing rapid changes in military technology and practices along the lines of those taking place in western Europe and that the standard model Bryant defends is incorrect because it presumes that Asian societies are more stagnant than is warranted by the evidence. At the same time, the article argues that counter-revisionists like Bryant are correct in their belief that military modernization was proceeding more quickly in Europe than that in Asia, which may indicate that the counter-revisionists are correct on a basic point: there was an early divergence between the west and the rest of Eurasia. At first this divergence was slight – so slight, indeed, that it probably left little clear evidence in the noisy and poor early modern data we have available. But the divergence increased over time. Thus, we can speak of a small but accelerating divergence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 683-709
Author(s):  
Aleksander Bołdyrew ◽  
◽  
Karol Łopatecki ◽  

The aim of the article is to show the way of adaptation of the military potential of the Crown to the Tatar threat, which first emerged in 1468. In connection with the particular geopolitical situation we present the dissimilarity of military reforms from those in Western Europe. In order to prevent Tatar raids, a standing frontier army (obrona potoczna or Permanent Defense) was formed. In the 1520s, an innovative strategy was developed which involved creating two defense lines with a very deep reconnaissance, 500 kilometers east of Lviv, already on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The consequence of applying the new model of defense was a new type of armed forces developed approximately two decades later, the cossack cavalry. The article presents a phenomenon of the creation a unified, in terms of weaponry, light cavalry, the process of which took place in the 1540s and 50s. Earlier the troops had consisted of soldiers differently equipped and armored and using various horses. Out of this chaos there emerged more unified units, which was the result of experiences of south-east borderline defense. The article emphasizes it was neither commanders-in-chief nor political and governmental factors that played a key role in the tactical innovation was mid-level commanders (starosts, rotmistrzes). It was their experiments with different types of arms that brought about a revolution in the rearmament and uniformity of the cavalry. The paper indicates that the main originator of the transformations was the starost of Bar and Trembowla Bernard Pretwicz. A clear influence of political decisions and strategic concepts on the final transformations in the warfare tactics should be noted.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-406
Author(s):  
Cécile Fabre

AbstractJust war theorists who argue that war is morally justified under certain circumstances infer implicitly that establishing the military institutions needed to wage war is also morally justified. In this paper, I mount a case in favor of a standing military establishment: to the extent that going to war is a way to discharge duties to protect fellow citizens and distant strangers from grievous harms, we have a duty to set up the institutions that enable us to discharge that duty. I then respond to four objections drawn from Ned Dobos's recent book Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine.


Author(s):  
Carolyn J. Anderson

Scotland generated four Jacobite risings from 1689 to 1745, plus Franco-Jacobite invasion threats in 1708 and 1744. British military mapping was the responsibility of the London-based Board of Ordnance. After the 1707 Act of Union the Scottish Ordnance Office came under London control and received additional staff. Road making was initiated, associated with Generals George Wade and William Roy. Originally fortress-oriented, the Drawing Room in the Tower of London shifted to producing topographical surveys, oriented after 1746 towards transportation, development and integration.


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