scholarly journals Public support for lockdown policies

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-309
Author(s):  
David Boto-Garcia

Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 disease, many countries have been forced to impose non-pharmaceutical policy interventions such as lockdowns to stop community transmission. We investigate public support for the lockdown policy in Spain, one of the countries most affected by the pandemic and with the strictest lockdown in Europe. Based on survey data collected during the first weeks of March and April 2020, we investigate how public support for the lockdown relates to the number of confirmed cases in the province of residence, personal institutional trust and concern about the severity of coronavirus. We find that public approval of the lockdown significantly relates to the evolution of COVID cases, institutional trust, political ideology and personal economic situation.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Debus ◽  
Jale Tosun

AbstractThe COVID-19 pandemic has forced governments to impose major restrictions on individual freedom in order to stop the spread of the virus. With the successful development of a vaccine, these restrictions are likely to become obsolete—on the condition that people get vaccinated. However, parts of the population have reservations against vaccination. While this is not a recent phenomenon, it might prove a critical one in the context of current attempts to manage the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the task of designing policies suitable for attaining high levels of vaccination deserves enhanced attention. In this study, we use data from the Eurobarometer survey fielded in March 2019. They show that 39% of Europeans consider vaccines to cause the diseases which they should protect against, that 50% believe vaccines have serious side effects, that 32% think that vaccines weaken the immune system, and that 10% do not believe vaccines are tested rigorously before authorization. We find that—even when controlling for important individual-level factors—ideological extremism on both ends of the spectrum explains skepticism of vaccination. We conclude that policymakers must either politicize the issue or form broad alliances among parties and societal groups in order to increase trust in and public support for the vaccines in general and for vaccines against COVID-19 in particular, since the latter were developed in a very short time period and resulted—in particular in case of the AstraZeneca vaccine—in reservations because of the effectiveness and side effects of the new vaccines.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110602
Author(s):  
David A. Steinberg

A burgeoning literature shows that international trade and migration shocks influence individuals’ political attitudes, but relatively little is known about how international financial shocks impact public opinion. This study examines how one prevalent type of international financial shock—currency crises—shapes mass political attitudes. I argue that currency crises reduce average citizens’ support for incumbent governments. I also expect voters’ concerns about their own pocketbooks to influence their response to currency crises. Original survey data from Turkey support these arguments. Exploiting exogenous variation in the currency’s value during the survey window, I show that currency depreciations strongly reduce support for the government. This effect is stronger among individuals that are more negatively affected by depreciation, and it is moderated by individuals’ perceptions of their personal economic situation. This evidence suggests that international financial shocks can strongly influence the opinions of average voters, and it provides further support for pocketbook theories.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-607 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dieuwertje Kuijpers ◽  
Gijs Schumacher

Abstract Do political parties change their position when military casualties increase? Several studies demonstrate that once military casualties increase, public support for sometimes even the government itself declines. With this potential backlash, once governing parties are faced with military casualties, do they (1) maintain that intervention was the “right thing” to do and even escalate their commitment by becoming even more pro-military or (2) try to avoid the blame and downplay the issue, i.e., “not mentioning the war”? And do the opposition parties become more negative or more positive about the military? To evaluate this, we measure the position on military issues in parties’ election manifestoes. Our dataset comprises 326 party policy changes in eleven Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and focuses on post-Cold War military interventions. By using pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis, we find that opposition parties and governing parties respond differently. Generally, governing parties become more negative in their manifesto and opposition parties more positive. We also demonstrate important differences between party families and pre/post-9/11. Our analyses show that whether political parties change policy course once confronted with negative outcomes depends on their position in office, and also the direction in which they change policy depends on political ideology.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
John Zhuang Liu

Abstract This article is the first to report the nationwide public support rate for the death penalty in China. Using a national representative sample with 31,664 respondents, it shows that 68 per cent of China's citizens are for the death penalty, while 31 per cent are opposed to it. These numbers suggest that support for capital punishment in China, although strong, is much weaker than in some other East Asian jurisdictions and less than first assumed by commentators. However, contrary to previous notions that public support for the death penalty derives from uninformed popular prejudice, it is the elites in China – i.e. those who receive higher education – who are more in favour of the death penalty. Further empirical analyses suggest that this is not because of political ideology or fear of crime. Rather, the reason is likely that the elites know fewer, and sympathize less with, criminal offenders, who generally come from underprivileged groups. These findings challenge a range of prevailing perceptions of public attitudes to the death penalty in China, especially the culture explanation for the Chinese public's punitiveness, and have important policy implications.


2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Jolien Galle ◽  
Koen Abts ◽  
Marc Swyngedouw ◽  
Bart Meuleman

This article contributes to the debate about migration’s impact on welfare state support by investigating the welfare opinions of migrants and their descendants. It examines whether experiences of group and individual discrimination explain the welfare attitudes of this group over and beyond classical predictors of self-interest and political ideology. Using survey data from Belgian citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent, we show that stronger support for redistribution is associated with higher levels of perceived group discrimination, religious involvement, and belonging to the second generation. Preferences of government responsibility, however, are strongly determined by labor market position and left-right ideology.


2001 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 901-922 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernadette C. Hayes ◽  
Ian McAllister

While much attention has been devoted to political efforts to solve the Northern Ireland problem, less attention has been given to the role of political violence in sustaining the conflict. We argue that one of the reasons for the intractability of the conflict is widespread exposure to political violence among the civil population. By 1998, thirty years after the conflict started, one in seven of the population reported being a victim of violence; one in five had a family member killed or injured; and one in four had been caught up in an explosion. Such widespread exposure to violence exists alongside latent support for paramilitarism among a significant minority of both communities. Using 1998 survey data, we show that exposure to violence serves to enhance public support for paramilitary groups, as well as to reduce support for the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. Overall, the results suggest that only a lengthy period without political violence will undermine support for paramilitarism and result in the decommissioning of weapons.


2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maura Kelly ◽  
Gordon Gauchat

Feminist scholars and activists have endorsed a broad and intersectional political agenda that addresses multiple dimensions of inequality, such as gender, sexuality, race/ethnicity, and class. We examine whether or not this perspective is also held by self-identified feminists in the general public. Drawing on public opinion polls from 2007 to 2009, we assess self-identified feminists’ attitudes toward a range of social policies. We find that after controlling for sociodemographic factors and political ideology, feminist identity is associated with progressive attitudes on policies related to gender and sexuality (e.g., abortion) as well as policies related to other social justice issues (e.g., immigration, health care). We also find some interactions between feminist identity and gender, age, education, and political ideology, suggesting some heterogeneity in feminists’ political attitudes. Overall, these findings suggest that feminists in the general public support an intersectional social justice agenda rather than a narrow focus on gender issues.


2008 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 653-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Curtice ◽  
Seyd Ben ◽  
Thomson Katarina

The introduction of directly elected mayors potentially represents a major reform of the operation of local government in Britain. Drawing upon survey data collected at the time of the first two London mayoral elections, this article considers whether such elections necessarily deliver the advantages claimed for them by their advocates. It addresses three questions: (1) What was the basis of public support for the new institutions; (2) who participated in the London elections, and why; and (3) what accounts for voting behaviour in the London elections? In particular we examine how far the election of a single-person executive helps provide people with a clear choice, encourages citizens to vote on the qualities of individual candidates rather than on their party affiliation, and motivates people to vote on distinctively local issues as opposed to national ones. Our results suggest that while mayoral elections deliver some of the advantages claimed for them, they may be less successful on others. The extent to which directly elected mayors enhance the local electoral process is thus doubtful.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell

How does an authoritarian past shape voters’ left-right orientation? Recent studies investigate “anti-dictator bias” in political ideology, where citizens in a former right-wing (left-wing) dictatorship may display a leftist (rightist) bias in their ideological self-identification. In this paper, I provide evidence for a “pro-dictator bias” where citizens hold ideological positions corresponding to those of the dictator depending on their experiences during and after transition. In countries with negotiated transitions and stronger former ruling parties, these successors could continue mobilizing the popular base of the former dictatorship with inherited advantages from the past and by invoking nostalgia through consistent reference to previous authoritarian achievements. I test this hypothesis with variables measuring successor party strength and the type of regime transition by combining individual-level survey data and country-level data. The findings emphasize the role of post-transition features in shaping alternative legacies on voter attitudes in former authoritarian societies.


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