Forging Bureaucratic Autonomy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Oleksak
Author(s):  
Morten Egeberg ◽  
Jarle Trondal

This chapter draws attention to the effects of vertical specialization of organizations and how it affects public governance. The chapter documents that agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) departments. This finding also holds when controlling for variation in tasks, the political salience of issue areas, and officials’ rank. In addition, it is documented that the greater the organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political leadership. Expert concerns are strongly emphasized at both levels; however, agency personnel are more sensitive to the influence of affected parties. The chapter applies large-N questionnaire data at four points in time (1986, 1996, 2006, and 2016) that spans three decades and shifting administrative doctrines: New Public Management as well as post-New Public Management.


1986 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rob Flynn

The influence of state bureaucrats and professionals on public policy is empirically and theoretically problematic. Recent work concerning the ‘dual politics thesis' has suggested that bureaucratic autonomy will flourish particularly at the regional level of the state. Evidence about decentralization in the Dutch housing system is reviewed which generally supports this thesis. However, it is argued that regional bureaucratic and professional power in housing policy, and the specific institutional arrangements for decentralization, must also be explained in terms of the distinctive nature of Dutch pillarized society and politics.


2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOSÉ CARLOS ORIHUELA

AbstractWhy and how do societies transform the environmental rules of economic development, or fail to do so? This article compares the experiences of Chile and Peru in the regulation of smelting activities between 1990 and 2010. Air pollution from smelters in Chuquicamata and La Oroya, each emblematic of the two countries’ mining industries, did not give rise to nationally destabilising protest. Nevertheless, despite the absence of pressing discontent with pollution, the environmental rules for mining could still be improved as a result of policy network activism and through highly idiosyncratic institutional channels. The analysis shows that policy entrepreneurship for Chuquicamata was enhanced by a national institutional environment that favoured bureaucratic autonomy, while parallel action for La Oroya was constrained by a political economy of state weakness and elite disregard.


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