scholarly journals Sanctus: An Architecture for Trusted Products

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 58-84
Author(s):  
Malcolm Shore ◽  
Andy Clark ◽  
Sherali Zeadally
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
State Security ◽  
Product Engineering ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government ◽  
Commercial Networks ◽  
Engineering Practices ◽  
Fundamental Shift

The last two decades have seen a fundamental shift in the manufacturing, sourcing and operation of technology, which has raised concerns in state security agencies about the cybersecurity risk to government and critical infrastructure. Sophisticated cyber attacks continue to be launched by state actors worldwide, while the engineering practices in common use have failed to deliver a commensurate improvement in technology cyber security. Cyber attacks continue to be successful against commercial networks, leading the US Government to encourage government agencies to look towards models such as zero-trust networking and tailored trustworthy spaces. There has been progress in product engineering, with formal methodologies such as Correctness by Construction (CbyC) successfully producing commercial products with increased trustworthiness. However, the adoption of these techniques has been limited, and governments are now increasingly resorting to an approach of technology Balkanization, where import and use of products and components may be restricted based on their country of origin. Even in the early stages of this strategy, the effect upon the economy is significantly adverse. We propose an alternative to technology Balkanization by combining trustworthy engineering approaches with the use of a national security component we call a sanctum which together can deliver sovereign trust.

scholarly journals Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

2016 ◽  
pp. 448-465
Author(s):  
Ana Kovacevic ◽  
Dragana Nikolic
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Infrastructure Systems ◽  
Cyber Threats ◽  
Scada Systems ◽  
Insight Into

We are facing the expansion of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more severe. This results in the necessity to improve security, especially in the vulnerable field of critical infrastructure. One of the problems in the security of critical infrastructures is the level of awareness related to the effect of cyberattacks. The threat to critical infrastructure is real, so it is necessary to be aware of it and anticipate, predict, and prepare against a cyber attack. The main reason for the escalation of cyberattacks in the field of Critical Infrastructure (CI) may be that most control systems used for CI do not utilise propriety protocols and software anymore; they instead utilise standard solutions. As a result, critical infrastructure systems are more than ever before becoming vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. It is important to get an insight into what attack types occur, as this may help direct cyber security efforts. In this chapter, the authors present vulnerabilities of SCADA systems against cyber attack, analyse and classify existing cyber attacks, and give future directions to achieve better security of SCADA systems.

Radicals and Rebels

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dauvergne
Keyword(s):  
September 11 ◽  
War On Terrorism ◽  
Business Associations ◽  
Business Interests ◽  
State Security ◽  
Environmental Ngos ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Government ◽  
History Of

This chapter adds to the book’s understanding of the shifting nature and great challenges confronting environmentalism, especially more radical strands. A glance at the history of Greenpeace reveals sharp differences as the organization was forming in the 1970s; even today the activism of Paul Watson, who left Greenpeace to spearhead the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, draws the ire of Greenpeace leaders. Since the war on terrorism took root after September 11, 2001, radical activists such as Watson have been increasingly marginalized, with the US government even declaring him an “eco-terrorist.” As this chapter notes, though, many environmentalists who challenge state and business interests face even greater threats, with hundreds murdered over the past two decades. State security agencies are not the only group sidelining radical environmentalists, however; so are business associations, media outlets, and mainstream environmental NGOs.

Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

2015 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Kovacevic ◽  
Dragana Nikolic
Keyword(s):  
Control Systems ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Infrastructure Systems ◽  
Cyber Threats ◽  
Scada Systems ◽  
Insight Into

We are facing the expansion of cyber incidents, and they are becoming more severe. This results in the necessity to improve security, especially in the vulnerable field of critical infrastructure. One of the problems in the security of critical infrastructures is the level of awareness related to the effect of cyberattacks. The threat to critical infrastructure is real, so it is necessary to be aware of it and anticipate, predict, and prepare against a cyber attack. The main reason for the escalation of cyberattacks in the field of Critical Infrastructure (CI) may be that most control systems used for CI do not utilise propriety protocols and software anymore; they instead utilise standard solutions. As a result, critical infrastructure systems are more than ever before becoming vulnerable and exposed to cyber threats. It is important to get an insight into what attack types occur, as this may help direct cyber security efforts. In this chapter, the authors present vulnerabilities of SCADA systems against cyber attack, analyse and classify existing cyber attacks, and give future directions to achieve better security of SCADA systems.

Cyber Attacks and Preliminary Steps in Cyber Security in National Protection

2018 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Faruk Aydin ◽  
O. Tolga Pusatli
Keyword(s):  
Cyber Security ◽  
Information Technologies ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
National Development ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Private Companies ◽  
Nation States ◽  
Development Plans ◽  
Security Standards

Cyber attacks launched by individuals and/or supported by nation states have increased due to the prevalence of information technologies at critical infrastructure of the states. In this chapter, such attacks and consecutive impacts are visited. In connection with this issue, evolution of cyber threats from annoying malware to serious weapons is studied by examples; hence, precautions against such threats are visited and usage of anti-malware applications as prevalent precautions is assessed within the scope. Selected information security standards and strategies of selected states and precautions for cyber security of Turkey are studied. Our findings underline that educated citizens and companies along with public institutions should cooperate to provide a nationwide cyber security. Consequently, it is defended that governments should play an affective role to protect, educate, and guide governmental and private companies and citizens on the cyber security by promoting the cyber security topic in the successive national development plans.

scholarly journals Cyber security threats in the microbial genomics era: implications for public health

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Iliya Fayans ◽  
Yair Motro ◽  
Lior Rokach ◽  
Yossi Oren ◽  
Jacob Moran-Gilad
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Rapid Evolution ◽  
Health Sector ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Disruptive Technology ◽  
Security Threats ◽  
Threat Mitigation ◽  
Next Generation Sequencing Ngs

Next generation sequencing (NGS) is becoming the new gold standard in public health microbiology. Like any disruptive technology, its growing popularity inevitably attracts cyber security actors, for whom the health sector is attractive because it combines mission-critical infrastructure and high-value data with cybersecurity vulnerabilities. In this Perspective, we explore cyber security aspects of microbial NGS. We discuss the motivations and objectives for such attack, its feasibility and implications, and highlight policy considerations aimed at threat mitigation. Particular focus is placed on the attack vectors, where the entire process of NGS, from sample to result, could be vulnerable, and a risk assessment based on probability and impact for representative attack vectors is presented. Cyber attacks on microbial NGS could result in loss of confidentiality (leakage of personal or institutional data), integrity (misdetection of pathogens) and availability (denial of sequencing services). NGS platforms are also at risk of being used as propagation vectors, compromising an entire system or network. Owing to the rapid evolution of microbial NGS and its applications, and in light of the dynamics of the cyber security domain, frequent risk assessments should be carried out in order to identify new threats and underpin constantly updated public health policies.

scholarly journals Legal Framework of the Space Activity Cybersecurity in the USA: Experience for Ukraine

2020 ◽  
pp. 325-335
Author(s):  
Nataliia Malysheva ◽  
Anna Hurova
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Space Activity ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Space Activities ◽  
Law Making

The article depict the timeline of the development of the cybersecurity legislation in the USA, which divided into two stages. Thefirst one rises as a response to the large-scale terroristic threats in 2001 and lasted until 2014. The second one starts with the massiveand multisectoral cyber incidents and cyber-attacks the US faced in the last five years. In addition, it was analyzed the changes in institutionalstructure aimed to support the cybersecurity in the US and their branched connections with public and private actors. The mainattention was paid to the content of the Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-5 “Cybersecurity Principles for Space Systems”, whichcould be the example of the best law-making practice not only for space actors within the US, but also for law-making actors of allspace-faring nations.The chronology of the elaboration of cybersecurity legislation and the institutional structure of their support in Ukraine analyzedin the second part of this article. On this ground, we observed some weak aspects of national cyber legislation. First is duplication andinconsistency of the basic terms, like “cyberattack”, “critical infrastructure”. The second one is the absence of an approved list of cri -tical infrastructure facilities and clear requirements for conducting an independent information security audit. The third one is by-lawsare aimed primarily at protecting public information resources and do not take into account the requirements for cooperation betweenthe public and private sectors in the protection of critical infrastructure, regardless of its affiliation to any form of ownership.Analysis of the draft law concerned critical infrastructure permits to make a conclusion about coming to the second stage in thedevelopment of cyber legislation in Ukraine, which will enhance the development of particular legislation within to each sector of criticalinfrastructure. In this regard, it is necessary to elaborate legal background for cybersecurity of space activity. For this aim, we supposeas necessary to designate the State Space Agency of Ukraine as a responsible entity in the field of space activities for the specifiedsector of critical infrastructure. Furthermore, the article suggested prescribing plans to protect against cyber threats (cyber attacks orcyber incidents) as one of the necessary documents for obtaining a permit to conduct certain types of space activities.

Comparison between Saudi Arabia and USA: Prevention and Dealing with Cyber Security

2021 ◽  
pp. 77-87
Author(s):  
Sonia Ibrahim ◽  
◽  
◽  
◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Deep Learning ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Denial Of Service ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Sensitive Data ◽  
External Threats ◽  
The Us ◽  
Security Practices ◽  
Training And Support

Cyber security practices mainly involve the prevention of external threats to software, hardware, server data, and other assets which are connected to the internet. Organizations follow a lot of cyber security practices to protect their systems and databases from malicious cyber actors. Cybercriminals use different techniques like spear-phishing, phishing, password attack, denial of service, ransomware, etc. to cause harm to people, organizations, and governments and steal important information from them. We analyzed the use of deep learning algorithms to deal with cyber-attacks. Deep neural networks or deep learning consist of machine learning procedures to support the network to fix complex issues and learn from unmanaged data. In addition, we also analyzed some of the cyber security laws and practices implemented in the US and Saudi Arabia to work collaboratively against cyber threats. It is observed that both countries are doing well against cyberthreats, but they need to work even more to provide training and support to professionals in the public sector who handle sensitive data about cyber security.

scholarly journals Beyond Physical Threats: Cyber-attacks on Critical Infrastructure as a Challenge of Changing Security Environment – Overview of Cyber-security legislation and implementation in SEE Countries

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Cesarec
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Critical Infrastructure ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Critical Infrastructures ◽  
Cyber Attack ◽  
Member States ◽  
Industrial Control Systems ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Cyber Threats

States, organizations and individuals are becoming targets of both individual and state-sponsored cyber-attacks, by those who recognize the impact of disrupting security systems and effect to people and governments. The energy sector is seen as one of the main targets of cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure, but transport, public sector services, telecommunications and critical (manufacturing) industries are also very vulnerable. One of most used example of cyber-attack is the Ukraine power grid attack in 2015 that left 230,000 people without power for up to 6 hours. Another most high profile example of a cyber-attack against critical infrastructure is the Stuxnet computer virus (first used on Iranian nuclear facility) which could be adapted to attack the SCADA systems (industrial control systems) used by many critical infrastructures in Europe.Wide range of critical infrastructure sectors are reliant on industrial control systems for monitoring processes and controlling physical devices (sensors, pumps, etc.) and for that reason, physical connected devices that support industrial processes are becoming more vulnerable. Not all critical infrastructure operators in all sectors are adequately prepared to manage protection (and raise resilience) effectively across both cyber and physical environments. Additionally there are few challenges in implementation of protection measures, such as lack of collaboration between private and public sector and low levels of awareness on existence of national key legislation.From supranational aspect, in relation to this papers topic, the European Union has took first step in defense to cyber threats in 2016 with „Directive on security of network and information systems“ (NIS Directive) by prescribing member states to adopt more rigid cyber-security standards. The aim of directive is to improve the deterrent and increase the EU’s defenses and reactions to cyber attacks by expanding the cyber security capacity, increasing collaboration at an EU level and introducing measures to prevent risk and handle cyber incidents. There are lot of other „supporting tools“ for Member States countries, such as European Union Agency for Network and Information Security – ENISA (which organize regular cyber security exercises at an EU level, including a large and comprehensive exercise every two years, raising preparedness of EU states); Network of National Coordination Centers and the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre; and Coordinated response to major cyber security incidents and crises (Blueprint) with aim to ensure a rapid and coordinated response to large-scale cyber attacks by setting out suitable processes within the EU.Yet, not all Member States share the same capacities for achieving the highest level of cyber-security. They need to continuously work on enhancing the capability of defense against cyber threats as increased risk to state institutions information and communication systems but also the critical infrastructure objects. In Southeast Europe there are few additional challenges – some countries even don't have designated critical infrastructures (lower level of protection; lack of „clear vision“ of criticality) and critical infrastructures are only perceived through physical prism; non-EU countries are not obligated to follow requirements of European Union and its legislation, and there are interdependencies and transboundary cross-sector effects that needs to be taken in consideration. Critical infrastructure Protection (CIP) is the primary area of action, and for some of SEE countries (like the Republic of Croatia) the implementation of cyber security provisions just complements comprehensive activities which are focused on physical protection.This paper will analyze few segments of how SEE countries cope with new security challenges and on which level are they prepared for cyber-attacks and threats: 1. Which security mechanisms they use; 2. The existing legislation (Acts, Strategies, Plan of Action, etc.) related to cyber threats in correlation with strategic critical infrastructure protection documents. Analysis will have two perspectives: from EU member states and from non-EU member states point of view. Additionally, for EU member states it will be analyzed if there were any cyber security legislation before NIS directive that meets same aims. The aim of research is to have an overall picture of efforts in region regarding cyber-security as possibility for improvement thorough cooperation, organizational measures, etc. providing also some recommendations to reduce the gap in the level of cyber-security development with other regions of EU.

Geopolitical tensions will add to UAE cyber threats

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United Arab Emirates ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Cyber Attacks ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Us ◽  
Home Depot ◽  
Virus Attack ◽  
State Group ◽  
Cyber Conflict

Subject The threats and capabilities of UAE in cyber security. Significance Concerns over cyber security are mounting with high-profile commercial breaches on companies such as TV5 Monde, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Target and Home Depot, and disclosures on nation-state capabilities and actions, such as the Stuxnet attack on Iranian centrifuges at Natanz in 2010 and the Shamoon virus attack on Saudi Aramco in 2012. The combination of rising cyber crime and geopolitical cyber conflict, not least that emanating from the Islamic State group (ISG), alarms the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as it seeks to enhance its position as a financial and logistics hub. Impacts Cyber-savvy ISG sympathisers are likely to conduct further cyber attacks to avenge the US-led air campaign against ISG. ISG-sympathetic insiders may be an even higher threat to businesses and governments. Managed Security Services Providers (MSSP) will be the primary beneficiary of moves to increase cyber security.

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