Risky Border Crossings

2019 ◽  
pp. 19-31
Author(s):  
Jason De León

De León provides a critique of “Prevention through Deterrence,” the federal border enforcement policy that encourages migrants to cross in areas characterized by extreme environmental conditions and a high risk of death. This policy has failed to deter border crossers while successfully turning the rugged terrain of southern Arizona into a killing field for all undocumented migrants. The threatening space of the U.S.-Mexico border poses particular threats to children and youth who are attempting to cross, especially when crossing without adult family members. Guides and smugglers typically facilitate the movement of young people, or—which is equally dangerous—children increasingly attempt to cross alone or with groups of other children. As children and youth are apprehended trying to enter the United States, they also enter a complicated system of immigration enforcement and detention.

The book considers illegality, deportability, and deportation in the lives of young people—those who migrate as well as those who are affected by the migration of others. A primary focus of the volume is to understand how children and youth encounter, move through, or are outside of a range of legal processes, including border enforcement, immigration detention, federal custody, courts, and state processes of categorization. Even if young people do not directly interact with state immigration systems—because they are U.S. citizens or have avoided detention—they are nonetheless deeply impacted by the reach of the government in its many forms. Combining different perspectives from advocates, service providers, attorneys, researchers, and, significantly, young immigrants, the book presents ethnographically rich accounts that can contribute to informed debates and policy reforms. By underscoring the ways in which young people encounter and/or avoid legal systems, the book problematizes the policies, laws, and legal categories that shape so much of daily life of young immigrants. The book makes visible the burdens, hopes, and potential of a population of young people and their families who have been largely hidden from public view and are currently under siege, following young people as they move into, through, and out of the complicated immigration systems and institutions in the United States.


Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); Its inability to meet the administration’s goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one- third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.  


Author(s):  
Jennifer Echemendia

In 1994, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) instituted a border enforcement policy aimed at deterring illegal immigration along strategic points of the United States’ southern border by increasing the presence of border patrol agents and constructing physical barriers. 3 The INS anticipated that securing conventional routes of entry would force illegal immigrants to more remote and rugged sections of the border that would be more difficult to traverse.4 The ultimate success of the policy has been debated, but it did result in a substantial decrease of illegal entries in places like San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas.5 As anticipated, the number of attempted illegal entries also increased along more remote sections of the border, although it is unclear that the inhospitable terrain has deterred significant numbers of illegal immigrants from crossing the border.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 481-490 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Alden

For too long, the policy debate over border enforcement has been split between those who believe the border can be sealed against illegal entry by force alone, and those who believe that any effort to do so is futile and without expanded legal work opportunities. And for too long, both sides have been able to muster evidence to make their cases — the enforcers pointing to targeted successes at sealing the border, and the critics pointing to continued illegal entry despite the billions spent on enforcement. Until recently it has been hard to referee the disputes with any confidence because the data was simply inadequate — both sides could muster their preferred measures to make their case. But improvements in both data and analysis are increasingly making it possible to offer answers to the critical question of the effectiveness of border enforcement in stopping and deterring illegal entry. The new evidence suggests that unauthorized migration across the southern border has plummeted, with successful illegal entries falling from roughly 1.8 million in 2000 to just 200,000 by 2015. Border enforcement has been a significant reason for the decline — in particular, the growing use of “consequences” such as jail time for illegal border crossers has had a powerful effect in deterring repeated border crossing efforts. The success of deterrence through enforcement has meant that attempted crossings have fallen dramatically even as the likelihood of a border crosser being apprehended by the Border Patrol has only risen slightly, to just over a 50–50 chance. These research advances should help to inform a more rational public debate over the incremental benefits of additional border enforcement expenditures. With Congress gearing up to consider budget proposals from the Trump administration that seek an additional $2.6 billion for border security, including construction of new physical barriers, the debate is long overdue. In particular, Congress should be taking a careful look at the incremental gains that might come from additional spending on border enforcement. The evidence suggests that deterrence through enforcement, despite its successes to date in reducing illegal entry across the border, is producing diminishing returns. There are three primary reasons. First, arrivals at the border are increasingly made up of asylum seekers from Central America rather than traditional economic migrants from Mexico; this is a population that is both harder to deter because of the dangers they face at home, and in many cases not appropriate to deter because the United States has legal obligations to consider serious requests for asylum. Second, the majority of additions to the US unauthorized population is now arriving on legal visas and then overstaying; enforcement at the southern border does nothing to respond to this challenge. And finally, among Mexican migrants, a growing percentage of the repeat border crossers are parents with children left behind in the United States, a population that is far harder to deter than young economic migrants. The administration could better inform this debate by releasing to scholars and the public the research it has sponsored in order to give Americans a fuller picture on border enforcement.


Author(s):  
Juan D. De Lara

In the final chapter, the book considers how the region’s emerging Latinx majority has confronted and transformed inland California’s old geographies of race and class. It examines how key elected leaders tied the region’s growing Latinx population to the national discourse on border enforcement and undocumented immigration. One result is that the growing Latinx population was racialized as suspect citizens within the broader policy debate about the United States–Mexico border. The chapter concludes by showing how social-movement organizations mobilized to transform local institutions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren

For years, noncitizens who fail to abide by the terms of their nonimmigrant (temporary) visas were not widely recognized as major contributors to the US undocumented population. Yet since 2005, the ratio of overstays to illegal entries across the border has increased rapidly as the number of border crossings dropped to 1970s levels. As a result, the inflow of overstays has exceeded border crossers for nearly a decade. These developments highlight the importance of accurate and timely estimates of overstays.In 2017, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a report, Fiscal Year 2016 Entry/Exit Overstay Report, showing estimates of overstays, by country, for the 50.4 million nonimmigrants admitted in fiscal year 2016 (DHS 2017). At the end of the fiscal year, DHS had not verified the departure of 628,799 nonimmigrants.[1]The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) compared the DHS overstay estimates to CMS’s estimates of the number of undocumented residents that arrived in the past few years. Data were available to make the comparisons for 133 countries; these countries account for 99 percent of all overstays. The major findings include the following:For 90 of the 133 countries, the DHS and CMS estimates differ by less than 2,000, and the correlation between the estimates for those 90 countries is .97, which indicates a very close mutual relationship.The DHS estimates of overstays for Canada are far too high.The DHS estimates greatly exceed the CMS estimates for about 30 countries, half of them participants in the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP).[2]Slightly more than half of the 628,799 reported to be overstays by DHS actually left the country but their departures were not recorded.After adjusting the DHS estimates to take account of unrecorded departures, as well as departures in 2016 of overstays that lived here in 2015, overstay population growth was near zero in 2016.Thus, while overstays account for a large percentage of the newly undocumented, they represent less than half (44 percent) of the overall undocumented population, and they are less likely than illegal border crossers to be long-term residents.The country-specific figures shown here should help DHS focus its efforts on improving the verification of departures of temporary visitors.    Finally, these comparisons indicate that the DHS estimates do not provide a sound basis for making decisions about admission to, or continuation in, the VWP. [1] The 628,799 figure refers to nonimmigrants that arrived in 2016 and whose departure had not been verified by the end of 2016. Thus, as demonstrated in this paper, it includes nonimmigrant admissions whose departure was not verified and actual overstays.[2] The US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is described at  https://www.dhs.gov/visa-waiver-program, as follows: “The VWP, which is administered by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in consultation with the State Department, permits citizens of 38 countriesto travel to the United States for business or tourism for stays of up to 90 days without a visa. In return, those 38 countries must permit US citizens and nationals to travel to their countries for a similar length of time without a visa for business or tourism purposes.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Lougee ◽  
Gregory L. Hess ◽  
David C. Winston

Introduction The Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) maintains medicolegal jurisdiction over Southern Arizona, which includes the Sonoran Desert and the Arizona/Mexico border. Given the unique climate and biodiversity of the Sonoran Desert coupled with the Mexican border, environmental-related deaths are represented in proportions different from other jurisdictions in the United States. Methods A retrospective study of deaths falling into one of five categories (hyperthermia, hypothermia, undetermined with skeletal and/or mummified modifiers, venom-related, and lightning) certified by the PCOME between January 1, 2010 and December 1, 2017 was conducted by searching the PCOME electronic database. Results and Discussion Of the 16 649 cases certified by the office during that time, 639 were categorized into one of the above five categories. Hyperthermia cases were the most common, followed by undetermined, hypothermia, venom-related, and lightning. A unique population of individuals referred to as undocumented border crossers (UBCs) is discussed and accounted for 470 of the 639 deaths.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Warren ◽  
Donald Kerwin

The Trump administration has made the construction of an “impregnable” 2,000-mile wall across the length of the US-Mexico border a centerpiece of its executive orders on immigration and its broader immigration enforcement strategy. This initiative has been broadly criticized based on: • Escalating cost projections: an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study recently set the cost at $21.6 billion over three and a half years; • Its necessity given the many other enforcement tools — video surveillance, drones, ground sensors, and radar technologies — and Border Patrol personnel, that cover the US-Mexico border: former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and other experts have argued that a wall does not add enforcement value except in heavy crossing areas near towns, highways, or other “vanishing points” (Kerwin 2016); • Its cost-effectiveness given diminished Border Patrol apprehensions (to roughly one-fourth the level of historic highs) and reduced illegal entries (to roughly one-tenth the 2005 level according to an internal DHS study) (Martinez 2016); • Its efficacy as an enforcement tool: between FY 2010 and FY 2015, the current 654-mile pedestrian wall was breached 9,287 times (GAO 2017, 22); • Its inability to meet the administration's goal of securing “operational control” of the border, defined as “the prevention of all unlawful entries to the United States” (White House 2017); • Its deleterious impact on bi-national border communities, the environment, and property rights (Heyman 2013); and • Opportunity costs in the form of foregone investments in addressing the conditions that drive large-scale migration, as well as in more effective national security and immigration enforcement strategies. The Center for Migration Studies (CMS) has reported on the dramatic decline in the US undocumented population between 2008 and 2014 (Warren 2016). In addition, a growing percentage of border crossers in recent years have originated in the Northern Triangle states of Central America (CBP 2016). These migrants are fleeing pervasive violence, persecution, and poverty, and a large number do not seek to evade arrest, but present themselves to border officials and request political asylum. Many are de facto refugees, not illegal border crossers. This report speaks to another reason to question the necessity and value of a 2,000-mile wall: It does not reflect the reality of how the large majority of persons now become undocumented. It finds that two-thirds of those who arrived in 2014 did not illegally cross a border, but were admitted (after screening) on non-immigrant (temporary) visas, and then overstayed their period of admission or otherwise violated the terms of their visas. Moreover, this trend in increasing percentages of visa overstays will likely continue into the foreseeable future. The report presents information about the mode of arrival of the undocumented population that resided in the United States in 2014. To simplify the presentation, it divides the 2014 population into two groups: overstays and entries without inspection (EWIs). The term overstay, as used in this paper, refers to undocumented residents who entered the United States with valid temporary visas and subsequently established residence without authorization. The term EWI refers to undocumented residents who entered without proper immigration documents across the southern border. The estimates are based primarily on detailed estimates of the undocumented population in 2014 compiled by CMS and estimates of overstays for 2015 derived by DHS. Major findings include the following: • In 2014, about 4.5 million US residents, or 42 percent of the total undocumented population, were overstays. • Overstays accounted for about two-thirds (66 percent) of those who arrived (i.e., joined the undocumented population) in 2014. • Overstays have exceeded EWIs every year since 2007, and 600,000 more overstays than EWIs have arrived since 2007. • Mexico is the leading country for both overstays and EWIs; about one-third of undocumented arrivals from Mexico in 2014 were overstays. • California has the largest number of overstays (890,000), followed by New York (520,000), Texas (475,000), and Florida (435,000). • Two states had 47 percent of the 6.4 million EWIs in 2014: California (1.7 million) and Texas (1.3 million). • The percentage of overstays varies widely by state: more than two-thirds of the undocumented who live in Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania are overstays. By contrast, the undocumented population in Kansas, Arkansas, and New Mexico consists of fewer than 25 percent overstays.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce Clayton Newell ◽  
Ricardo Gomez ◽  
Verónica E. Guajardo

This paper presents findings from an exploratory qualitative study of the experiences and perceptions of undocumented (irregular) migrants to the United States with various forms of surveillance in the borderlands between the U.S. and Mexico. Based on fieldwork conducted primarily in a migrant shelter in Nogales, Mexico, we find that migrants generally have a fairly sophisticated understanding about U.S. Border Patrol surveillance and technology use and that they consciously engage in forms of resistance or avoidance. Heightened levels of border surveillance may be deterring a minority of migrants from attempting immediate future crossings, but most interviewees were undeterred in their desire to enter the U.S., preferring to find ways to avoid government surveillance. Furthermore, migrants exhibit a general lack of trust in the “promise” of technology to improve their circumstances and increase their safety during clandestine border-crossing—often due to fears that technology use makes them vulnerable to state surveillance, tracking, and arrest.


2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magalí Murià ◽  
Sergio Chávez

This article examines how border enforcement at the U.S.-Mexico border affects the border crossing and consumption practices of Tijuana residents.  Drawing on three years of combined ethnographic research, we focus on the experiences of Tijuana residents who cross the international border with legal documents to work and consume in the United States.  We argue that the tech-nologies of surveillance and deterrence that regulate cross-border transit also reshape the geographical and social landscape of Tijuana. We explain how identities and patterns of difference among border residents are reconstructed by a legal taxonomy that identifies and classifies crossers according to categories of legality. We find that these categories are locally framed and translated into a binary distinction between consumers and workers that reflect a growing gap between the rich and poor in the city. Finally, we conclude that this distinction ignores the transnational character of the city, and in particular, that consumers and workers are not mutually exclusive categories at the borderlands.


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