scholarly journals Direitos humanos, o funcionalismo político e o minimalismo jurídico em John Rawls e Joseph Raz

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-72
Author(s):  
Rodolfo de Freitas Jacarandá
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Joseph Raz

As teorias tradicionais de direitos humanos – teorias normativas e substantivas – estabelecem critérios gerais para que valores morais possam ser normativamente universalizados, além dos motivos para que sejam impostas obrigações para seu cumprimento. Nas últimas décadas, contudo, filósofos e teóricos do direito, preocupados com o realismo global do discurso de aplicação dos direitos humanos, a maioria deles sob a influência do trabalho de John Rawls, criticaram as teorias tradicionais a partir de uma análise funcionalista dos direitos humanos. Colocando as práticas jurídicas e políticas em maior evidência, os funcionalistas políticos como Charles Beitz e Joseph Raz argumentam a falta de precisão lógica e a incoerência na proliferação excessiva de direitos atribuída às abordagens normativas e substantivas de teóricos como Jeremy Waldron e James Griffin. Neste artigo vou descrever os principais argumentos do funcionalismo político em direitos humanos, enfatizando o minimalismo jurídico comum a essa abordagem. Meu objetivo é avaliar as condições de aplicação da teoria aos problemas decorrentes da falta de uma coerente fundamentação teórica atribuída, pelos funcionalistas, aos pensadores mais ortodoxos. Minhas conclusões demonstram que sem haver maior integração entre os grupos teóricos continua muito difícil compreender corretamente a complexidade dos desafios da teoria e da prática cotidiana em direitos humanos.

Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Bird
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Main Line ◽  
Legitimate Authority ◽  
Moral Reflection ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Essential Aspect ◽  
Political Morality ◽  
Self Image ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
Liberal Thought

This chapter analyzes three major assumptions in Joseph Raz’s book The Morality of Freedom (MF): its account of legitimate authority, its rejection of egalitarianism, and its defense of an autonomy-based perfectionism. It first summarizes the book’s main line of argument about how a concern for freedom should figure in moral reflection regarding the value and purpose of political practices. It then examines MF’s repudiation of the conventional self-image of liberalism, and in particular utilitarian consequentialism. It also considers Raz’s claim that the trajectory that liberal thought has described in the wake of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice is misguided. Finally, it discusses Raz’s strategy for reconciling a commitment to liberal freedom with a perfectionist political morality as it relates to the claim that autonomy is an essential aspect of individual flourishing.

Dworkin on the Foundations of Liberal Equality

Legal Theory ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-226
Author(s):  
Patrick Neal
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
English Speaking ◽  
English Speaking World ◽  
Liberal Political Theory

Ronald Dworkin's Tanner Lectures, “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” have hardly elicited comment within the academic political theory community. This is surprising for a number of reasons. First, Dworkin is widely taken to be one of the leading liberal theorists in the English-speaking world, and “Foundations” is a major statement (120 pages in length) involving reflection upon issues of principle that are at the center of contemporary scholarly debate among liberals. Secondly, “Foundations” introduces a number of ideas and concepts that are new in Dworkin's corpus and that serve to illuminate and clarify some of his wdely discussed earlier works, especially the famous article “Liberalism,” which sparked so much argument over the idea of neutrality and its place within liberal political theory. Finally, the lectures are interesting because of the approach they take to the matter of “defending liberalism,” an approach that departs in interesting and significant ways from those presently pursued by other leading liberal thinkers, notably John Rawls and Joseph Raz.

Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of Human Rights: A False Polemic?

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-352 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Matthew Liao ◽  
Adam Etinson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Alternative Conception ◽  
The Political ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
In Virtue Of

What are human rights? According to one longstanding account, the Naturalistic Conception of human rights, human rights are those that we have simply in virtue of being human. In recent years, however, a new and purportedly alternative conception of human rights has become increasingly popular. This is the so-called Political Conception of human rights, the proponents of which include John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. In this paper we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights can accommodate two of the most salient concerns that proponents of the Political Conception have raised about them. Second, we argue that the theoretical distance between Naturalistic and Political Conceptions is not as great as it has been made out to be. Finally, we argue that a Political Conception of human rights, on its own, lacks the resources necessary to determine the substantive content of human rights. If we are right, not only should the Naturalistic Conception not be rejected, the Political Conception is in fact incomplete without the theoretical resources that a Naturalistic Conception characteristically provides. These three claims, in tandem, provide a fresh and largely conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights.

After Politics: The Rejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy. By Glen Newey. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 253p. $68.00.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 808-809
Author(s):  
Simone Chambers
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Side Constraint ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
Insufficient Reason ◽  
Liberal Philosophy ◽  
Amy Gutmann ◽  
Analytic Skills ◽  
Michael Sandel

This is a very smart book that comes to some very questionable conclusions. Glen Newey takes issue with contemporary liberal philosophy on two counts: Not only does it fail to address the “real world of politics,” but it actually aims at the suppression of politics. Included in the list of those guilty of suppressing politics and failing to provide “philosophical reflection on politics—at least not on politics as it is” (p. 15) are John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Brian Barry, Joseph Raz, Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, Will Kymlicka, Amy Gutmann, and others. Clearly, a great deal hangs on what Newey means by “politics as it is,” and I will say at the outset that I found his definition wholly unconvincing. But along the way, Newey says some very intelligent things about the leading lights of liberal political philosophy. The book has two layers. In the first, Newey takes up particular philosophical arguments embedded in various liberal theories. At this level he shows us his considerable analytic skills in carefully argued, if somewhat technical, investigations of philosophical weaknesses. So, for example, his discussion of moral internalism and its problems is very good, as is the discussion of neutralist side-constraint as an insufficient reason requirement. Anyone interested in really looking under the hood of contemporary liberal philosophy can get something out of this book. But when Newey moves to the second layer, he tries to tie all his various arguments together under one big claim: the rejection of politics claim, and this is problematic.

Human Rights, Interests, and Variation

2019 ◽  
pp. 53-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Sangiovanni
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political View ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
Institutional Variation ◽  
Orthodox View

The debate on human rights is currently divided between three camps: the Orthodox View associated with, for example, James Griffin and John Tasioulas; the Political View associated with, for example, John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz; and the Legal View associated with Allen Buchanan. The debate is reaching somewhat of a stalemate, with all three sides backed into defensive and unattractive positions. Rainer Forst offers a distinctive, and distinctively appealing, way to play a different game. This chapter reconstructs what makes the Forstian game distinctive; highlights a tension in Forst’s view that threatens to make it indistinguishable from an Orthodox View; and shows how to resolve it. The resolution suggests a novel way of conceiving of human rights that allows for much greater institutional variation in conceptions of human rights than we are accustomed to.

The State’s Role in Ensuring Fair Income Distribution in Vietnam Today: Some Issues from the Theory of Justice as Fairness by John Rawls

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Social Equality ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis ◽  
Economic Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020

From Crusades to Colonization: Violence in Secular and Religious Political Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Xavier Scott
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
State Power ◽  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Medieval Period ◽  
Beliefs And Values

This paper examines the transition in political philosophy between the medieval and early-modern periods by focusing on the emergence of sovereignty doctrine. Scholars such as Charles Taylor and John Rawls have focused on the ability of modern-states to overcome conflicts between different religious confessionals. In contrast, this paper seeks to examine some of the peace-promoting features of Latin-Christendom and some of the conflict-promoting features of modern-secular states. The Christian universalism of the medieval period is contrasted with the colonial ventures promoted by the Peace of Westphalia. This paper’s goal is not to argue that secularism is in fact more violent than religion. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the major role that religion played in early modern philosophy and the development of sovereignty doctrine. It argues against the view that the modern, secular state is capable of neutrality vis-à-vis religion, and also combats the view that the secular nature of modern international law means that it is neutral to the different beliefs and values of the world’s peoples. These observations emphasize the ways in which state power and legitimacy are at the heart of the secular turn in political philosophy. 

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