scholarly journals The Black Heroine in the Mirror: crossing the threshold of the specular image, the esoteric journey and the encounter with the annihilating I in Jordan Peele’s Us

Author(s):  
Gitanjali Kapila

Using the conceptual framework of the mirror-stage established by Lacan to describe the initial anchoring of the subject, this paper seeks to interrogate the mirror as the locus of a secondary elaboration of the hero’s journey which follows its traditional articulation adumbrated by Joseph Campbell in The Hero with a Thousand Faces. If the goal of the classic hero as Campbell suggests is to exit the nursery which represents the subject’s entrapment in Oedipal triangulation, this study posits that the successful selfrelease of the hero from the nursery simply sees him entering another nursery where the hero’s world is conceived of as a series of infinitely nested nurseries without exit. The mirror and its binding capture become the exemplary point of departure for the secondary elaboration of the journey for which, it turns out, the black heroine is the ideal adventurer. It is no wonder then that Jordan Peele’s Us is replete with mirrors functioning as cinematic signifiers for the portals effecting the subject’s displacement not towards an outer world of aggressive fathers and unobtainable ideal mothers; but, rather into a proximate encounter with the self, one precipitated by the mirror where the goal of the journey –the one that can only be revealed by the black heroine– is the apprehension of the “cipher of [her] moral destiny” and the unfathomable cartography of her true exit.

2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 793-806 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduard Bonet

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how the boundaries of rhetoric have excluded important theoretical and practical subjects and how these subjects are recuperated and extended since the twentieth century. Its purpose is to foster the awareness on emerging new trends of rhetoric. Design/methodology/approach – The methodology is based on an interpretation of the history of rhetoric and on the construction of a conceptual framework of the rhetoric of judgment, which is introduced in this paper. Findings – On the subject of the extension of rhetoric from public speeches to any kinds of persuasive situations, the paper emphasizes some stimulating relationships between the theory of communication and rhetoric. On the exclusion and recuperation of the subject of rhetorical arguments, it presents the changing relationships between rhetoric and dialectics and emphasizes the role of rhetoric in scientific research. On the introduction of rhetoric of judgment and meanings it creates a conceptual framework based on a re-examination of the concept of judgment and the phenomenological foundations of the interpretative methods of social sciences by Alfred Schutz, relating them to symbolic interactionism and theories of the self. Originality/value – The study on the changing boundaries of rhetoric and the introduction of the rhetoric of judgment offers a new view on the present theoretical and practical development of rhetoric, which opens new subjects of research and new fields of applications.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasheed S. Al-Jarrah ◽  
Ahmad M. Abu-Dalu ◽  
Hisham Obiedat

AbstractThe purpose of our current research is to see how Relevance Theory can handle one specific translation problem, namely strategic ambiguous structures. Concisely, we aim to provide a conceptual framework as to how the translator should cope with a pervasive ambiguity problem at the discoursal level. The point of departure from probably all previous models of analysis is that a relevance-theoretic analysis would, we believe, require that a “good” translation benotthe one that representsan interpretationof the text, but the one which leaves the door open for all interpretations which the original text provides evidence for. Hence,the role of translator is not to ‘interpret’ but to ‘translate’. If this is true, ambiguity resolution should not be a viable alternative. In other words, what the translator should do is empower the audience with all it takes to let them work out all the explicatures (linguistically inferred meanings) and entertain themselves with the implicatures (contextually inferred meanings) of the original. Direct Translation, along the lines laid down by Gutt (1991/2000), is the method of translation which can, we believe, bring about the desired results because “it tries to provide readers with contextual information that enables them to draw their own inferences” (Smith 2000: 92).


2021 ◽  
Vol 258 ◽  
pp. 07033
Author(s):  
Vladimir N. Panferov ◽  
Svetlana A. Bezgodova ◽  
Anastasia V. Miklyaeva

The article presents the results of studying the personal maturity of adolescents aged 13-17 (n=1078) who are infantilized in intergenerational relationships (on the model of relations with parents and teachers). Empirical data were collected with the use of the Self-Assessment Scale of Personal Maturity, as well as the modified Dembo-Rubinstein Self-Assessment Diagnostic Method, which measured the actual self-assessment of adolescents’ adulthood, as well as reflected assessments of their own adulthood from the parents’ and teachers’ positions. Infantilization in intergenerational relationships was assessed by comparing the self-assessment of adulthood and the reflected assessments of parents and teachers. The results show that the relationships between adolescents, on the one hand, and parents and teachers, on the other hand, are characterized by a tendency to infantilization. Obvious infantilization is found in about 10 % of cases. Infantilization in intergenerational relationships affects, first of all, the regulatory maturity of adolescents, and its influence differs depending on who is the subject of infantilization: in the case of infantilization by parents, the regulatory maturity of adolescents decreases as they grow up, while in the case of infantilization by teachers it increases. In general, infantilization in relations with parents has more intense negative impact on the formation of personal maturity in adolescence, in comparison with infantilization on the part of teachers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmelo Licitra Rosa ◽  
Carla Antonucci ◽  
Alberto Siracusano ◽  
Diego Centonze

To understand Lacan’s thinking process on vision, the entirety of his teaching must be taken into consideration. Until the 60s, the visual field is the imaginary, the constitutive principle of reality in its phenomenal giving to the experience of a subject. This register is the opposite of the field of the word with the L schema and, subsequently, as subordinated to the symbolic system according to the model of the optical schema of the inverted flower vase of Bouasse. It is only with the 1964 seminar that Lacan makes a daring turnaround through which the visual becomes a sign of the emergence of a real that is irreducible to both reality and the mediation of the subject of knowledge. The split that separates reality and the real is reproduced in Lacan within the visual field, which is, on the one hand, the cardinal principle of the consistency of the experience of reality (as imaginary), and on the other, it is an element of irreducibility to reality (as object gaze). This produces a cascade of consequences: first of all, the modification of the presentation of the mirror stage. Unlike the voice, which through prosody, tone, and volume, finds some strips with which anchor itself imaginatively to reality, the gaze, invisible and elusive, escapes the imaginary grasp. Captured in myths, it reveals its power and ability to annihilate—as in the myth of Medusa’s gaze—or to make people fall in love but only with a narcissistic love that leads inexorably to death as in the myth of Narcissus. The gaze is elusive because the subject is dependent on it in the field of desire. Like the voice, it is about the desire on which the subject is supported; it is one of the objects on which the phantom depends. In our opinion, thanks to this characteristic, the gaze object can make remote psychoanalytic treatment possible through easily accessible videoconferencing tools and, at the same time, create new conditions within it that should be carefully evaluated to understand its implications in the session itself.


PhaenEx ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
BJØRN HAMRE

This article reports on the ways in which psychiatric practice and power were constituted in a Danish asylum at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The point of departure will be a complaint by a former patient questioning the practice at the asylum in 1829. In an analysis of this narrative the study draws upon Foucauldian concepts like disciplinary power, confession, pastoral power and subjectivation. I will argue that the critique of the patient provides us with an example of the way that disciplinary power works in the case of an informal indictment of the methods and practice at an asylum. A key issue is whether the critique is not itself a part of the self-legitimation of disciplinary power.


Plaridel ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Jaimee Faith J. Santos

The subject of my paper is the author. I aim to explore how the self-conscious author functions in Fish-Hair Woman (2012), a metafictional novel by Merlinda Bobis. I begin with a brief discussion of how the author is constructed, first, in Philippine literary criticism, and second, in light of the collapse of the humanist tradition of valorizing the writer, which prompted the proclamation of the author’s “death” and rendered her irrelevant to the text and to criticism. But does the author stay dead? In metafiction, in particular, the author manages to “write” herself into the text using self-consciousness. I find that, while it is impossible to overlook the author’s decentered status, it is equally untenable to ignore how an overt “manifestation” of the author functions within the text. Through my reading of Fish-Hair Woman, I attempt to examine how the author’s self-consciousness results in two seemingly contradicting implications. On the one hand, the author’s constant references to herself allows her to “live” through the text, reinforcing the Barthesian notion that the author limits the text and its possible interpretations. On the other hand, the author’s constant references to herself as a subject exposes the author’s own limitations. This, in turn, “re-opens” the text, by giving room to questions about other perspectives that are not or cannot be represented in the text.


Kepes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (24) ◽  
pp. 197-231
Author(s):  
Miguel A. Romero-Ramírez ◽  
Duncan Reyburn

This article proposes to resolve an internal ambiguity in the subdiscipline called Everyday Aesthetics (EA), systematized by the researcher Horacio Pérez-Henao, according to whom the extension of aesthetics to the everyday has been done, on the one hand, by means of a consideration of an expansive object and subject according to aesthesis itself, as mainly proposed by Katya Mandoki, and, on the other hand, by means of a restrictive object and subject according to the parameters of an authentic aesthetic experience, a theory headed by John Dewey. Methodology: To resolve this tension, a hermeneutic methodology known as the fourfold sense of being, related to Hegelian dialectic, albeit with important modifications supplied by William Desmond was used. This methodology allows a suitable way to explore and discuss different approaches in everyday aesthetics epitomized by Mandoki and Dewey, and makes possible the proposal of a third way, epitomized by G. K. Chesterton. Results: Bearing in mind the original intention of EA—according to which the everyday must be revitalized from an aesthetic perspective, as explained by Joseph Kupfer, it is argued that the two alternate positions of Mandoki and Dewey are unsatisfactory; an attempt is therefore made to respond to this through the analysis of the aesthetic approach of G. K. Chesterton. From his aesthetic reflections, it can be ascertained that to revitalize daily life, the object must be expansive and the subject, restrictive, from a certain méthodos and according to patterns that qualify an everyday aesthetic experience. All of this seeks to pave the way for subsequent investigations of EA being both expansive and restrictive. Finally, it is argued that this Chestertonian EA converges with and extends the aesthetics of design of Jane Forsey, and thus shows that design itself can be revitalized in keeping with a restrictiveexpansive approach to everyday aesthetics. Conclusion: aesthetics should be expansive every day, in that it should concern itself with any aspect of daily life, and restrictive, in that it should set certain limits on the self and its intentions with regard to the possibilities of aesthetic experience.


2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 28-62
Author(s):  
Andrei B. Patkul

To reconstruct a critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God in Schelling’s philosophy I examine his interpretation of the ontological argument by Anselm of Canterbury and Descartes as well as Schelling’s assessment of the critique of the Kantian ontological proof of the existence of God. I propose a reconstruction of Schelling’s account of undoubted being which cannot be deduced from the concept of the totality of all that is possible and therefore must come before any thought. He interprets reason as having an ecstatic nature which posits precedent undoubted being. This enables Schelling to formulate his own version of the thesis on the unity of being and thought, whereby being comes first and thought is only second. Against this background I analyse Schelling’s interpretation of the Kantian account of the ideal of reason. Schelling, on the one hand, agrees with Kant that being is not a real predicate, hence real existence cannot be deduced from essence in the sense of “what.” But, on the other hand, in contrast to Kant, he believes that real existence of the individual absolute must be assumed, which would be the subject for all possible predicates and whose being is ecstatically posited by reason as being external to itself. I raise the question of the relevance of Schelling’s thought for modern ontology, above all in overcoming ontotheology. Proceeding from the works of J. F. Courtine and L. Tengelyi I single out two aspects of Schelling’s doctrine that are relevant to my subject: (1) the priority of existence over essence in God’s being and (2) the fundamental irreducibility of God to a necessarily existent being, i.e. God’s freedom. It is evident that, in his interpretation of Kant, Schelling somewhat simplifies his train of thought and leaves it unclear how Kant links the concepts of necessary being and the supremely perfect being. It is also evident that Schelling’s concepts of “contingency,” “contingent necessity,” “the whole experience” need further study.


2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-168
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Martin ◽  
Duke Pesta

As a generation of Lacanian critics convert what Spenser does into a science of the formations of subjectivity and psycholinguistic desire, they miss Spenser's project of providing a unique account of human psychology in his encyclopedic work. Both Lacan and Spenser have detailed accounts of the operations of the human soul or psyche and the stages the subject passes through in each. As the essay contrasts these divergent models, a number of illuminating distinctions emerge. While in Lacan the self remains positioned in a single arena where the irreconcilable demands of subjectivity and intersubjectivity oppose one another perpetually, in Spenser the conditions of subjectivity are always perilous for the self, cut off from the nutriments of community and nature. Despite grand claims Lacanians have made on his behalf, Lacan's account of human nature cannot enter the heroic struggles of Spenser's second stage and so never fully engages the dynamics of Spenser's quest narrative. The story Lacan tells of the psyche is always the one that ends in a tragic thwarting. Whether we like Spenser's picture or not, it is clearly not the one espoused by Lacan. In the end, a comparative critical reading of Spenser helps correct an interpretive overeagerness by Lacanian critics, a cast of mind that is perhaps psychologically significant in itself. Spenser's cautionary tales about the pitfalls of subjectivity and its proper correctives outside the self contrast finally with a style of reading that mirrors the critics' own narcissistic obsessions more than they are willing to admit.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (120) ◽  
pp. 55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo F. Chagas

O artigo mostra a trajetória do pensamento de Marx sob a perspectiva do método na sua determinação dupla, investigação e exposição, enquanto processo de apropriação e explicitação crítico-racional da imanência do próprio objeto pelo sujeito. O método dialético de Marx enquanto método de investigação e de exposição distingue, sem separar, esses dois momentos, pressupondo que o objeto só pode ser exposto depois de ser investigado, analisado, criticamente em suas determinações essenciais. Por isso, tal método constitui uma oposição ao positivismo acrítico, próprio da economia clássica moderna, que toma o objeto como uma imediatidade factual, dada, sem a mediação do pensamento, assumindo e ratificando a positividade do fato, e ao idealismo acrítico, típico da especulação e da dialética hegeliana, que tem o objeto como resultado de uma construção abstrata do pensamento que sintetiza tudo em si e se movimenta a partir de si mesmo, sendo, por isso, incapazes de realizar uma investigação sistemática da “lógica”, da “racionalidade”, imanente ao próprio real e uma exposição crítica desse real, reconstruindo, no plano ideal, a totalidade do movimento istemático do próprio real.Abstract: The article presents the trajectory of Marx’s thought under the perspective of the method in its double determination, i.e. research and exposition, seen as a process of appropriation and of critical rational explanation of the object’s immanence by the subject. Marx’s dialectical method, in its investigative and expositional nature, distinguishes these two moments without separating them, presupposing that the object can only be presented after being critically investigated, according to its essential determinations. Therefore, such a method is, on the one hand, opposed to acritical positivism, which is so characteristic of modern classical economics and takes the object as a factual immediate entity devoid of mediating thought, assuming and confirming the positivity of the fact, and, on the other hand, to acritical idealism, which is typical of Hegel’s speculation and dialectic which takes the object as a result of an abstract construction of thought that synthethizes everything in itself and moves by its own means. These two kinds of explanation are therefore incapable of performing both a systematic investigation of the “logics” and “rationality”, immanent to reality itself, and a critical exposition of this reality, reconstructing in the ideal plan the totality of the systematic movement of reality itself. 


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