scholarly journals COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY RETURNS: A REVIEW OF HULSE, FOWLER, AND HONIG'S COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN ANIMAL BEHAVIOR1

1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward A. Wasserman
2012 ◽  
Vol 367 (1599) ◽  
pp. 2181-2191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cecilia Heyes

Cumulative cultural evolution is what ‘makes us odd’; our capacity to learn facts and techniques from others, and to refine them over generations, plays a major role in making human minds and lives radically different from those of other animals. In this article, I discuss cognitive processes that are known collectively as ‘cultural learning’ because they enable cumulative cultural evolution. These cognitive processes include reading, social learning, imitation, teaching, social motivation and theory of mind. Taking the first of these three types of cultural learning as examples, I ask whether and to what extent these cognitive processes have been adapted genetically or culturally to enable cumulative cultural evolution. I find that recent empirical work in comparative psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides surprisingly little evidence of genetic adaptation, and ample evidence of cultural adaptation. This raises the possibility that it is not only ‘grist’ but also ‘mills’ that are culturally inherited; through social interaction in the course of development, we not only acquire facts about the world and how to deal with it (grist), we also build the cognitive processes that make ‘fact inheritance’ possible (mills).


Author(s):  
Ivan Hvatov

Currently, the subject of the use of tools by animals is avidly explored in comparative psychology and evolution psychology. It is believed that the use of tools, if determined by instincts, is an evidence of complex cognitive processes in the animal, in particular, thinking. The abi­lity to use and make tools was discovered in primates, a number of mammals, birds and even invertebrates. However, the abovementioned animals show an already formed complex ability to use tools. Evolutionary preconditions and factors leading to emergence of the ability to use tools as a part of mental phylogenesis are understudied. The author of the paper offers a novel approach to exploring the preconditions for the use of tools based on the concept of self-reflection of animals and human as well as embodied cognition. According to the approach developed, the proto-tool is the body of the animal, which physical characteristics initially serve as an obstacle in achieving the goal of various activities; only afterwards, the animal recognizes its body as an opportunity, a means of affecting the environment.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Beran

Comparative psychology is the study of behavior and cognition across species. In recent decades, much of this research has focused on cognitive capacities that are well studied in humans. This approach provides comparative perspectives on the evolution of these cognitive capacities. Although in many areas humans shows distinct aspects of various cognitive processes, it is clear that for most major topics in human cognition, important and illustrative data are available from studies with other animals. Moreover, these areas of investigation increasingly show continuities between the behavior of other species and human behavior. Several of these cognitive processes, including concept and category learning, numerical cognition, memory, mental time travel and prospective cognition, metacognition, and language learning, highlight these continuities and demonstrate the richness of mental lives in other animals. Nonhuman animals can discriminate between categories of perceptual and conceptual classes, they can form concepts, and they can use those concepts to guide decision making and choice behavior. Other species can engage in rudimentary numerical cognition, and more importantly share with humans certain core quantitative abilities for the approximate representation of magnitude and number. Nonhuman animals share many phenomena of memory that are well-recognized in humans, and in some cases may even share the capacity to mentally re-experience the past and to anticipate and plan for the future. In some cases, some species may even reflect on their own knowledge states, memory accessibility, and perceptual acuity as they make metacognitive judgments. And, studies of animal communication provided the basis for intensive assessments of language-like behavior in certain species. Taken together, these results argue much more for continuity than discontinuity. This should not be seen as a challenge to the uniqueness of human minds, but rather as a way to better understand how we became the species we are through the process of evolution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Trond A. Tjøstheim ◽  
Birger Johansson ◽  
Christian Balkenius

Organisms must cope with different risk/reward landscapes in their ecological niche. Hence, species have evolved behavior and cognitive processes to optimally balance approach and avoidance. Navigation through space, including taking detours, appears also to be an essential element of consciousness. Such processes allow organisms to negotiate predation risk and natural geometry that obstruct foraging. One aspect of this is the ability to inhibit a direct approach toward a reward. Using an adaptation of the well-known detour paradigm in comparative psychology, but in a virtual world, we simulate how different neural configurations of inhibitive processes can yield behavior that approximates characteristics of different species. Results from simulations may help elucidate how evolutionary adaptation can shape inhibitive processing in particular and behavioral selection in general. More specifically, results indicate that both the level of inhibition that an organism can exert and the size of neural populations dedicated to inhibition contribute to successful detour navigation. According to our results, both factors help to facilitate detour behavior, but the latter (i.e., larger neural populations) appears to specifically reduce behavioral variation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thibaud Gruber

Abstract The debate on cumulative technological culture (CTC) is dominated by social-learning discussions, at the expense of other cognitive processes, leading to flawed circular arguments. I welcome the authors' approach to decouple CTC from social-learning processes without minimizing their impact. Yet, this model will only be informative to understand the evolution of CTC if tested in other cultural species.


2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oscar H. Hernández ◽  
Muriel Vogel-Sprott

A missing stimulus task requires an immediate response to the omission of a regular recurrent stimulus. The task evokes a subclass of event-related potential known as omitted stimulus potential (OSP), which reflects some cognitive processes such as expectancy. The behavioral response to a missing stimulus is referred to as omitted stimulus reaction time (RT). This total RT measure is known to include cognitive and motor components. The cognitive component (premotor RT) is measured by the time from the missing stimulus until the onset of motor action. The motor RT component is measured by the time from the onset of muscle action until the completion of the response. Previous research showed that RT is faster to auditory than to visual stimuli, and that the premotor of RT to a missing auditory stimulus is correlated with the duration of an OSP. Although this observation suggests that similar cognitive processes might underlie these two measures, no research has tested this possibility. If similar cognitive processes are involved in the premotor RT and OSP duration, these two measures should be correlated in visual and somatosensory modalities, and the premotor RT to missing auditory stimuli should be fastest. This hypothesis was tested in 17 young male volunteers who performed a missing stimulus task, who were presented with trains of auditory, visual, and somatosensory stimuli and the OSP and RT measures were recorded. The results showed that premotor RT and OSP duration were consistently related, and that both measures were shorter with respect to auditory stimuli than to visual or somatosensory stimuli. This provides the first evidence that the premotor RT is related to an attribute of the OSP in all three sensory modalities.


2002 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Kotchoubey

Abstract Most cognitive psychophysiological studies assume (1) that there is a chain of (partially overlapping) cognitive processes (processing stages, mechanisms, operators) leading from stimulus to response, and (2) that components of event-related brain potentials (ERPs) may be regarded as manifestations of these processing stages. What is usually discussed is which particular processing mechanisms are related to some particular component, but not whether such a relationship exists at all. Alternatively, from the point of view of noncognitive (e. g., “naturalistic”) theories of perception ERP components might be conceived of as correlates of extraction of the information from the experimental environment. In a series of experiments, the author attempted to separate these two accounts, i. e., internal variables like mental operations or cognitive parameters versus external variables like information content of stimulation. Whenever this separation could be performed, the latter factor proved to significantly affect ERP amplitudes, whereas the former did not. These data indicate that ERPs cannot be unequivocally linked to processing mechanisms postulated by cognitive models of perception. Therefore, they cannot be regarded as support for these models.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Friedman ◽  
Ray Johnson

A cardinal feature of aging is a decline in episodic memory (EM). Nevertheless, there is evidence that some older adults may be able to “compensate” for failures in recollection-based processing by recruiting brain regions and cognitive processes not normally recruited by the young. We review the evidence suggesting that age-related declines in EM performance and recollection-related brain activity (left-parietal EM effect; LPEM) are due to altered processing at encoding. We describe results from our laboratory on differences in encoding- and retrieval-related activity between young and older adults. We then show that, relative to the young, in older adults brain activity at encoding is reduced over a brain region believed to be crucial for successful semantic elaboration in a 400–1,400-ms interval (left inferior prefrontal cortex, LIPFC; Johnson, Nessler, & Friedman, 2013 ; Nessler, Friedman, Johnson, & Bersick, 2007 ; Nessler, Johnson, Bersick, & Friedman, 2006 ). This reduced brain activity is associated with diminished subsequent recognition-memory performance and the LPEM at retrieval. We provide evidence for this premise by demonstrating that disrupting encoding-related processes during this 400–1,400-ms interval in young adults affords causal support for the hypothesis that the reduction over LIPFC during encoding produces the hallmarks of an age-related EM deficit: normal semantic retrieval at encoding, reduced subsequent episodic recognition accuracy, free recall, and the LPEM. Finally, we show that the reduced LPEM in young adults is associated with “additional” brain activity over similar brain areas as those activated when older adults show deficient retrieval. Hence, rather than supporting the compensation hypothesis, these data are more consistent with the scaffolding hypothesis, in which the recruitment of additional cognitive processes is an adaptive response across the life span in the face of momentary increases in task demand due to poorly-encoded episodic memories.


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