scholarly journals Odpowiedzialność zakładu ubezpieczeń za szkody wyrządzone przez agenta ubezpieczeniowego

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 13-30
Author(s):  
Amanda Adamska ◽  
Anna Maria Barańska
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Insurance Company ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Insurance Agent ◽  
Insurance Intermediation ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Injured Party ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of

The responsibility of an insurance company for damages caused by an insurance agent The subject of this article is the responsibility of an insurance company for damages caused by an insurance agent in connection with the performance of agency activities. The Act on Insurance Intermediation of 22 May 2003 lays down a liability regime based on the principle of risk. It also contains the definition of an insurance agent and performed agency activities. In the next part of the article there is analysed the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court concerning the interpretation of article 11 1 of the abovementioned Act. It discusses an attempt at defining the difference between activities performed “in connection with” and “at the occasion of” other activities. Finally there is analysed an issue of the contribution of the injured party to the occurrence of the damage in this type of cases article 362 of the Civil Code.

scholarly journals Czy przebaczenie niweczy skutki uprzedniego wydziedziczenia?

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 143-153
Author(s):  
Anna Moskal
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Inheritance Law ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Made In

Does forgiveness nullify the effects of previous disinheritance? The legal nature of forgiveness is the subject of passionate debates among the representatives of civil law doctrine. According to the dominant position in the literature, forgiveness is an act of affection or its manifested expression of forgiveness of the perpetrator of experienced injustice and related to this grudge. This institution has been applied three times in the Civil Code — once with the donation agreement, twice in regulations of inheritance law. Article 1010 § 1 provides that a testator cannot disinherit eligible for legal portion if he forgave him. The wording of the above article indicates that accomplishment of disinheritance in case if testator eligible for legal portion has previously forgiven. The legislator did not, however, determine the effects of forgiveness in relation to previous disinheritance. In the act of 1971, the Supreme Court accepted that such forgiveness would automatically nullify the effects of disinheritance, and could be made in any form. In recent years, lower courts have begun to question the Supreme Court's position, and judges increasingly refer to the critical statements of numerous doctrines. As it was rightly stated, admitting the possibility of invoking the forgiveness made after disinheritance poses a serious threat to the realization of the testator’s will, who, by forgiving, does not necessarily want to revoke the effects of his previous disinheritance. The postulate of de lege ferenda is, according to the author of the article, giving of freedom of judging the effects of forgiveness to the courts and each examination of the forgiving testator’s will on the possible abatement of the consequences of previous disinheritance.]]>

scholarly journals Assignment of a Claim Under an Obligation in Which the Identity of the Obligee Is Essential for the Obligor

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-464
Author(s):  
A. A. Martsun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Scientific Literature ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Essential Value ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

The Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution of December 21, 2017 No. 54 “On some issues of application of the provisions of Chapter 24 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation on the change of persons in an obligation on the basis of a transaction", which sets out important clarifications regarding the application standards contained in this chapter. At the same time, not all issues related to the assignment of the claim were resolved by the above resolution. One of these issues is the definition of the term “essential value of the identity of the creditor” or approximate criteria for such a value in the context of the need to obtain the latter’s consent to the assignment of rights. The presence of this problem is rightly indicated in the scientific literature [3, p. 549–655, 688–713]. The Author examines the Model Rules of European Private Law and the UNIDROIT principles in order to find a solution to the problem. Attention is drawn to the problem of determining the essential value of the creditor for the debtor in the case of assignment of the right of claim, as well as to the consequences of making the assignment without the consent of the debtor under an obligation in which the identity of the creditor was essential.In the Author's opinion, the identity of the creditor is recognized as essential for the debtor when the connection between the debtor and the creditor arose as a result of the conclusion of a transaction that has a personallyconfidential nature, or if the connection arose during the conclusion of other transactions in the case when the connection was broken during the execution assignment of rights entails or may entail a significant deprivation for the debtor of what he had the right to count on when concluding a transaction with the creditor.In addition, situations are considered that are an exception to the presumption of the absence of a significant value of the creditor's personality for the assignment of claims for monetary obligations. The author also points out that the consequence of the transaction on the assignment of rights without the consent of the debtor in the context of paragraph 2 of Art. 388 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation is the nullity of the transaction on the basis of paragraph 2 of Art. 168 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.

scholarly journals Redetermination of a Claim to Be a Convention Refugee; A Review of the Jurisprudence

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-643
Author(s):  
Roger Cantin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Advisory Committee ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Judicial Interpretation ◽  
Refugee Status ◽  
Determination Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of

The refugee determination process under the Immigration Act, 1976 comprises many steps which have been the subject of judicial interpretation. An individual claiming to be a “Convention refugee” in Canada will first be examined under oath with regard to his claim. The Refugee Status Advisory Committee will study the transcript of this examination. After obtaining the advice of the Committee, the Minister of Employment and Immigration will determine whether or not the claimant is a “Convention refugee”. Should this determination be negative, the person concerned will have the choice to apply to the Immigration Appeal Board for a redetermination of his claim. At this stage, the Board will grant an oral hearing to the applicant and render a decision thereafter if it is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he could prove that he is a “Convention refugee”. If no oral hearing is granted, the Board will determine that the applicant is not a “Convention refugee”. The Federal Court and the Supreme Court of Canada have had a considerable input in the interpretation of the provisions relating to this refugee determination process, including the wording of the definition of “Convention refugee”. This paper limits itself to a review of the decisions rendered by these courts.

scholarly journals Un aspect crucial mais délicat des libertés de conscience et de religion des articles 2 et 3 des Chartes canadienne et québécoise: l'objection de conscience

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-205
Author(s):  
Henri Brun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Freedom Of Conscience ◽  
Current Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right

The Supreme Court of Canada, obiter, in the Big M Drug Mart Case, has spoken of the "Constitutional Exemption". It is the possibility not to be bound to obey the neutral laws that conflict with one's conscience or religion. It is what we call in French l'objection de conscience. The institution exists in Canadian and Québec Law as a part of the right to freedom of conscience or religion expressed in 2a) and 3 of the Canadian and Québec Charters of Rights. And it goes well beyond the right not to fight within the armed forces. The Supreme Court of Canada has actually delivered six judgments touching on the subject in 1985 and 1986. The conditions under which l'objection de conscience come into play are not so well known however. Does it cover matters of worship or only rules of morals ? Secular or only religious principles ? Personal or only group beliefs ? Do the existence of the rule, the sincerity of the objector and the reasonableness of the exemption have to be proved? Above all, what is the difference between a creed and an opinion ? The following article tries to formulate answers to these questions, with the help of current case-law.

The right to freedom from discrimination in Rwanda

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 156-180
Author(s):  
Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
The State ◽  
National Unity ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Human Rights Treaties ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Discrimination is prohibited in different provisions of the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda (the Constitution), in different pieces of legislation and in international and regional human rights treaties ratified by Rwanda. According to the 2003 Constitution, one of the fundamental principles which have to be upheld by the State is the ‘eradication of discrimination and divisionism based on ethnicity, region or on any other ground as well as promotion of national unity’. Article 15 of the Constitution provides for equality before the law and Article 16 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination and it provides for the grounds on which a person shall not be discriminated against. Rwanda is also one of the very few African countries whose constitutions criminalise discrimination and different laws have been enacted to deal with the offence of discrimination. The Supreme Court of Rwanda, the highest court in the country, has handed down decisions on Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution. The purpose of this article is to analyse these decisions and illustrate how the Supreme Court has dealt with the issues such as the definition of discrimination and the difference between discrimination and differentiation. The author also discusses the issues that the Rwandan judiciary and prosecutors are likely to face when dealing with the offence of discrimination.

scholarly journals The dispute about law in urgent administrative cases at the appeal of the bodies of revenue and fees

2019 ◽  
pp. 85-90
Author(s):  
O.V Skochylias-Pavliv ◽  
N.V. Lesko
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Legal Definition ◽  
Judicial Practice ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Judicial Procedure ◽  
Administrative Proceedings

The article deals with current issues related to the procedure of consideration and resolution of urgent administrative cases at the appeal of the bodies of revenue and fees. The peculiarities of the specified category of cases which are manifested in the urgency; subject composition; notification of the participants of the case on the date, time and place of the case; filing of the claim; calculation of procedural terms; announcement and service of court decisions; appeal and cassation appeal; the court fee are analyzed. It is noted that the statements of the case are a statement of claim, reaction a statement of claim, a response to a reaction, a protest, a third party’s explanation of the statement claim, or reaction a statement of claim. The form of the appeal of tax authorities to the administrative court is a claim. Obviously, that is why in these categories of cases there are often misunderstandings regarding the payment of court fees as evidenced by a large number of decisions on leaving without motion the claim of bodies of revenue and fees on the ground of failure to submit to the court a document on payment of court fees. Central to the article is the consideration of the issue of understanding of the dispute about law as one of the grounds for refusing to open proceedings at the appeal of the bodies of revenue and fees. The only form of administrative proceedings is the consideration of the case on the statement of claim. As is well known, a lawsuit involves conflict between the parties. The mutual rights and obligations of the parties to prove their claims and objections constitute the substance of the dispute. However, the peculiarities of disputes at the request of the bodies of revenue and fees due to the fact that they don’t have a dispute about the law. It is noted that there is no legal definition of the term «dispute about the law», which significantly complicates the consideration and resolution of this category of cases. The interpretation of this concept exists only in judicial practice, in particular in resolutions of the Supreme Court but they are also contradictory. That’s why we consider it necessary to supplement article 283 Code of Administrative Proceedings of Ukraine a note defining the concept of «dispute about the law», which should be understood as a claim of the taxpayer to the tax authority regardless of the subject of the claim which may be submitted to administrative or judicial procedure. Keywords: a dispute about law, administrative proceedings, administrative case, revenue, and fees, claim.

A Gloss to the Supreme Court’s Resolution of 26 July 2017 (III CZP 30/17) concerning the Exclusive Fault of a Third Party as an Exonerating Circumstance

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 79-91
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Serwach
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Absolute Certainty ◽  
Subjective Criterion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Injured Party ◽  
Sound Mind

In the said Resolution, the Supreme Court held that in order for a person running an enterprise or an establishment which are set in motion by natural forces to be effectively released from liability, it was not necessary to identify an entity in question (Article 435 of the Polish Civil Code). It was sufficient to demonstrate that the person in question was of sound mind, i.e. unlikely to be found guilty. According to the Supreme Court, such a flexible interpretation was supported by both systemic reasons and the fact that the liability based on Article 435 of the Civil Code was very strict. It was a question of the increased danger linked to risk-based liability, as the provision itself did not require the subjective criterion to be applied. It was sufficient to prove the objective premises (absolute certainty was not necessary). The author of this gloss points out that the proposed interpretation of the above-mentioned exonerating circumstance significantly weakens the situation of an injured party, who, in many cases, is not be able to obtain compensation either from the entity running an enterprise or from a third party (since it has not been identified) or from the liability insurer. Consequently, it indirectly weakens the extended protection provided to the victim in the risk-based liability. Moreover, it requires a hypothetical assumption not only of the guilt of an unidentified third party, but also of the fact that it is a third party who is in no way connected with the motion of an undertaking (enterprise). Finally, the author raises other objections, especially given that the aforementioned interpretation could be applied under Article 435 of the Civil Code and in all cases of risk-based liability as well.

scholarly journals Służebność gruntowa o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu w świetle najnowszego orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 207-219
Author(s):  
Anna Maria Barańska
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Lively Discussion ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Subject ◽  
First Time

Problem konstytucyjności służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu oraz możliwości jej zasiedzenia jest  przedmiotem ożywionej dyskusji już blisko od dekady. Mimo ugruntowanej i jednolitej linii orzeczniczej Sądu Najwyższego w tym  zakresie sądy powszechne cały czas mają wątpliwości, czy ta wykładnia znajduje umocowanie w przepisach kodeksu cywilnego. Nie  odmawiając interpretacji Sądu Najwyższego funkcjonalności, nie sposób jednak nie zauważyć towarzyszących jej mankamentów. Z  tego względu warte uwagi są ostatnie orzeczenia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, który zdaje się po raz pierwszy zdecydował się  przełamać swoją bierną postawę. Building lease with the content corresponding to transmission easement in the light of the latest case law of the Constitutional TribunalThe problem of the constitutionality of a building lease with the content corresponding to transmission easement and the possibility of acquisitive prescription has been the subject of lively discussion already for almost a decade. Despite the well-established and unified jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in this regard, common courts constantly have doubts whether this interpretation is in line  with the provisions of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court’s interpretation is thought to have some shortcomings. That is why the last  ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal is worth paying attention to, as the Constitutional Tribunal seems to be for the first time active in this topic.

scholarly journals The Position of Consideration in Nepal: A Study of Theories, Cases, and Laws

2021 ◽  
pp. 35-49
Author(s):  
Laxmi Sapkota
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Research Paper ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Unjust Enrichment ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Cost

Lawful consideration is one of the essential elements of a valid contract. However, The National Civil Code, 2017 A.D. (2074 B.S.) has not included a definition of consideration, and it has not stated the necessity of consideration in Nepal in a particular section. Nevertheless, it seems that the Code has realized the importance of lawful consideration in the provisions of contracts of rent, wage and hire purchase. The Code has also stated unjust enrichment, under which one party should not enrich himself or herself at the cost of others or other’s property. Conversely, the now-repealed Contract Act, 2000, in its section 2(d), had defined consideration and stated that consideration must be lawful in section 13(k). In the cases decided by the Supreme Court of Nepal (Bhagwan Lal Shah v. Harka Lal Giri and Chitra Bahadur Karki; Proprietor of Manakamana Construction and Concerns Pvt. Ltd v. Maniram Aggrawal, Proprietor of Aggrawal Industries Pvt. Ltd.), the Supreme Court has issued the precedent stating the importance of consideration in Nepal in regard to Contract Act, 2000 which has now been repealed and replaced by The National Civil Code 2017. Additionally, different theories of the contract like bargain theory, realistic interpretation, theory of reciprocity, ‘nundum pactum’ theory and ‘no consideration no contract’ theory also emphasize the importance of consideration in Contract. Finally, this research paper has proven that consideration is essential in Nepal, thereby stating the theories of consideration, the legislative provisions, and the cases. Furthermore, the researcher came to the conclusion that the lawful consideration is essential in Nepal and it should be dealt with like oxygen to humans and whether written or not, must be implicitly understood. The word ‘consideration’ not explicitly being mentioned in law should not create confusion that a contract can happen without lawful consideration.

scholarly journals Liquidated damages for failure to pay or delayed payment of remuneration to subcontractors — comments on the background of the resolution of the Supreme Court of 30 June 2020, III CZP 67/19

2021 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 33-50
Author(s):  
Cyprian Herl
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Legal Discourse ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Liquidated Damages ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship

The subject of this work is the issue of the admissibility of stipulating liquidated damages for failure to pay or delayed payment of remuneration to subcontractors in the light of article 483 par. 1 of the Civil Code, which allows stipulating contractual penalties only in non-pecuniary obligations. The basis for the considerations is the content of the resolution of the Supreme Court of June 30th, 2020 (III CZP 67/19), which took a firm position in the ongoing legal discourse. This publication is a comparison on the basis of the previous jurisprudence and the doctrine of the relationship between liquidated damages defined in article 483 par. 1 of the Civil Code, and liquidated damages provided for in the Act of 29th January 2004 — Public Procurement Law.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document