The Special Corps of Railway Troops’ command and control staff training in the Moscow Military Railway School (1932–1941)

Author(s):  
Denis S. Lapay

The study is devoted to the Moscow Military Railway School activities in the command and control staff qualifying for the Special Corps of Railway Troops during its existence from 1932 to 1941. The relevance of the research is due to the lack of the issues of construction and training studies of the Special Railway Corps military personnel and the little studied aspects of command and control staff training in the Moscow Military Railway School during the period of Russian historiography. Factor analysis of justification of Railway School foundation historical necessity is carried out. We reveal the main activities of the military authorities, management and teaching staff of the school to train specialists for the Railway troops of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. The experience of deploying the material and training base of the military school within a limited time frame is analyzed. The specificities of the school’s variable staffing system are also noted. The background for the school establishment discontinuing is analyzed, and the conclusion is drawn that this reorganization in March 1941 on the eve of the Great Patriotic War is unjustified, as well as the need to restore historical memory of the school.

2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 15-24
Author(s):  
Denis S. Lapay

The article deals with the training of commanding (technical) staff at schools of military railway technicians’ during the period of military staff training system foundation for the Red Army railway troops in the first half of the 1920s. Topicality of the study is caused by insufficient research of training problems of Red Army railway painter technicians throughout the days of the Civil War ending, the military reform of the 1920s, reorganisation of system of military professional education and stabilisation of a staff contingent. The article reveals the primary activities of the military administration, managing and teaching staff of military railway technicians’ schools in the interests of training technical specialists for the Red Army railway troops. An analysis is made of the disbandment background of mentioned military educational institutions, as well as of the countermeasures taken to preserve them. The finding is about the unreasonableness of the total abolition of military-railway technicians’ schools with the transfer of training junior technical personnel functions directly to the units of railway troops in the format of regimental schools. A brief generalised comparison is made of the Red Army technicians’ historical experience versus the modern training system of junior specialists and technicians of railway troops.


2019 ◽  
pp. 494-504
Author(s):  
Aleksei A. Kilichenkov ◽  

Drawing on the yet unknown to researchers documents from the fonds of the Russian State Military Archive, the author assesses the qualification of the designated and cadre personnel of the Red Army tank troops in late 1930s. The peculiarity of documents involved is that they are reports of the NKVD special departments, which in addition to their direct duties informed the national command authority of the real circumstances in the armed forces. At this, the attention of special departments was focused on the shortcomings and disqualification of the units and formations command. The article examines reports of the special department for the Leningrad Military District, which informed the national military authority of the virtual disruption of the tank reserve commanders training and of failures in the maneuvers of regular units. The events of September 1939, associated with the campaign in Eastern Poland, demonstrated true levels of the Red Army combat efficiency. This was especially the case of designated personnel and equipment mobilization and of reserve soldiers and commanders qualification. Analysis of the reports on the armored troops’ field activity reveals acute problems of command and control over the armed forces interactions with the national economic enterprises in the process of mobilization. The mobilization dragged on. The troops received useless tractors, automobiles and supporting means, and ill-trained personnel, and thus the effectiveness of units and formations was thwarted. These flaws in aggregate sprang from the Red Army command underestimating the complexity of mobilization and training of both reserve and cadre personnel of the Army units and formations. However, reporting documents on the performance in Poland showed optimism and gave assurances in the Army power to execute any order, which could but confuse the Soviet leaders’ assessment of war preparedness.


2015 ◽  
pp. 1231-1245
Author(s):  
Madjid Tavana ◽  
Dawn A. Trevisani ◽  
Dennis T. Kennedy

The increasing complexity in Military Command and Control (C2) systems has led to greater vulnerability due to system availability and integrity caused by internal vulnerabilities and external threats. Several studies have proposed measures of availability and integrity for the assets in the C2 systems using precise and certain measures (i.e., the exact number of attacks on the availability and the integrity, the number of countermeasures for the availability and integrity attacks, the effectiveness of the availability and integrity countermeasure in eliminating the threats, and the financial impact of each attack on the availability and integrity of the assets). However, these measures are often uncertain in real-world problems. The source of uncertainty can be vagueness or ambiguity. Fuzzy logic and fuzzy sets can represent vagueness and ambiguity by formalizing inaccuracies inherent in human decision-making. In this paper, the authors extend the risk assessment literature by including fuzzy measures for the number of attacks on the availability and the integrity, the number of countermeasures for the availability and integrity attacks, and the effectiveness of the availability and integrity countermeasure in eliminating these threats. They analyze the financial impact of each attack on the availability and integrity of the assets and propose a comprehensive cyber-risk assessment system for the Military C2 in the fuzzy environment.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 651-655
Author(s):  
Jeff Simmerman

ABSTRACT In the development of the area contingency plan, the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC) received a vast array of response expertise from the membership of each area committee. This expertise provided a wealth of response knowledge vital in contingency planning. Additionally, each agency in the area committee could be involved in the response command structure. These agencies, each with very different policies and procedures, offer a unique challenge to the FOSC in implementing that area contingency plan. Another challenge faced by the FOSC is ensuring that the operational expertise contained in the area contingency plan is available to each member of a diverse response organization, including personnel mobilized from agencies in areas outside the FOSC area of responsibility, who may be unfamiliar with both the contingency planning process and the command and control (C & C) structure they are augmenting. The solution to both these challenges lies in arranging the area contingency plan in a format outline directly representing the C & C response structure determined by the FOSC and the area committee. This paper discusses the steps in the Savannah Area Contingency Plan and the evolution of its format; the operational and training advantages of this format; and the potential for this format to incorporate improvements.


Author(s):  
Gregory S. Marzolf ◽  
Ronald M. Sega

Abstract This research hypothesizes that changes in command and control along with increased levels of trust and training led to a stronger response in Colorado’s 2013 Black Forest fire than that of the 2012 Waldo Canyon fire. Because the fires were categorized as the worst in the region’s history, and because they occurred in very close succession, in roughly the same area, involving many of the same responders, the fires provide valuable insights into how the response system adapted, or failed to adapt, to overcome key events under both scenarios. The study found that the ability to tailor command and control and supporting response structures to a particular event instead of using traditional rigid frameworks were instrumental to a more effective response. The study goes on to suggest that even though the Black Forest fire was met with an improved response, a systems approach is needed to better accommodate increasingly complex future events.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-32
Author(s):  
Dumitru Grigore

Abstract The research described in the paper at had approaches the interaction between the bio-signal and the remote movement control, by introducing an original mathematical model, regarding the psychophysiological inference from the EDA response bio-signals. The experiments were performed using an adequate design, consisting of two different techniques regarding bio-signals, in order to obtain, in variables corresponding to each of them, the same type of electrical behaviour. In order to establish the projective functions, a direct measurement method was used on the levels of potential in the epidermis’s alternative current, of base-(SPL) and response-type (SPR), the acquisition being executed with an integrated technical system, patented by the author in year 2013. The statistical study targets the correlation analysis of the action of multiple stimuli on the EDA functions, respectively the analysis of the multiple correlations between the EEG and EDA patterns. Necessary in sending the remote command and control of a movement, this correlation in the electrical signal can be implemented in the BCI-type systems, offering superior possibilities of using the bio-feedback systems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-63
Author(s):  
Cezar POPA ◽  
Ion MITULEȚU

With the diversification of risks and threats in the multidimensional operational environment, in variable geometry conflicts, state-of-the-art technology must be used at all times in the architecture of command and control systems. This will ensure optimal response conditions both at the planning level and at the level of the execution of the military operation/action. Real-time communication, horizontally and vertically, between tactical level forces, operational and strategic level command and support structures, and with other institutions with security and defence responsibilities can only be ensured and protected by using advanced technologies. Not to be neglected at all is the training of the human resource for an efficient use of equipment as well as the algorithms and processes for making an efficient decision-making process, in line with technical, technological and artificial intelligence developments.   Keywords: command and control; artificial intelligence; efficiency; technologies; 'Information Technologies.  


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-14
Author(s):  
Maxim V. Evstratov

The article examines the issue of carrying out Stalinist repressions against the officers of the late 1930s. Separate problematic plots associated with repressions in relation to the command and control and political composition of the Red Army are highlighted. Mass repressions began in the early 1930s. thanks to falsified charges related to the Viasna case. Based on special research literature, the article reveals the reasons and consequences of the peak of repressions against the military, which fell on the period of the disclosure of the so-called «military conspiracy» in 1937. The background of the conspiracy itself was connected with the fact that around J.V. Stalin there were two large opposing forces, consisting of eminent military men, who had different views on the further development of the army. As a result, the «leader» supported KE Voroshilov’s group, and MN Tukhachevsky’s associates were repressed. The article notes that about 40 thousand people from among the commanders suffered from the repressions of 1937-1938. In 1939, by order of JV Stalin, the mass coverage of repression was suspended, as a result, 11,178 people were reinstated in the army. Any interrelated events inevitably have a cause-and-effect relationship. Many historians, discussing the failures of the Soviet Union in the first year of the Great Patriotic War, come to the conclusion that the professionally formed army, which led to successes during the Civil War, was largely destroyed by the internal policy of the state, which was directly related to the repression of the end 1930s. The massive repressions carried out against the commanding and commanding personnel in the pre-war years inflicted great losses on the Red Army. Events of the 1930s became the main reason for personnel problems in the Red Army, which entailed tragic consequences during the Great Patriotic War.


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