scholarly journals “The Drivers Will Then Step On Their Starters.” Problems of Training the Red Army Armored Forces in Late 1930s

2019 ◽  
pp. 494-504
Author(s):  
Aleksei A. Kilichenkov ◽  

Drawing on the yet unknown to researchers documents from the fonds of the Russian State Military Archive, the author assesses the qualification of the designated and cadre personnel of the Red Army tank troops in late 1930s. The peculiarity of documents involved is that they are reports of the NKVD special departments, which in addition to their direct duties informed the national command authority of the real circumstances in the armed forces. At this, the attention of special departments was focused on the shortcomings and disqualification of the units and formations command. The article examines reports of the special department for the Leningrad Military District, which informed the national military authority of the virtual disruption of the tank reserve commanders training and of failures in the maneuvers of regular units. The events of September 1939, associated with the campaign in Eastern Poland, demonstrated true levels of the Red Army combat efficiency. This was especially the case of designated personnel and equipment mobilization and of reserve soldiers and commanders qualification. Analysis of the reports on the armored troops’ field activity reveals acute problems of command and control over the armed forces interactions with the national economic enterprises in the process of mobilization. The mobilization dragged on. The troops received useless tractors, automobiles and supporting means, and ill-trained personnel, and thus the effectiveness of units and formations was thwarted. These flaws in aggregate sprang from the Red Army command underestimating the complexity of mobilization and training of both reserve and cadre personnel of the Army units and formations. However, reporting documents on the performance in Poland showed optimism and gave assurances in the Army power to execute any order, which could but confuse the Soviet leaders’ assessment of war preparedness.

Author(s):  
Denis S. Lapay

The study is devoted to the Moscow Military Railway School activities in the command and control staff qualifying for the Special Corps of Railway Troops during its existence from 1932 to 1941. The relevance of the research is due to the lack of the issues of construction and training studies of the Special Railway Corps military personnel and the little studied aspects of command and control staff training in the Moscow Military Railway School during the period of Russian historiography. Factor analysis of justification of Railway School foundation historical necessity is carried out. We reveal the main activities of the military authorities, management and teaching staff of the school to train specialists for the Railway troops of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army. The experience of deploying the material and training base of the military school within a limited time frame is analyzed. The specificities of the school’s variable staffing system are also noted. The background for the school establishment discontinuing is analyzed, and the conclusion is drawn that this reorganization in March 1941 on the eve of the Great Patriotic War is unjustified, as well as the need to restore historical memory of the school.


1995 ◽  
Vol 1995 (1) ◽  
pp. 651-655
Author(s):  
Jeff Simmerman

ABSTRACT In the development of the area contingency plan, the federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC) received a vast array of response expertise from the membership of each area committee. This expertise provided a wealth of response knowledge vital in contingency planning. Additionally, each agency in the area committee could be involved in the response command structure. These agencies, each with very different policies and procedures, offer a unique challenge to the FOSC in implementing that area contingency plan. Another challenge faced by the FOSC is ensuring that the operational expertise contained in the area contingency plan is available to each member of a diverse response organization, including personnel mobilized from agencies in areas outside the FOSC area of responsibility, who may be unfamiliar with both the contingency planning process and the command and control (C & C) structure they are augmenting. The solution to both these challenges lies in arranging the area contingency plan in a format outline directly representing the C & C response structure determined by the FOSC and the area committee. This paper discusses the steps in the Savannah Area Contingency Plan and the evolution of its format; the operational and training advantages of this format; and the potential for this format to incorporate improvements.


2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constantine Antonopoulos

Abstract The power of the Security Council to adopt military measures for the maintenance of international peace and security has never been implemented as originally envisaged by the text of the UN Charter. The Council never acquired armed forces permanently at its disposal and under its command and control and it adopted the practice of authorisation of force leaving coalitions of willing States or regional organisations to implement it by conducting an operation under their command and resources with minimum control by the Council. The mandate of the operation in an enabling resolution is in principle a safeguard against abuse but its interpretation lies primarily (but not exclusively) with the participating States. The SC action in Libya intended to protect civilians (humanitarian intervention). Moreover, it revealed the real dimensions of humanitarian intervention and the vagaries of responsibility to protect: a suspension of the substance of Article 2(4).


2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-172
Author(s):  
Taeyoung Yoon

This article seeks to examine the development of the ROK-U.S. combined command and control system and crisis management procedures in South Korea. In particular, it explores the four crises which occurred between 1968 and 1999 in order to identify its implications for the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management. During a crisis, command and control over the armed forces are critical issues, in order to co-ordinate military movements and alert operations in the context of overall crisis objectives. Within the ROK-U.S. alliance, the ROK command and control chain of armed forces was highly integrated with the command and control chains of the UNC until 1978 and with the CFC from 1978. This CFC combined command structure has enabled the ROK to participate in the chain of operational control of its own forces and to strengthen its position in the ROK-U.S. combined crisis management procedures. Although both co-operated closely to cope with Korean crises in the past, there were some tensions in the use of military force and in the co-ordination of the detailed operational dimension of military operations. However, it can be argued that as long as the ROK crisis objectives and strategy were achieved through a consensus of alliance crisis options, these arrangements provided an effective crisis management system for ROK to resolve Korean crises. To some extent, the combined crisis management system enabled ROK to use America's massive military and intelligence capabilities to deter North Korea and to manage crises effectively. In the face of an era of transition and transformation in the ROK-U.S. alliance relationships following the September 11 2001, the ROK and U.S. need to minimise potential negative effects on combined crisis management system and maintain coherent deterrence capability and alliance stability on the Korean peninsula.


2020 ◽  
pp. 685-696
Author(s):  
О. Ruvin ◽  
O. Srednii

The article deals with the main provisions that are being investigated within the framework of the research work “Development of the methodology for conducting forensic military examinations related to the level of defence capability of the state”. The authors investigate the inconsistency between the Strategic Planning of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Defence Planning measures conducted in the country during 1991-2014. In order to restore military registration throughout the country in 2016, district (city) MC were further formed in administrative-territorial units of the district type, where they were reduced in previous years. Thus, one of the main indicators of the mobilization readiness of the MC is their real capacity for the full and timely deployment of mobilization resources to the troops. However, the results of the implementation of the MC tasks for lifting and submitting part of the mobilization resources during 1-6 phases of partial mobilization in 2014-2015, confirm the existence of significant problems and inconsistencies between the real and necessary capabilities of the MC to fulfil the assigned tasks. In the opinion of the authors of the article, the necessary and necessary techniques for conducting judicial military examinations, which are an important tool for objective evaluation of actions (inaction) of military officials (commanders, commanders, commanders, commanders) in matters of construction, development, training and implementation of the AF, are needed and required. The establishment of a causal link between the violations by the abovementioned officials of the requirements of the current legislation and the occurrence of grave consequences related to the death of personnel, the loss of arms, military equipment, material means, etc.


Author(s):  
BOJAN ZEVNIK

Za učinkovito izvajanje namena in poslanstva Slovenske vojske je najpomembnejša urejenost medsebojnih razmerij znotraj nje. Ta temeljijo na poveljevanju in kontroli z natančno razmejitvijo vloge nadrejenosti in podrejenosti. Osnova učinkovitosti teh vlog je v enostavnosti, da ima vsak podrejeni le enega neposredno nadrejenega ter da vsak nadrejeni daje naloge svojim neposredno podrejenim in nadzoruje njihovo izvajanje. Medsebojna razmerja podrobno opredeljujejo tako vojaški normativni predpisi kot tudi vojaški doktrinarni dokumenti. Kršitve se sankcionirajo. Na strokovnem področju obvladovanja komunikacijsko-informacijskih sistemov se je v zadnjih letih poleg neposredne nadrejenosti začel uporabljati termin strokovna nadrejenost. Čeprav uporabe in namena tega pojma vojaški normativni akti ne urejajo niti ne opredeljujejo, se je sčasoma začel uporabljati tudi v aktih poveljeva- nja in kontrole. Nedorečenost uporabe in njegovo vsesplošno sprejemanje posledič- no povzročata nastajanje novih, neformalnih medsebojnih odnosov. Drugačni med- sebojni odnosi od predvidenih pa so za vojaško organizacijo, katere učinkovitost temelji na rutini, povelju in izvrševanju povelja, lahko vzrok za zmanjševanje njene učinkovitosti. The regulation of mutual relations within the organisation is of ultimate impor- tance for an effective implementation of the purpose and mission of the Slovenian Armed Forces. These relations are based on command and control with precise limi- tations drawn between superiority and subordination. The basic efficiency of these roles lies in the simplicity of each superior having only one immediate subordina- te, assigning tasks to their immediate subordinates and controlling their realisation. Mutual relations are defined in detail in military normative regulations as well as in military doctrinal documents. All breaches are penalised. In the professional field of communication and information system management, the term professional superiority has in the recent years been added to the term immediate superiority. Even though the use and aim of this term are not regulated nor defined by military legal acts, it has eventually been introduced to the acts of command and control. The undefined nature of usage and its general adoption have thus triggered the emergence of new, informal mutual relations. However, mutual relations that differ from those foreseen can reduce the efficiency of a military organisation, where efficiency depends on routine, command and execution of commands.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Vaclav Talhofer ◽  
Šárka Hošková-Mayerová

<p><strong>Abstract.</strong> Multi-criterial analysis is becoming one of the main methods for evaluation of influence of geographic environment on human activity, or human activity on geographic environment, respectively. Analysis results are often used in command and control systems, especially in armed forces and units of rescue systems. For analyses, digital geographic data – whose quality significantly influences the reached results – are used. Visualization of results of analyses in command and control systems are usually thematic layers over raster images of topographic maps. That is why this visualization must correspond to cartographic principles used for the creation of thematic maps. The article presents problems that an analyst encounters within the evaluation of the quality of the used data, performance of the analysis itself as well as preparation of data files for their transfer and publishing in command and control systems.</p>


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document