scholarly journals Libertad de investigación e impunidad de dictadura: jurisprudencia constitucional a la deriva = Freedom of Research and Impunity of Dictatorship: Constitutional Jurisprudence Adrift

Author(s):  
Bartolomé Clavero Salvador

Resumen: Este trabajo parte de la evidencia de la impunidad de los crímenes de la dictadura franquista por obra, esencialmente, de un aparato judicial que ha bloqueado el acceso de las víctimas y de sus descendientes a la justicia. Se concentra en la responsabilidad que pueda recaer en el Tribunal Constitucional como instancia de amparo de derechos. Su papel ha sido clave para recluir el asunto de la criminalidad franquista en la historia para extraerlo del derecho. Confrontado con Comunidades Autónomas que emprenden con decisión la vía contraria, como sea el caso de Navarra, la cobertura de la impunidad está llevando al Tribunal Constitucional a extremos de degradación de sus procedimientos con riesgo de deslegitimación de su jurisprudencia.Palabras clave: Impunidad franquista, derechos de investigación e información, derecho al honor, derecho a la verdad y a la justicia, Tribunal Constitucional, crítica de jurisprudencia.Abstract: This paper’s starting point is the evidence of impunity for the crimes of the Francoist dictatorship, essentially due to a judicial regime that has blocked the access of victims and their descendants to justice. It focuses on the responsibility that may fall on the Constitutional Court in its capacity as protector of rights, since it aims at confining the question of Francoist criminality in the field of history to extract it out of the realm of law. Some regional governments, such as Navarre, resolutely take the opposite path, against which the coverage of impunity by the Constitutional Court leads to extremes of degradation of its proceedings bearing the risk of delegitimisation of its jurisprudence. Keywords: Francoist impunity, research and information rights, right to honour, right to truth and justice, Constitutional Court, criticism of jurisprudence.

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Anmari Meerkotter

The Constitutional Court (CC) judgment of Lee v Minister of Correction Services 2013 2SA 144 (CC) is a recent contribution to transformative constitutional jurisprudence in the field of the law of delict. This matter turned on the issue of factual causation in the context of wrongful and negligent systemic omissions by the state. In this case note, I explore the law relating to this element of delictual liability with specific regard to the traditional test for factual causation – the conditio sine qua non (‘but-for’) test. In particular, I note the problems occasioned by formalistic adherence to this test in the context of systemic state omissions as evidenced by the SCA judgment in the same matter. I also consider the manner in which English courts have addressed this problem. Thereafter, I analyse the CC’s broader approach to the determination of factual causation as one based on common sense and justice. I argue that this approach endorses a break from a formalistic application of the test and constitutes a step towards an approach which resonates with the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. Furthermore, it presents an appropriate solution to the problems associated with factual causation where systemic omissions are concerned. I then consider the transformative impact of the Lee judgment. In particular, I argue that the broader enquiry favoured by the CC facilitates the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed state accountability, and amounts to an extension of the existing norm of accountability jurisprudence. Hence, I contend that the judgment presents a further effort by the Constitutional Court to effect wholesale the constitutionalisation of the law of delict, as well as a vindicatory tool to be used by litigants who have been adversely affected by systemic state omissions.


ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.


Author(s):  
Juan José Ruiz Ruiz

La adopción de los Protocolos 15 y 16 ha culminado un nuevo proceso de reflexión sobre las deficiencias y transformaciones que habrá de afrontar en los próximos decenios el sistema de protección del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. El nuevo Protocolo, bautizado el Protocolo 16 como el «protocolo del diálogo» incorpora una novedosa «vía incidental de diálogo» en el marco del control de convencionalidad, vía que viene a sumarse a las vías incidentales ya existentes en el marco de los controles de incidentales en aplicación del Derecho de la Unión Europea (UE) y en el marco del control de constitucionalidad. Este artículo dedica especial atención a la creciente complejidad de cuestión prejudicial convencional traerá en aquellos sistemas en los que hay una cuestión previa de constitucionalidad y la cuestión prejudicial en virtud del Derecho de la UE. El reenvío que incorpora el Protocolo 16 puede convertirse en una valiosa herramienta en el proceso de cooperación y propulsión de la coherencia del circuito jurisprudencial construido a partir de la circularidad de interpretaciones conformes de Tribunal Constitucional, Tribunal de Justicia de la UE y TEDH. La inserción de una nueva cuestión prejudicial no traerá por ello consigo una disminución en la autonomía del juez nacional, sino que debe ser vista como una garantía más de la triple tutela de derechos que se superponen y que tiene como regla esencial la del mejor standard de protección a partir de una disputa discursiva construida sobre la mejor solución.The adoption of the Protocols 15 and 16 to the ECHR has completed a new process of reflection on the shortcomings and transformations that the protection system of the European Convention on Human Rights will face in the coming decades. The new protocol, named the «protocol of dialogue», incorporates a novel «incidental procedure of dialogue » in the framework of the conventionality control, a procedure in addition to preliminary questions which already exist under European Union law (EU) and in the framework of constitutional control. This article aims to address particular reference to the increasing complexity that Conventional preliminary procedure will bring in those systems in which there are a preliminary question of constitutionality and the preliminary reference procedure on the interpretation of EU law. The preliminary reference procedure enacted by Protocol 16 can become a valuable tool in the process of cooperation and coherence propulsion of jurisprudential circuit, built from the circularity of conforming interpretations of the Constitutional Court, Court of Justice of the EU and ECtHR. The new preliminary question will not bring a reduction in the autonomy of national jurisdiction, but should be seen as a further guarantee of the triple protection of rights that overlap and whose essential rule is «the best standard of protection» from the starting point of a discursive argument founded on the best solution.


Author(s):  
Antonio Bar Cendón

Este trabajo realiza una ordenación y un análisis sistemáticos de las decisiones adoptadas por el Tribunal Constitucional sobre el conjunto de las actuaciones de la Generalitat de Cataluña conducentes a la consecución de la independencia de esta Comunidad Autónoma, a partir del año 2013. Se trata de autos y sentencias que han producido una doctrina constitucional relevante, tanto sobre aspectos directamente afectados por el proceso independentista catalán —la soberanía de la nación española, la primacía de la Constitución, el referéndum—, como con respecto a otras cuestiones tangenciales. La conclusión del Tribunal Constitucional es que ni las mencionadas actuaciones de la Generalitat de Cataluña conducentes a la consecución de la independencia de esta Comunidad Autónoma, ni los instrumentos jurídicos utilizados hasta el presente con ese fin, tienen cabida ni en la Constitución Española de 1978 ni en el vigente Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña que de aquélla se deriva.This article realizes a systematic organization and analysis of the decisions taken by the Spanish Constitutional Court concerning the measures adopted by the Generalitat of Catalonia conducive to the attainment of independence by this Autonomous Community since 2013. The decisions analyzed here are final judgements and procedural judicial orders that have established relevant constitutional jurisprudence, as much on substantial issues directly affected by the Catalonian independence process — the sovereignty of the Spanish nation, the primacy of the Constitution, the referendum — as on other peripheral issues. The Constitutional Court concludes that neither the mentioned activities of the Generalitat of Catalonia conducive to the attainment of independence by this Autonomous Community, nor the legal instruments used so far for this purpose may be accepted within the framework of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which is a constitutional offspring.


Author(s):  
Luis Jimena Quesada

El presente artículo toma como punto de partida la importancia de la cuestión prejudicial como instrumento fundamental del actual constitucionalismo europeo multinivel, en la medida en que a través de él cabe dotar de fuerza a los principios esenciales del Estado de Derecho y de la UE como comunidad de Derecho (especialmente seguridad jurídica, responsabilidad, tutela judicial efectiva y optimización de los derechos fundamentales). Con tal premisa, se efectúa un análisis crítico de estrategias más que dudosas (no siempre aparentemente guiadas por buena fe procesal) que, por acción o por omisión, vulneran el artículo 267 TFUE poniendo en entredicho la fluida articulación del sistema jurídico europeo (de las normas de producción nacional y supranacional) y el correcto reparto del poder judicial europeo (entre la Justicia nacional y supranacional) y, con ello, la óptima realización del sistema europeo de derechos fundamentales. Finalmente, el trabajo concluye con unas propuestas que pretenden mejorar el diálogo judicial supranacional a través de un verdadero espíritu de colaboración que tenga el respaldo de una sólida formación de la Judicatura en Derecho europeo, de una voluntad jurisdiccional positiva (inspirada en el principio favor libertatis), de una dinamización de la obligación de formulación la cuestión prejudicial en los casos previstos en el artículo 267 TFUE y de una disciplina precisa de la doble prejudicialidad (ante la Jurisdicción Constitucional nacional y ante el Tribunal de Justicia).This article takes as its starting point the importance of the preliminary ruling as a fundamental instrument of the current multi-level European constitutionalism, since it allows for strengthening the basic principles of the rule of law at both the State level and the EU level (especially legal certainty, responsibility, due process of law and optimization of fundamental rights). With such a premise, a critical analysis of more than dubious strategies (not always apparently guided by good procedural faith) is carried out. Indeed, these strategies, by action or omission, breach Article 267 TFEU by challenging the fluid articulation of the European legal system (of national and supranational provisions) as well as the correct distribution of the European judicial power (between national and supranational courts) and, as a result, the optimal realization of the European system of fundamental rights. Finally, the paper concludes with proposals that seek to improve supranational judicial dialogue through a true spirit of collaboration supported by a solid training of judges in European law, a positive jurisdictional will (inspired by the favor libertatis principle), a re-dimension of the obligation to submit the preliminary ruling in the cases referred to in Article 267 TFEU and a specific discipline of a double preliminary ruling (both before the national Constitutional Court and before the Court of Justice).


Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea

By presenting the Court’s principal lines of case law regarding the allocation of powers in the Italian constitutional system, this chapter explores the constitutionally regulated relationships among the President, Executive, Parliament, and Judiciary. It reveals that rather than a “separation of powers” in the conventional sense of contemporary constitutional models, the Italian system is best described as instituting a set of reciprocal “relations of powers” with the Constitutional Court as the “judge of powers” that maintains and guarantees these interrelationships of constitutional actors. The chapter explores this role of the Constitutional Court in its relations with both Parliament and the President of the Republic, as well as the Court’s regulation of the relationship between the President and the Executive.


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2081-2094
Author(s):  
Peter E. Quint

Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the order of first appearance) Donald Kommers's monumental casebook, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany and David Currie's magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Professor Kommers's comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late 1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and, drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first major work in English on that court. Since then, Kommers has produced a steady stream of significant works on German constitutional law.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Becker

Even experienced scholars will have to think for quite a while when asked to remember whether a similar situation has ever occurred: A tiny constitutional provision in the organisational part of the Grundgesetz (GG – Basic Law), not exactly neglected by learned writers but definitely never seen as a source of major problems, became the starting point of one of the most emotional outbursts German politics has ever experienced. The said provision, Article 51.3(2) of the Basic Law, dealing with the voting procedure in the Bundesrat innocently says that the votes of one Land's representatives “can” (“können”) be cast only unanimously. In order to understand the causes for the earthquake that struck the German political and constitutional system in the 774th session of the Bundesrat on 22 March 2002 it is essential to shed light on the structure and the constitutional role of the Bundesrat.


Author(s):  
José Mateos Martínez

RESUMEN: El presente artículo analiza el reforzamiento de la libertad de expresión que se produce cuando ésta es ejercida en conexión con el derecho de defensa, y se centra en un concreto supuesto que ha sido recientemente examinado por el Tribunal Constitucional: el ejercicio del derecho de defensa en primera persona por un funcionario que es objeto de un expediente disciplinario. A la vez que estudiamos la solución dada por el TC al citado caso, reflexionamos sobre los efectos de la misma más allá del caso específico que resuelve, planteando la posibilidad de su extrapolación a la generalidad de supuestos donde el ciudadano ejerce su derecho de defensa en primera persona y sin asistencia letrada. ABSTRACT: The present article analyzes the reinforcement of the freedom of expression that takes place when this one is exercised in connection by the right of defense, and centres on a concrete supposition that has been recently examined by the Constitutional Court: the exercise of the right of defense in the first person for a civil servant who is an object of a disciplinary process. Simultaneously that we study the solution given by the Constitutional Court to the mentioned case, we think about the effects of the same one beyond the specific case that resolves, raising the possibility of its extrapolation to the generality of suppositions where the citizen exercises his right of defense in the first person and without legal aid service.PALABRAS CLAVE: libertad de expresión, derecho de defensa, funcionario público, autotutela, expediente disciplinario.KEYWORDS: freedom of expression, right of defense, civil servant, autoguardianship, disciplinary process.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document