scholarly journals El proceso independentista de Cataluña y la doctrina jurisprudencial: una visión sistemática

2016 ◽  
pp. 187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Bar Cendón
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Autonomous Community ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Este trabajo realiza una ordenación y un análisis sistemáticos de las decisiones adoptadas por el Tribunal Constitucional sobre el conjunto de las actuaciones de la Generalitat de Cataluña conducentes a la consecución de la independencia de esta Comunidad Autónoma, a partir del año 2013. Se trata de autos y sentencias que han producido una doctrina constitucional relevante, tanto sobre aspectos directamente afectados por el proceso independentista catalán —la soberanía de la nación española, la primacía de la Constitución, el referéndum—, como con respecto a otras cuestiones tangenciales. La conclusión del Tribunal Constitucional es que ni las mencionadas actuaciones de la Generalitat de Cataluña conducentes a la consecución de la independencia de esta Comunidad Autónoma, ni los instrumentos jurídicos utilizados hasta el presente con ese fin, tienen cabida ni en la Constitución Española de 1978 ni en el vigente Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña que de aquélla se deriva.This article realizes a systematic organization and analysis of the decisions taken by the Spanish Constitutional Court concerning the measures adopted by the Generalitat of Catalonia conducive to the attainment of independence by this Autonomous Community since 2013. The decisions analyzed here are final judgements and procedural judicial orders that have established relevant constitutional jurisprudence, as much on substantial issues directly affected by the Catalonian independence process — the sovereignty of the Spanish nation, the primacy of the Constitution, the referendum — as on other peripheral issues. The Constitutional Court concludes that neither the mentioned activities of the Generalitat of Catalonia conducive to the attainment of independence by this Autonomous Community, nor the legal instruments used so far for this purpose may be accepted within the framework of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which is a constitutional offspring.

scholarly journals “Desde el principio”: la quiebra jurisprudencial del autogobierno constitucional = ‘From the beginning’: the jurisprudential breakdown of constitutional self-government

2019 ◽  
pp. 116
Author(s):  
Bartolomé Clavero Salvador
Keyword(s):  
Basque Country ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Second Republic ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
Palabras Clave ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
Pais Vasco

Resumen: La Constitución Española diseñó en 1978 un régimen de autogobierno mediante Estatutos pactados para el acomodo de los territorios más diferenciados. Los reconoció como nacionalidades dotadas de derechos históricos con título así precedente a la propia Constitución en el tiempo y así, virtualmente, en el derecho. Incluso se revalidaron constitucionalmente los referenda de iniciativa para acceso a la autonomía que se habían efectuado bajo la Constitución anterior, la de la Segunda República. De tal modo se constituyeron en 1979 el País Vasco y Cataluña. Fue un proceso que comenzó a torcerse pronto. El Tribunal Constitucional, apenas establecido, comenzó en 1981 una labor concienzuda de zapa de ese régimen de autogobierno. He aquí un caso de verdadera jurisprudencia o, por lo que resultará, jurisimprudencia preventiva. De esto se preocupa este trabajo. Palabras clave: Constitución Española, jurisprudencia constitucional, derechos históricos, pactos estatuyentes, bloque de constitucionalidad, conflicto catalán. Abstract: In 1978, the Spanish Constitution designed a system of self-government by means of negotiated Statutes for the accommodation of the most differentiated territories. It recognized them as nationalities endowed with historical rights and therefore with a title preceding the Constitution itself in time and also, virtually, at law. Even the referenda of initiative for access to autonomy that had been carried out under the previous Constitution, that one of the Second Republic, were constitutionally revalidated. In this way, the Basque Country and Catalonia were constituted in 1979. It was a process that soon began to be distorted. The Constitutional Court, barely established, began in 1981 a meticulous work of sabotage of such a framework of self-government. Here is a case of truly preventive jurisprudence or, as it would turn out, juris-imprudence. That is what this paper is concerned about. Keywords: Spanish Constitution, constitutional jurisprudence, historical rights, self-government covenants, bloc de constitutionnalité, Catalan conflict.

La reforma del artículo 135 de la Constitución y su incidencia en la Ley del Concierto

2012 ◽  
pp. 57-97
Author(s):  
Arantza GONZÁLEZ LÓPEZ
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Autonomous Community ◽  
Autonomous Communities ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
As If

LABURPENA: Azterlan honetan, EKren 135. artikulua aldatzeak dakartzan ondorioak aztertzen dira, haren aurrekari gertu-gertukoen eta Konstituzio Auzitegiaren 134/2011 epaiaren argitan, eta honako hau ondorioztatzen da: aldaketa horrek ez duela aldatu eskumenak Estatuaren eta autonomia-erkidegoen artean banatzeko era, eta, horrez gain, ezin dela eskumen-titulu autonomotzat jo. Orobat aztertu dugu zer ondorio dakarzkion EKren 135. artikulua aldatzeak Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoari, betiere kontuan hartuz garatzeko emango den lege organikoak erresalbuzko klausula bat jaso beharko duela foru-ogasunen inguruan, eta nahitaezkoa dela aurrekontu-egonkortasunari buruzko helburuak Ekonomia Itunaren Batzorde Mistoaren baitan ezartzea. Azkenik, tesi bat defendatzen du, alegia, bateragarria dela konstituzio-erreforma hau behar bezala interpretatzea eta lurralde historikoak autonomia-erkidego balira bezala hartzea. RESUMEN: Este estudio analiza las consecuencias de la modificación del artículo 135 CE a la luz de sus antecedentes normativos inmediatos y de la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 134/2011, concluyendo que aquella modificación no ha alterado el régimen de distribución de competencias entre el Estado y las Comunidades Autónomas, ni admite la consideración de título competencial autónomo. Examina, también, las consecuencias de la modificación del artículo 135 CE en el ámbito de la Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi, entendiendo que la Ley Orgánica que se dicte en desarrollo de dicho deberá incluir una salvedad referida a las haciendas forales, siendo imprescindible que la fijación de los objetivos de estabilidad presupuestaria se realice en sede de la Comisión Mixta del Concierto. Por último, defiende la tesis de que una adecuada interpretación de la reforma constitucional es compatible con la consideración de los Territorios Históricos como si de una Comunidad Autónoma se tratara. ABSTRACT: This study analyzes the consequences to the amendment of section 135 of the Spanish Constitution in the light of its immediate legal background and of Constitutional Court judgment number 134/2011 and it concludes that that amendment has not altered the regime of allocation of powers between State and Autonomous Communities nor admits its qualification as autonomous source of powers. It also examines the consequences of the amendment of section 135 within the Autonomous Community of Euskadi by understanding that the organic act to be enacted as implementation of that amendment will have to include an exception referred to the Foral Treasuries. Finally, it advocates the thesis that a correct interpretation of the constitutional amendment is compatible with the consideration of the Historic Territories as if they were an Autonomous Community.

The Dudley Lee Case: A new approach to factual causation and its implications for transformative jurisprudence

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Anmari Meerkotter
Keyword(s):  
Case Note ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Recent Contribution ◽  
New Approach ◽  
State Accountability ◽  
The Law ◽  
Transformative Impact ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
Law Of Delict

The Constitutional Court (CC) judgment of Lee v Minister of Correction Services 2013 2SA 144 (CC) is a recent contribution to transformative constitutional jurisprudence in the field of the law of delict. This matter turned on the issue of factual causation in the context of wrongful and negligent systemic omissions by the state. In this case note, I explore the law relating to this element of delictual liability with specific regard to the traditional test for factual causation – the conditio sine qua non (‘but-for’) test. In particular, I note the problems occasioned by formalistic adherence to this test in the context of systemic state omissions as evidenced by the SCA judgment in the same matter. I also consider the manner in which English courts have addressed this problem. Thereafter, I analyse the CC’s broader approach to the determination of factual causation as one based on common sense and justice. I argue that this approach endorses a break from a formalistic application of the test and constitutes a step towards an approach which resonates with the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. Furthermore, it presents an appropriate solution to the problems associated with factual causation where systemic omissions are concerned. I then consider the transformative impact of the Lee judgment. In particular, I argue that the broader enquiry favoured by the CC facilitates the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed state accountability, and amounts to an extension of the existing norm of accountability jurisprudence. Hence, I contend that the judgment presents a further effort by the Constitutional Court to effect wholesale the constitutionalisation of the law of delict, as well as a vindicatory tool to be used by litigants who have been adversely affected by systemic state omissions.

Estatutos y competencias después de la STC 31/2010, de 28 de junio

2011 ◽  
pp. 139-165
Author(s):  
Hèctor LÓPEZ BOFILL
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Formal Concept ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Autonomous Community ◽  
Autonomous Communities ◽  
El Sistema ◽  
General Material ◽  
Definition Of

LABURPENA: Eskumenak banatzeko sistemari dagokionez, ekainaren 28ko 31/2010 Epaiak, Kataluniako Autonomia Estatutuari buruzkoak, estatutu-arauek Estatuaren eta autonomia erkidegoaren arteko eskumen-egitura modulatzeko aukera bertan behera uzten du, nahiz eta sistema konstituzionalak estatutuen xedapenei nolabaiteko protagonismo teorikoa ematen dien konstituzionaltasunaren blokea egituratzean eta eskumenak hartzean. Hala, 31/2010 Ebazpenak erakusten duenez, Auzitegi Konstituzionalak kategoria orokorren gaineko interpretazioaren monopolioa berresten du, eskumenen definizio funtzionala egiterakoan (egileak eskumen-egituraren «hiperkonstituzionalizazioa» deitzen dio fenomeno horri). Gainera, autonomia erkidegoei aitortutako eskumenen esklusibotasun-kontzeptua lausotzen du, Estatuaren oinarrizko legeriaren kontzeptu orokor material eta formalari uko egiten dio, eta autonomia-erakunde horien eskumen betearazleen irismena mugatzen du. RESUMEN: En lo referido al sistema de distribución de competencias, la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 31/2010, de 28 de junio, sobre el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña, cierra la posibilidad de que las normas estatutarias modulen la estructura competencial entre el Estado y la Comunidad Autónoma pese al teórico protagonismo que el sistema constitucional confiere a las disposiciones estatutarias en la articulación del bloque de la constitucionalidad y en la asunción de competencias. En la doctrina emanada de la resolución 31/2010, el Tribunal Constitucional refuerza su monopolio interpretativo sobre categorías generales en la definición funcional de competencias (la llamada por el autor «hiperconstitucionalización» de la estructura competencial) diluyendo el concepto de exclusividad aplicado a las competencias reconocidas a las Comunidades Autónomas, renunciando a un concepto general material-formal de legislación básica estatal y restringiendo el alcance de las competencias ejecutivas de los mismos entes autonómicos. ABSTRACT: As far as the allocation of powers is concerned, the 31/2010 ruling by the constitutional Court, from June 28th, about the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, opens the door to the possibility that the Statute norms modulate the competences framework between the State and the Autonomous Community despite the theoretical prominence awarded to the Statute provisions for the articulation of the block of constitutionality and the assumption of competences. As the doctrine from the 31/2010 ruling by the Constitutional Court states, the Constitutional Court enhances its interpretative monopoly on the general categories regarding the functional definition of competences (the so called by the author hiperconstitutionalization of the competences framework) wakening down the concept of exclusivity applied to the competences recognized to the Autonomous Communities, renouncing to a general material-formal concept for the State basic legislation and restricting the scope of the executive competences of the Autonomous entities.

scholarly journals El principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales en el ordenamiento constitucional español // The principle of non-regressivity of Social rights in the Spanish Constitutional Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 849
Author(s):  
Miguel Agudo Zamora
Keyword(s):  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Social Model ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Social ◽  
Legitimate Expectations

Resumen:Este trabajo analiza la situación en el modelo constitucional español del principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales. Se parte del análisis sucinto del modelo social de nuestra Constitución lo que implica el reconocimiento de derechos económicos y sociales. Este reconocimiento es la plasmación constitucional de los principios de solidaridad y de cohesión social. El principio de cohesión social ha sido definido por el Consejo de Europa e incluido explícitamente en los tratados constitutivos de la Unión Europea. La necesidad de lograr la cohesión social fundamenta la inclusión en las Constituciones y en los tratados internacionales del principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales. En la Constitución española de 1978 este principio no se incluye expresamente. La no inclusión en la Constitución de este principio supone un peligro para la cohesión social en tiempos de crisis económica. Por su parte, el Tribunal Constitucional ha sentado una doctrina ambigua sobre este asunto, que ha sido analizada en este trabajo, así como las más significativas aportaciones doctrinales sobre la materia. Para saber cuáles son los limites de la regresividad de los derechos sociales que dotan de contenido este principio se ha realizado una comparativa internacional y de los principios constitucionales. Del estudio del ordenamiento internacional y de los valores y principios constitucionales se ha obtenido una serie de límites a la regresividad del contenido, eficacia y protección de los derechos sociales. Concluye este trabajo sugiriendo una propuesta de reforma constitucional que incluya el principio de no regresividad de los derechos sociales en el texto constitucional estableciendo una serie de requisitos de aquellas medidas que puedan suponer una regresión de contenido de los mismos tales como que deberán justificarse plenamente en referencia a la totalidad de los derechos, valores y principios recogidos en la Constitución y en los tratados internacionales suscritos por el Estado español y en el contexto del aprovechamiento pleno del máximo de los recursos de que se disponga; se aplicarán tras el examen más exhaustivo de todas las alternativas posibles; tendrán en todo caso carácter temporal hasta que las circunstancias económicas permitan restablecer el ámbito material de contenido, eficacia, protección y garantía prexistente de los derechos sociales afectados; en todo caso respetarán el contenido mínimo esencial de los derechos sociales como manifestación de la dignidad humana; serán razonables y estarán suficientemente motivadas; no vulnerarán, entre otros, los principios de seguridad jurídica, confianza legítima, no discriminación e irretroactividad de disposiciones restrictivas de derechos individuales, serán proporcionadas y respetarán los principios de solidaridad, cohesión y sostenibilidad social. Summary1. State, solidarity and social cohesion. 2. Doctrinal and jurisprudential notes on the principle of non-regressivity of social rights. 3. Limits to the regressivity of social rights. a) Limits derived from international law. b) Limits derived from dignity as essential content of social rights. c) Limits derived from the prohibition of arbitrariness: the need for sufficient motivation. 4. Conclusion: constitutionalamendment and non-regressivity of social rights.Abstract:This paper analyzes the constitutional recognition of the principle of non-regressivity of social rights in Spain. It starts from the succinct analysis of the social model of our Constitution which implies the recognition of economic and social rights. This recognition is the constitutionalization of the principles of solidarity and social cohesion. The principle of social cohesion has been defined by the Council of Europe and explicitly included in the constitutive treaties of the European Union. The need to achieve social cohesion underpins the inclusion in the Constitutions and international treaties of the principle of non-regression of social rights. In the Spanish Constitution of 1978 this principle is not expressly included. The non-inclusion in the Constitution of this principle poses a danger to social cohesion in times of economic crisis. For its part, the Constitutional Court has established an ambiguous doctrine on this subject, which has been analyzed in this work, as well as the most significant doctrinal contributions on the subject. In order to know which are the limits of the regressivity of the social rights that give content of this principle an international comparison has been made as well as a study of constitutional principles. Limits to the regressivity of content, effectiveness and protection of social rights have been obtained from the study of international order and constitutional values and principles. This paper concludes by suggesting a proposal for constitutional amendment that includes the principle of non-regressivity of social rights in the Spanish Constitution establishing some requirements of those measures that imply a regression of their content such as: they shall be fully justified in relationship with all the rights, values and principles contained in the Constitution and in the international treaties signed by the Spanish State and in the context of full exploitation of the maximum resources available; Shall be applied after a more comprehensive examination of all possible alternatives; Shall in any case be of a temporary nature until the economic circumstances permit the restoration of the content, effectiveness, protection and pre-existing guarantee of the social rights affected; In any case they will respect the essential minimum content of social rights as a manifestation of human dignity; Shall be reasonable and sufficiently motivated; Shall not infringe, inter alia, the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, non-discrimination and non-retroactivity of provisions restricting individual rights; Shall be proportionate and shall respect the principles of solidarity, cohesion and social sustainability.

scholarly journals De la ‘libertad informática’ a la constitucionalización de nuevos derechos digitales (1978-2018) // From «computing freedom» towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights (1978-2018).

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Artemi Rallo Lombarte
Keyword(s):  
Data Protection ◽  
Personal Data ◽  
Digital Age ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Contemporary Society ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Digital Rights ◽  
European Directive ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
New Framework

Resumen:La referencia a la informática en la Constitución de 1978 reconoció trascendencia constitucional a la necesidad de protección del individuo frente a los riegos derivados de los avances tecnológicos. Cuatro décadas después, la sociedad contemporánea afronta el reto de constitucionalizar nuevos derechos digitales. En España, sendas leyes (LORTAD y LOPD) desarrollaron el precepto constitucional que consagra la garantía de los derechos frente al uso de la informática. Para preservar a los individuos frente a los riesgos y amenazas de latecnología, el Tribunal Constitución dedujo del artículo 18.4 CE un derecho fundamental autónomo a la protección de datos personales. Las leyes españolas de protección de datos son el resultado de la obligación de cumplir compromisos internacionales (Convenio 108 del Consejo de Europa de 1981) y europeos (Directiva 95/46, artículo 8 de la CDFUE 41 y Reglamento UE 2016/679). Sin embargo, el reconocimiento constitucional o europeo, legal o constitucional, del derecho fundamental a la protección de datos no agota la necesidad de establecer un nuevo marco de protección de los ciudadanos en la era digitalen el que se reconozcan nuevos derechos digitales.SummaryI. Introduction. II. The misleading constitutionalization of «computing ». III. Convention 108 of the council of europe (1981). IV. Data protection right as an autonomous fundamental right. V. LORTAD (1992), LOPD (1999) and its reform. VI. The europeanization of data protection right: Directive 95/46, art. 8 CDFUE and regulation EU 2016/679. VII. Towards the constitutionalization of new digital rights.Abstract:The reference to computing in the Spanish Constitution (1978) recognized constitutional significance to the need for protection against the technological risks. Four decades later, the contemporary society faces the challenge of constitutionalising new digital rights. In Spain, two laws (LOPD and LORTAD) developed the constitutional article that enshrined the guarantee of rights against the use of computers. The Constitutional Court inferred from article 18.4 CE an autonomous fundamental right to the protection of personal data. Spanish data protection laws are the result of the obligation to comply withinternational (Convention 108 of the Council of Europe from 1981) and European (Directive 95/46, article 8 of the CDFUE and Regulation EU 2016/679) commitments. However, the European, legal or constitutional, recognition of the fundamental right to data protection does not exclude the need to establish a new framework for the protection of citizens in the digital age in which new digital rights should be recognized.

The Right to Assisted Dying: Constitutional Jurisprudence and Its Impact in Canada, Germany and Austria

ICL Journal ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Braun
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Assisted Dying ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Right ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Abstract Many states are grappling with the regulation of assistance in suicide and ending the life of another upon their request. Initially punishable in most countries, a growing number of jurisdictions have now introduced permissive frameworks decriminalising, to varying degrees, rendering assistance in dying. Other countries, however, have proceeded with the criminal prohibition and several courts have upheld the lawfulness of the respective criminal laws during human rights and constitutional challenges. Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2015, the German Federal Constitutional Court in February 2020 and the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2020 have respectively declared unconstitutional and void national criminal laws prohibiting rendering assistance in dying. This article first outlines the criminal law framework relating to assisted dying in Canada, Germany and Austria. It subsequently analyses the judgments before pondering their impact on the legal landscape in the three countries. The article concludes that while the Canadian Supreme Court decision appears to have had a significant impact on the introduction of subsequent legislation in Canada, the effects of the Constitutional Courts’ judgments seem much more subdued in Germany and are yet to unfold in Austria.

scholarly journals Tribunal Constitucional y proceso secesionista catalán: respuestas jurídico-constitucionales a un conflicto político-constitucional

2016 ◽  
pp. 561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep M.ª Castellá Andreu
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Title V ◽  
Participatory Process ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Right

En este estudio se pasa revista a las cinco sentencias dictadas por el Tribunal Constitucional entre 2014 y 2015 en relación con el proceso secesionista iniciado en Cataluña en 2012. Buena parte de las impugnaciones siguen el procedimiento del artículo 161 CE y Título V LOTC y versan unas sobre la constitucionalidad de dos resoluciones aprobadas por el Parlamento de Cataluña en las que se plantea el derecho a decidir, el carácter soberano del pueblo de Cataluña y el inicio del proceso político y de un proceso constituyente, y las otras sobre la regulación y aplicación de los instrumentos para llevar a cabo el proceso secesionista seguido hasta ahora: una llamada consulta popular no referendaria y un proceso de participación ciudadana. Las sentencias advierten contradicciones con la Constitución de las normas y actos impugnados tanto de carácter sustantivo como de orden competencial. Para el Tribunal la reforma constitucional es ineludible a la hora de afrontar el proceso secesionista con respeto al ordenamiento jurídico. Se concluye que el Tribunal en las diferentes sentencias emitidas otorga distinta relevancia a las exigencias de la democracia pluralista y a las de la democracia constitucional.The essay deals with the five rulings dictated by the Constitutional Court in 2014-15 in relation with the secessionist process started in Catalonia in 2012. Most of the cases follow the procedure of section 161.2 Spanish Constitution and Title V of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court. They are focused on i) the constitutionality of two resolutions passed by the Catalan Parliament on the right to decide, the sovereignty of Catalan people and the beginning of the political and constituent processes and ii) the regulation and exercise of the instruments to reach the secessionist process followed until now: a so-called popular consultation without referendum and a participatory process. The rulings take into account the contradiction of the norms and acts contested with the Constitution, in both substantive and allocation of powers perspectives. For the Court the constitutional amendment is ineluctable to confront the secessionist process. We conclude that the Constitutional Court assumes in the different rulings differently the obligations of a pluralist and of a constitutional democracy.

II Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 Powers and Conflicts

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barsotti Vittoria ◽  
Carozza Paolo G ◽  
Cartabia Marta ◽  
Simoncini Andrea
Keyword(s):  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Reciprocal Relations ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Principal Lines

By presenting the Court’s principal lines of case law regarding the allocation of powers in the Italian constitutional system, this chapter explores the constitutionally regulated relationships among the President, Executive, Parliament, and Judiciary. It reveals that rather than a “separation of powers” in the conventional sense of contemporary constitutional models, the Italian system is best described as instituting a set of reciprocal “relations of powers” with the Constitutional Court as the “judge of powers” that maintains and guarantees these interrelationships of constitutional actors. The chapter explores this role of the Constitutional Court in its relations with both Parliament and the President of the Republic, as well as the Court’s regulation of the relationship between the President and the Executive.

David Currie and German Constitutional Law

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2081-2094
Author(s):  
Peter E. Quint
Keyword(s):  
Federal Republic ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Federal Republic Of Germany ◽  
Major Work ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
German Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Jurisprudence

Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the order of first appearance) Donald Kommers's monumental casebook, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany and David Currie's magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Professor Kommers's comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late 1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and, drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first major work in English on that court. Since then, Kommers has produced a steady stream of significant works on German constitutional law.

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