scholarly journals Does the Apple Fall Far from the Tree?

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-80
Author(s):  
Željko Boneta ◽  
Marko Mrakovčić

The paper presents the results of a survey that assessed the impact of informal and formal agents of the political socialization (PS) process on a sample of students enrolled at the University of Rijeka (N = 635). The correlation between the participants' ideological self-identification (PIS) and the assessed ideological orientation of their parents (PIO) was analyzed. Students believe that no agent of socialization has even moderately influenced the formation of their political views and assess the weakest influence of the formal PS agent – teachers in primary and secondary schools. The participants believe that parents have influenced their political attitudes more than other agents, but assess this influence on average as weak, regardless of whether they place their parents in the same or different positions on the ideological orientation (IO) scale. Left- and right-oriented participants admit a somewhat stronger influence of their parents' informal PS than those who rank themselves in the center. Statistically significant correlations between PIS and the perceived PIO were obtained. A small share of participants does not perceive a similarity between their own and their parents' IO and there is a negligible share of those who place their parents in diametrically opposed positions on the scale. The participants who have a greater interest in politics and those from a more politically stimulating environment are more inclined to move away from the political center and their parents' IO. Concordance between family IOs increases with the perception of better relationships with parents.

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin S. McAdams ◽  
Justin Earl Lance

AbstractIn the United States, Evangelical Protestants' political attitudes have been attributed to their conservative theological beliefs. As this religion's membership has increased around the world, other Evangelicals would logically be expected to demonstrate a similar conservatism in their political views. And yet, this anticipated result does not hold. In Brazil, for example, Evangelicals maintain moderate-to-liberal attitudes on several issues. To address this anomaly, this article relies on the Pew Forum's Multi-Country Religion Survey to examine the impact of religion on Evangelicals' ideology as well as attitudes on moral and economic issues in the United States and Brazil. While doctrinal orthodoxy predicts Evangelicals' moral conservatism, neither religious component examined significantly predicts Brazilian Evangelicals' ideology or economic attitudes. Significant differences in Brazilian and American attitudes on these dimensions in general suggest that the political environment plays a much larger role in whether — and how — religion influences these political attitudes.


1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Marsh

Political socialization research has been characterized by a number of poorly documented but widely accepted generalizations. In particular, it has been assumed that indetgenarational consistency in political attitudes is the usual, if not the inevitable, outcome of the political socialization process in Western democracies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 210 ◽  
pp. 04006
Author(s):  
Jana Pasáčková

Since decreasing level of knowledge of mathematics is the problem at universities, not only in the Czech Republic, we try to define some reasons for that between our students from different secondary schools. The paper discusses the results of the examinations in mathematics at the university in the Czech Republic. The aim is focused on the differences between the scores of students from different secondary schools. We compare the results of two tests which students have to pass during the semester. In addition, we compare the impact of introducing a new subject called “Math seminar”. This seminar should help students to complete their knowledge of topics from mathematics of secondary schools. We observe the improvement of students who passed the Math seminar. We observe the impact of passing the school-leaving exam from mathematics as well. We would like to consider this as a part of a long-term monitoring of students in this study programme and re-analyze unsuccessful students after they pass the course “Math seminar”.


1974 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 687-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
William M. Chandler

When compared to research on the family and the school, the study of peer groups within the context of political socialization is a relatively neglected area. Somewhat more concern for peer-group effects has been indicated by non-political social scientists, especially social psychologists. But even though some of their work is suggestive, its application is often marginal for explaining political attitudes. Just as the existing theory on peer-group political socialization is weak, so are the existing data and analysis. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and extent of peer-group socialization among German students. This analysis is based on a survey of student attitudes at the University of Cologne. The survey is a random sample of 855 respondents and was carried out in 1968.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Sütterlin ◽  
Torvald F. Ask ◽  
Sophia Mägerle ◽  
Sandra Glöckler ◽  
Leandra Wolf ◽  
...  

AI-generated “deep fakes” are becoming increasingly professional and can be expected to become an essential tool for cybercriminals conducting targeted and tailored social engineering attacks, as well as for others aiming for influencing public opinion in a more general sense. While the technological arms race is resulting in increasingly efficient forensic detection tools, these are unlikely to be in place and applied by common users on an everyday basis any time soon, especially if social engineering attacks are camouflaged as unsuspicious conversations. To date, most cybercriminals do not yet have the necessary resources, competencies or the required raw material featuring the target to produce perfect impersonifications. To raise awareness and efficiently train individuals in recognizing the most widespread deep fakes, the understanding of what may cause individual differences in the ability to recognize them can be central. Previous research suggested a close relationship between political attitudes and top-down perceptual and subsequent cognitive processing styles. In this study, we aimed to investigate the impact of political attitudes and agreement with the political message content on the individual’s deep fake recognition skills.In this study, 163 adults (72 females = 44.2%) judged a series of video clips with politicians’ statements across the political spectrum regarding their authenticity and their agreement with the message that was transported. Half of the presented videos were fabricated via lip-sync technology. In addition to the particular agreement to each statement made, more global political attitudes towards social and economic topics were assessed via the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS).Data analysis revealed robust negative associations between participants’ general and in particular social conservatism and their ability to recognize fabricated videos. This effect was pronounced where there was a specific agreement with the message content. Deep fakes watched on mobile phones and tablets were considerably less likely to be recognized as such compared to when watched on stationary computers.To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate and establish the association between political attitudes and interindividual differences in deep fake recognition. The study further supports very recently published research suggesting relationships between conservatism and perceived credibility of conspiracy theories and fake news in general. Implications for further research on psychological mechanisms underlying this effect are discussed.


2007 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-246
Author(s):  
VJERAN PAVLAKOVIĆ

AbstractIn summer 1936 Vladko Maček's priorities lay with rebuilding the Croatian Peasant Party after its six years of illegality under King Aleksandar's dictatorship in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Yet the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) was to have a polarising and radicalising effect on Croatian society. Both communists and supporters of the fascist Ustaša movement looked to Spain as a model for resolving the ‘Croat question’ at a time when Croats were becoming increasingly frustrated with Maček's passivity. As a propaganda war raged in the press of the radical left and right, the Croatian Peasant Party tried to ignore the conflict. Maček's failure to realise the impact of the war in Spain on the political situation in Croatia is indicative of some of his weaknesses as a leader in difficult times. The Croatian Peasant Party missed the opportunity to take a strong moral stance against fascism during the Spanish conflict, and Maček's fence-sitting from the 1930s onwards permitted the more extreme ideological movements in Croatia to take advantage of the rapidly changing conditions of a Europe engulfed in war.


1983 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joyce Shettel-Neuber ◽  
Joseph O'Reilly

Numerous studies have considered the possibility of consistent differences in the percentages of left- and right-handers in verbal and visuospatial career fields and academic disciplines. Conflicting results have supported hypotheses suggesting more left-handers in visuospatial fields, fewer left-handers in visuospatial fields, and no differences between the percentages of left- and right-handers in visuospatial and verbal fields. The present study sought to examine further the possibility of differential distributions of left-and right-handers in verbal and visuospatial fields by considering hand preferences of 109 faculty members in the architecture college, art department, law college, and psychology department at The University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. No significant differences were found in reported handedness, hand position in writing, or familial handedness for the verbal and visuospatial groups. Results were discussed in relationship to methodological difficulties of previous studies and the overemphasis of the impact of cerebral dominance on functioning in normal individuals.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 621-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
DIANA C. MUTZ

How do Americans acquire the impression that their political foes have some understandable basis for their views, and thus represent a legitimate opposition? How do they come to believe that reasonable people may disagree on any given political controversy? Given that few people talk regularly to those of opposing perspectives, some theorize that mass media, and television in particular, serve as an important source of exposure to the rationales for oppositional views. A series of experimental studies suggests that television does, indeed, have the capacity to encourage greater awareness of oppositional perspectives. However, common characteristics of televised political discourse—incivility and close-up camera perspectives—cause audiences to view oppositional perspectives as less legitimate than they would have otherwise. I discuss the broader implications of these findings for assessments of the impact of television on the political process, and for the perspective that televised political discourse provides on oppositional political views.


2020 ◽  
pp. 82-94
Author(s):  
K. A. Bukin ◽  
M. I. Levin

The paper examines the evolution of individual political preferences under the influence of the parties and political groups of which they are members. Individual preferences are considered in terms of proximity to political doctrines of the political institutions in question. The change in political views can be considered as a combination of a steady trend with the imposition of random change, and in this sense it is similar to mutations in biology. The paper shows that stationary distributions of individuals on the political spectrum scale are defined by their utility functions and initial numbers. While the initial distribution was generated by membership of the central party and two groups conventionally called “left” and “right”, the stationary distribution has the form of three narrow peaks, the maximums of which are at the points characterizing political doctrines on the political spectrum scale. In addition, it is shown that in the stationary mode, the relative number of members of the “center” party will increase as compared to the initial period, and vice versa, the total share of “left” and “right” will decrease.


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