scholarly journals The Aspect of Subjectivity in Scientific Thinking—Where Did It Actually Come From?

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Hroar Klempe
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Thinking ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Folk Culture ◽  
The Third ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Main Figure

Subjectivity has always been a part of philosophical speculations. However, Immanuel Kant is mentioned as the main figure to bring in subjectivity in modern philosophy by comparing the Critique of Pure Reason with the Copernican revolution. We might include Descartes as well, and not least the followers of Kant, like Fichte and Hegel. Yet none of these end up with subjectivity as the only premise for thinking, but rather combine it with objectivity. Hence, subjectivity has appeared as a stranger in philosophy and yet not fully accepted. In this paper, I try to pursue the aspect of subjectivity by not looking at philosophy, but rather at psychology. The appearance of the term can be dated back to 1520 when the Croatian humanist Marcus Marulus published the thesis entitled “Psychology, the Nature of the Soul”. This thesis is lost, but by pursuing the appearance of the term, four different movements seem to contribute with and highlight an aspect of subjectivity. One is Humanism, the other is Reformation, the third is a focus on the empirical aspects of science and the fourth is the dissemination of folk culture to academics and aristocracy by means of the art of printing. The finding, therefore, is that psychology is not to be regarded as a discipline that grows out of philosophy, but rather as a discipline that conflicts philosophy, but nevertheless intervenes it and makes it progress.

The Two Dogmas without Empiricism

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan W. Hall
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Theoretical Domain ◽  
The Third ◽  
New Form ◽  
Web Of Belief ◽  
Meaningful Sentence ◽  
Immediate Experience

AbstractIn Two Dogmas of Empiricism W.V. Quine begins his attack on the analytic/ synthetic dogma by criticizing Immanuel Kant’s conception of analyticity. After dismissing Kant’s interpretation as well as others, he articulates a view of the analytic/synthetic distinction that connects it to the other dogma of empiricism, reductionism. Ultimately, Quine rejects both dogmas in favor of a new form of empiricism which subscribes to neither one. Just as Quine believes it is possible to accept empiricism without the dogmas, I will argue that the Kantian can accept both dogmas while avoiding the forms of empiricism that Quine considers in his article. The paper is broken into four sections. First, I offer a brief overview of the two dogmas and their relationship to one another before examining Quine’s argument against ‘radical reductionism’, i.e., the position that every meaningful sentence is translatable into a sentence about immediate experience that is either true or false. The second section shows how one of Kant’s arguments from the Critique of Pure Reason anticipates the crux of Quine’s argument against radical reductionism. What is left after this argument is only an ’attenuated form’ of reductionism that Quine believes is identical to the analytic/synthetic distinction. In the third section, I explain how Kantians can draw the analytic/ synthetic distinction in a way that is consistent with this attenuated form of reductionism while avoiding the objections that Quine lodges against the two dogmas. I argue that this allows the Kantian to accept the dogmas while avoiding both the radically reductive form of empiricism as well as the form of empiricism that Quine endorses (web-of-belief holism). Finally, I will consider how this Kantian version of the analytic/synthetic distinction can be extended beyond the theoretical domain to practical and aesthetic sentences

The Voyage of Human Reason in and beyond Kant's The Critique of Pure Reason

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-91
Author(s):  
Yi Wu ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Coming Of Age ◽  
Vantage Point ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Declaration Of Independence ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
To Come ◽  
Do So

The Copernican Revolution had meant for modern Europe surer navigation, bolder voyages and wilder discoveries. With the declaration of independence of America in 1781 and the publication of The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant in the same year, the age of Enlightenment defined itself as an age of coming of age and of daring to know. This essay tries to draw out the peculiar enlightenment ethos of a youth against youth through Kant’s depiction of the voyage of human reason in the First Critique. It will do so by examining the four-fold sense of objects, the island of truth surrounded by illusion, amphibolic insularity, the mirror of schema and the “No Further!” of the Pillars of Hercules. Interrogating the dual sense of “limit” as both infinitizing, transgressively de-territorializing and yet at the same time self-delimiting, self-critiquingly re-territorializing, this essay argues for a hermeneutic vantage point to comprehend Kant as the unwilling mariner who by way of the transcendental as-if attempted to gain a certain spectatorship, a particular possibility of seeing - at a shore already and increasingly lost to the European and global humanity of centuries to come.

Pleasure and Fit in Kant's Aesthetics

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 117-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth F. Rogerson
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Scientific Understanding ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Empirical Concept ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
The Status ◽  
The One

In the third Critique Kant shifts the focus in his enquiry from the status of factual statements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the grounding of moral imperatives in the Critique of Practical Reason to investigating two methods of considering the world which go beyond the strictly verifiable. This is a move from evaluating the interplay of a ‘determinate’ set of facts and intellectual preconditions to forming what Kant calls ‘reflective’ judgements on these facts. There are two major questions which the Critique of Judgement tackles. On the one hand Kant ambitiously considers how we might properly interpret a set of facts as comprising a larger teleological system and, on the other hand, he is interested in the seemingly quite separate issue of the appreciation of objects as beautiful. It is this latter issue which shall concern us here. Consistent with the reflective stand in the third Critique, Kant argues from the very outset that beauty is not an empirical concept with which we might describe the world. Beauty is not objective in the sense that size, colour or weight might be. Objective properties of this kind belong to the world of scientific understanding. Instead, he holds that judgements of aesthetic merit should be based upon the subjective pleasure we take in experiencing works of art and natural objects.

Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Watkins
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
Present Context ◽  
Systematic Importance ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

The historical and systematic importance of Kant’s philosophy can hardly be exaggerated. The revolutionary contribution it made to earlier modern philosophy, the influence it had on the subsequent course of philosophical thought, and the significance it has for an understanding of our current situation are unparalleled. Given its importance, it is not surprising that scholarship on Kant’s philosophy has also been extremely rich, with attention being paid both to specific sections of Kant’s famous Critique of Pure Reason and to the systematic topics that are treated therein. While Kant’s practical philosophy and aesthetics are revolutionary in their own right, the focus in the present context is on Kant’s theoretical philosophy, which is expressed primarily, though not exclusively, in the Critique of Pure Reason.

scholarly journals A QUESTÃO DA LIBERDADE PRÁTICA NA CRÍTICA DA RAZÃO PURA

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (139) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Antonio Saturnino Braga
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Third ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Legislative Activity

Resumo: Este artigo tem três objetivos inter-relacionados. Em primeiro lugar, defender uma interpretação compatibilista da noção de liberdade prática exposta no capítulo do Cânone da Crítica da Razão Pura. Em segundo lugar, defender a hipótese de que a noção incompatibilista de liberdade prática exposta no capítulo das Antinomias da mesma Crítica incorre em sérios problemas. Por fim, defenderemos uma hipótese mais abrangente: se por um lado, para evitar os problemas suscitados pela interpretação incompatibilista, a liberdade prática deve ser interpretada num sentido compatibilista, para ser interpretada deste modo ela precisa por outro lado ser compreendida como propriedade da atividade deliberativa da razão prática, essencialmente distinta da atividade legislativa, à qual cabe a noção incompatibilista da liberdade transcendental.Abstract: This paper has three interrelated aims. The first defends a compatibilist interpretation of the concept of practical freedom presented in the Canon chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason. The second defends the hypothesis that the incompatibilist concept of practical freedom, presented in the Antinomies chapter of the same Critique, involves serious problems. Finally, the third defends a more comprehensive hypothesis: If, to avoid the serious problems created by the incompatibilist interpretation, practical freedom must be interpreted in a compatibilist way, on the other hand, to be interpreted in this way, practical freedom must be understood as a property of the deliberative activity of practical reason. The latter being essentially distinct from legislative activity, to which the incompatibilist concept of transcendental freedom applies.

scholarly journals KRITIK IMMANUEL KANT TERHADAP FAHAM RASIONALISME DAN EMPIRISME

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (02) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jauhan Budiwan
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Profound Impact ◽  
Philosophical Movement ◽  
Philosophical Background ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Mind

Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. This portion will focus on his metaphysics and epistemology in one of his most important works. The Critique of Pure Reason, A large part of Kant’s work addresses the question “What can we know?” The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the -natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind's access to the empirical realm of space and time. In order to understand Kant's position, we must understand the philosophical background that he was reacting to. First, 1 will present a brief overview of his predecessor's positions with a brief statement of Kant's objections, then I will return to a more detailed exposition of Kant's arguments. There are two major historical movements in the early modem period of philosophy that had a significant impact on Kant; Empiricism and Rationalism,

scholarly journals Epistemologia Kanta jako rozwiązanie sporu empiryzmu z racjonalizmem

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-168
Author(s):  
Michał Wendland
Keyword(s):  
Turning Point ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
Pure Intuition ◽  
History Of ◽  
Main Ideas

The article concerns some of the most important elements of I. Kant’s epistemology and its connections with earlier epistemological ideas, namely rationalism and empiricism. The history of dispute between rationalism (Descartes, Leibniz) and empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) is hereby shortly presented while Kant’s own philosophical achievements are suggested to be both alternative and synthesis of these. The main core of this paper is summary of basis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason; some most important categories are described: apriorism, synthetic and analytical judgements, knowledge a priori and a posteriori, main ideas of transcendental esthetics (two forms of pure intuition: time and space), main ideas of transcendental logic (forms of judgement and twelve categories). Also the meaning of Kant’s „copernican revolution” is presented as a turning point for classical German philosophy as well as for whole modern epistemology.

scholarly journals Some Remarks in Defense of Immanuel Kant's Theory of Experience

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Balanovskiy Valentin
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Experiential Knowledge ◽  
Central Position ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Reliable Knowledge ◽  
Conceptual Nature

The author attempts to answer a question of whether the fact that Immanuel Kant’s theory of experience most likely has a conceptual nature decreases an importance of Kant’s ideas for contemporary philosophy, because if experience is conceptual by nature, then certain problems with the search for means to verify experiential knowledge arise. In particular, two approaches are proposed. According to the first approach, the exceptional conceptuality of Kant’s theory of experience may be a consequence of absence of some important chains in arguments contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, which could clarify a question of how the conceptual apparatus of the subject corresponds to the reality. The author puts a hypothesis that the missing chains are not a mistake, but Kant’s deliberate silence caused by the lack of accurate scientific information that could not have been available to humankind in Enlightenment epoch. According to the second approach even if Kant’s theory of experience is exclusively conceptual by nature, this cannot automatically lead to a conclusion that it is unsuitable for obtaining reliable knowledge about reality, since transcendental idealism has powerful internal tools for verifying data in the process of cognition. The central position among them is occupied by transcendental reflection.

scholarly journals Transcendental Philosophy as a Research Programme

2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-126
Author(s):  
Michael Lewin
Keyword(s):  
Research Programme ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Third ◽  
Definite Form ◽  
Historical Investigation ◽  
Clear Idea ◽  
Different Levels ◽  
Insight Into

Transcendental philosophy was not born like Athena out of Zeus’s head, mature and in full armour from the very beginning. That is why in both prefaces to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 and 1787) Kant introduces the concept of transcendental philosophy as an “idea.” The idea understood architectonically develops slowly and only gradually acquires a definite form. As witnessed by the works of Kant himself and of his predecessors and followers, the idea of transcendental philosophy has undergone a series of changes and adjustments compared to the initial plan. In this context, my goal is not simply exegesis and historical investigation of transcendental philosophy, but also to look at it from a systematic and methodological perspective. I examine the concept of transcendental philosophy from the viewpoint of programmatic metaphilosophy. The first part discusses programmatics as a distinct subsection of metaphilosophy. I argue that Kant’s architectonic methodology and the methodology of Lakatos can be used to understand the inception, development and degradation of philosophical systems. In the second part I look at the project of transcendental philosophy and the stages of its development from the standpoint of architectonics. The third part shows that Lakatos’s methodology can provide a detailed insight into the elements of transcendental philosophy, a clear idea of its logic and identify the component parts that can be improved and developed. In spite of the different levels of detailing and epistemological prerequisites, the methodologies of Kant and Lakatos can be combined to achieve a metaphilosophically informed and progressive understanding of philosophical projects.

Kant and the Art of Schematism

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Matherne
Keyword(s):  
Valuable Insight ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Judgment ◽  
The Third ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractIn theCritique of Pure Reason, Kant describes schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’ (A141/B180–1). While most commentators treat this as Kant's metaphorical way of saying schematism is something too obscure to explain, I argue that we should follow up Kant's clue and treat schematism literally asKunst. By letting our interpretation of schematism be guided by Kant's theoretically exact ways of using the termKunstin theCritique of Judgmentwe gain valuable insight into the nature of schematism, as well as its connection to Kant's concerns in the thirdCritique.

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