Party Switching, Partisan Dynamics, and Government Formation: Stability and Flux in a Dynamic Legislative Party System in Japan

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junko Kato ◽  
Kentaro Yamamoto
2021 ◽  
pp. 517-543
Author(s):  
Patrícia Calca

How have Portuguese political parties, especially the ones in coalition governments, operated? The main focus of this chapter is the study of coalition governments in Portugal since the 2000s. This chapter shows how the country’s governments have shifted back and forth from left-wing single-party governments to right-wing coalition governments during this period. It aims to improve the understanding of Portuguese governments by shedding light on their specificities and dynamics. It is thus useful as a standalone chapter or as a source for multi-country comparisons. The chapter is initiated with a brief description of Portugal’s institutional setting. It is developed further by delving into the country’s party system followed by a discussion of government-formation issues. In conclusion, the chapter considers all the previous information going deeper into coalition governance mechanisms.


2014 ◽  
Vol 56 (03) ◽  
pp. 93-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yann P. Kerevel

AbstractWhy do politicians in Mexico switch parties? The party-switching literature suggests that politicians generally switch parties for office-seeking or policy-seeking motives, whereas literature on the Mexican party system suggests that switching may be related to party system realignment during the democratic transition. Using data on party switching across the political careers of politicians who served as federal deputies between 1997 and 2009, this study argues that party switching in Mexico can primarily be explained by the office-seeking behavior of ambitious politicians. Only in rare instances do politicians switch parties because of policy disagreements, and party system realignment fails to explain a large number of party switches. This article also suggests that the ban on consecutive re-election encourages party switching; after every term in office, Mexican politicians have the opportunity to re-evaluate their party affiliation to continue their careers.


Politics ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 165-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynda K. Barrow

The breakdown of Mexico's hegemonic party system raises questions about the nature of the new system and of the prospects of consolidating Mexican democracy. The concern addressed in this article is that, at the very same time that democratisation has made Mexicans' electoral choices more significant, frequently changing party allegiances among candidates and even elected officials renders these choices less meaningful. Since parties ‘matter’ in a democratic polity, party switching may prove an impediment to the development of a liberal and stable democracy. Partisan shifts within the state congress of Morelos illustrate this point.


2007 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Mershon ◽  
Olga Shvetsova

This article examines politicians' changes of party labels during the life of a legislature. The authors view a legislator's choice of party as a strategic decision recurring throughout the parliamentary cycle. In their approach, individuals are open to switching parties as they pursue goals specific to the stage in the parliamentary cycle. Analyzing Italy and Russia, they identify among legislators in both countries patterns of heightened switching for office benefits, policy advantage, and vote seeking at distinctive moments in the parliamentary cycle. The commonalities across the two systems provide compelling support for their theoretical framework. The evidence also points to a midterm peak in switching in both countries. Differences appear, however, in the timing of preelectoral positioning—contrasts that the authors attribute to differences in the degree of party system institutionalization, the age of the democratic regimes, and thus the information available to players in electoral politics.


2005 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 329-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy-Erik Isaksson

AbstractThis study focuses on the principal rules of government formation as well as on the deviant cases. On a party level, over 1,000 cases and approximately 250 government formations in 17 West European countries during the second half of the twentieth-century are analysed. By means of regression analyses, the study explores the effects of the size of the parties, other party characteristics, as well as characteristics in the party system on the choice of premier party and coalition party respectively. The results show that the choice of premier party to a great extent is decided by the size of the party and the position as median party. The choice of coalition party, however, is a far more complex process. Favourable and unfavourable conditions are defined, and the deviant cases are identified, compared and analysed with respect to the choice of PM party and the choice of coalition party respectively. The study shows that the deviant cases are not disparate. On the contrary, the deviant cases form a set of rules of their own.


Author(s):  
Kristof Jacobs

The Netherlands has one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world. This chapter details the origins, functioning, and effects of the Dutch electoral system. After providing the historical background of the electoral system, the chapter discusses the allocation of seats both to parties and to candidates and gives practical examples. Afterward, the chapter outlines the effects of the electoral system on the party system, the parties themselves, the composition of the parliament, and the government formation. Lastly, the chapter covers historical and more recent electoral reform debates. It turns out that in the Netherlands, electoral reform is a Sisyphean task: because of the low electoral threshold, electoral reform is always on the table, but given the broad coalitions and rigid constitution, reform attempts typically fail, and the reform discussions have to start all over again.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 665-695 ◽  
Author(s):  
Semra Sevi ◽  
Antoine Yoshinaka ◽  
André Blais

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate the phenomenon of party switchers in the Canadian House of Commons. With the most extensive dataset on party-switching MPs (1867–2015), we answer the following questions: What are the electoral trajectories of party switchers? Have their prospects changed over time? We assess whether the historical dynamics of the Canadian party system explain changes in the incidence and fate of party switchers since 1867, hypothesizing that both the rate of party switching and the electoral fortunes of floor crossers decline over time. The evidence accords with our second hypothesis more strongly than our first. Party switching has become slightly less common, but the electoral consequence has become much more severe.


2017 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alejandro Ecker ◽  
Thomas M. Meyer

Why do some government formation periods end after a few days, while others last for several weeks or even months? Despite the rich literature on government formation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying bargaining processes. This article introduces a new dataset on 303 bargaining attempts in nineteen European democracies to analyse the duration of individual bargaining rounds. The study hypothesizes that (1) preference tangentiality, (2) ideological proximity, (3) incumbency and (4) party leadership tenure decrease the duration of coalition bargaining. Employing a copula approach to account for the non-random selection process of the observations, it shows that these actor-specific factors matter in addition to systemic context factors such as post-election bargaining and party system complexity. These findings highlight the need to consider both actor-specific and systemic factors of the bargaining context to explain government formation.


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