scholarly journals The EU-Turkey Energy Relations after the 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Enhancing the Partnership in a Rapidly Changing Environment

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simone Tagliapietra
Keyword(s):  
Changing Environment ◽  
Energy Relations ◽  
Ukraine Crisis ◽  
The Eu

Defining Elements and Emerging Legal Issues of eu “Sanctions”

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-52
Author(s):  
Leonardo Borlini ◽  
Stefano Silingardi
Keyword(s):  
Legal Issues ◽  
Policy Framework ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
Restrictive Measures ◽  
Ukraine Crisis ◽  
The Eu

With some 40 different types of restrictive measures in force, the European Union is undisputedly one of the major protagonists of today’s sanction regimes. Measures such as selective trade embargos, asset freezes and travel bans have been adopted by the EU not only to implement Security Council mandated sanctions, but also in addition to (as with Iran and North Korea) or in the absence of UN action (as with Syria and Russia). Further, EU recent practice evidences that sanctions (Myanmar and Zimbabwe) have served the EU and its member states’ own interests also with the view to promoting (the European construction of) values generally shared in international society. After outlining the legal discipline and the policy framework of EU restrictive measures, the present article analyses the legal issues emerging with respect to EU sanctions over the last four years. Among these, the 2017 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU in Rosneft, Brexit and its consequences on the implementation/adoption of sanctions by the United Kingdom, and recent developments concerning the legal position of candidate countries which refused to align with the EU sanction adopted in reaction to the Ukraine crisis, are the most important.

scholarly journals The Green Deal and the Resilience of EU-Russian Energy Relations

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 108-123
Author(s):  
Tatiana Romanova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Internal Constraints ◽  
The Third ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
New Challenges ◽  
Energy Relations ◽  
Over Time ◽  
The Eu

In this article, the influence of the European Union’s (EU) Green Deal on its energy relations with Russia is analyzed. Two models of resilience are identified in the EU’s discourse. One aims at achieving resilience at the level of the EU’s energy sector (the “microsystem” for the purpose of this study) while destroying the system of EU-Russia relations (the “macrosystem”). The other aims at achieving resilience in the micro- and macrosystem at the same time. Empirically, the study relies on EU documents and speeches by its national and supranational representatives. Three cases are studied. The first covers competition of two models of resilience in the principles that the EU defined for its relations with Russia. The second case involves investments that slow down the development of renewable sources of energy in favour of natural gas. This case demonstrates how resilience can be achieved as a return to the previous pattern (bouncing back). Although it can be achieved both at the EU-only level and at the level of the EU and its relations with Russia, it clearly favours the latter. The third case involves the import of hydrogen, which creates possibilities for resilience both at the microsystem alone and at the micro- and macrosystems at the same time. This latter option is achieved through adaptation to new challenges (bouncing forward). The author concludes by comparing the two models of resilience. The model that prioritizes the microsystem’s resilience and challenges the macrosystem is based on the synthesis of environmental and geopolitical logics. The other model is based on economic and market logics, but the EU’s normative leadership is a prerequisite. The EU’s discourse demonstrates the viability of both models and related governance practices. Most likely, the two models will co-exist, but their relative importance will vary over time. This variation will be primarily determined by the EU’s internal constraints. However, Russia’s policy can facilitate the model of resilience, achieved in both the micro- and macrosystem.

scholarly journals BILATERAL TRADE AND ENERGY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE CASPIAN SEA REGION

2020 ◽  
pp. 47-64
Author(s):  
Evangelos Siskos ◽  
Konstantia DARVIDOU
Keyword(s):  
Bilateral Trade ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Caspian Sea ◽  
Trade Relations ◽  
Energy Trade ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Main Component ◽  
Structure Of Trade ◽  
Energy Relations ◽  
The Eu

The European Union and the Caspian countries are important trade partners, although there is still potential for improvement of the cooperation considering the energy security and other issues. The paper analyses trends and structure of trade relations of the EU and Caspian countries. The trade between the regions is about 370 billion dollars. Exports of fuels to the EU are the main component of the trade between the regions. Therefore energy transportation projects are an important issue in the agenda for the international relations. A gravity model for the exports of fuels is presented. The model considers demand in the EU importing country, total fuel exports of an exporting Caspian country as an indicator of exporting supply capacities and in some cases energy self-sufficiency of an importing country. Distance turned out to make an insignificant effect on the energy trade. The analysis helps to determine undertraded and successfully exploited bilateral energy trade links between the individual EU and Caspian countries. The model showed that Greece is among the most relatively intensive importers of fuels from the Caspian region. JEL: F10, F13, F15, Q4.

scholarly journals RUSSIA’S ENERGY EXPANSIONISM ON THE EXAMPLE OF NORD STREAM 2 IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Energy Policy ◽  
Main Tool ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Use Of Resources ◽  
Nord Stream ◽  
Energy Relations ◽  
The Eu

The modern world depends on energy, the consumption of which is increasing, while the use of resources is becoming more and more intensive. It should be noted that imperialist Russia makes excellent use of this opportunity, which is reflected in the expansion and strengthening of its sphere of political influence. As we know, all states hold energy policies based on national-strategic values and define national aspirations and priorities. Russia has a big amount of energy resources, which it uses quite purposefully. The main tool of the Kremlin’s expansionist policy is energy policy, which opposes European integration and increases its own role in the international arena. Despite the fundamental radical differences between the democratic West and undemocratic Russia, they still manage to find common preventive-cooperative relations in terms of energy policy. A clear example of this is the energy relations between Russia and Germany, which are complex and perennial. The Nord Stream 2 is a project of global importance that explicitly increases the EU’s energy dependence on Russia, which may not prove as beneficial to the Brussels side as it may do to the Moscow side. Both Putin and his governance system are using their country’s resources and geopolitics “dishonestly” to exercise considerable influence on political space around them, serving the national interests of Russia. Therefore, in the eyes of the developed West, Russia is perceived as an aggressor and an undemocratic country, which creates a negative political landscape for both the European Union and the international political arena. That is why such maneuvering of Russia is not positively understood by any of the powerful states of the world, as this very project is found to be an integral part of world politics. The United States also supports this view. The Nord Stream 2, followed by Brexit, is the first international project and it is literally a dynamic action on how the energy relations between the EU and Russia can be continued. At the current stage, Germany’s political actions are more profitable and productive for Russia than for the EU, since this case carries the potential for the energy sector of the two parties to become more integrated.

Russia and the European Union

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Casier
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Strategic Partnership ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Systemic Crisis ◽  
Run Up ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Ukraine Crisis ◽  
The Eu

Relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia have gone through a dramatic journey from close partnership to confrontation. The narratives of the crisis that erupted over Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 are diametrically opposed. The root causes of the crisis are primarily related to colliding visions of the European order that have existed ever since the end of the Cold War. Yet, to understand why the escalation happened at that time, one also needs to understand the dynamics of a process of increasing tensions and dwindling trust. The Ukraine crisis was thus both the outcome of an escalation of tensions and a radical rupture. In the run-up to the Ukraine crisis (2003–2013), EU–Russia relations were characterized by a Strategic Partnership. The latter was launched in 2003, closing a decade of asymmetrical EU-centric cooperation and redressing the balance in a formally equal partnership, based on pragmatic cooperation and a recognition of mutual interests. Despite high aspirations, the Strategic Partnership gradually derailed into a logic of competition. Tensions eventually crystallized around colliding integration projects: the Eastern Partnership (aiming at Association Agreements) on the EU’s side and the Eurasian Economic Union on Russia’s side. The crisis erupted specifically as the result of the choice Ukraine had to make between the two options. This choice radicalized the negative geopolitical reading that Moscow and Brussels had gradually developed of each other’s behavior. Since the start of the Ukraine crisis (2014), EU–Russia relations have been characterized by a harsh confrontation in the field of high politics. The Strategic Partnership was suspended and the EU imposed sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Ukraine. Moscow retaliated and relations became highly acrimonious. Security-related issues dominate the agenda: Russia accuses the West of neo-containment, while Moscow is blamed for undermining the pan-European border regime and security order. The stalemate between Russia and the EU (and by extension the Euro-Atlantic Community) is ambivalent. On the one hand, it has taken the form of a systemic crisis, where both parties risk running from incident to incident in the absence of effective pan-European instruments that may constrain or reverse the conflict. On the other hand, in the field of low politics, in particular trade and energy, business often seems to continue as usual.

The different faces of power in European Union–Russia relations

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Casier
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
Norm Diffusion ◽  
Institutional Power ◽  
Theoretical Assumptions ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Ukraine Crisis ◽  
The Eu

This article applies Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy of power to European Union (EU)–Russia relations aiming to understand power in its complexity and without a priori theoretical assumptions. Four different types of power – compulsory, institutional, structural and productive – feature simultaneously. It is argued that non-compulsory forms of power are key to understanding the logic of competition in EU–Russia relations in the decade preceding the 2014 Ukraine crisis, despite receiving limited scholarly attention. First, a struggle over institutional power, the capacity to control the conditions of the other actor indirectly, appeared from rivalling integration projects and competing norm diffusion. Secondly, power relations were strongly characterised by constitutive forms of power – structural and productive – in particular the capacity to produce and recognise identities, such as Europeanness. In both fields, the EU held a hegemonic position, which Russia increasingly challenged. The geopolitical reading of the change in regime in Ukraine in 2014 prompted Moscow to a radical change of strategy, by shifting the emphasis in the confrontation to compulsory power. Attempts at direct control, from annexation to sanctions, now dominate relations. Where Russia seeks to prevent the Euro-Atlantic community from gaining effective control over Ukraine through destabilisation, this can be labelled ‘negative’ compulsory power.

Why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-20
Author(s):  
Alexander Berger
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
Buffer Zone ◽  
The United States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
European Security ◽  
Sphere Of Influence ◽  
Ukraine Crisis ◽  
The Eu

The world observed a well-developed Russian strategy and military model have had destabilizing consequences and wide-ranging implications for international security, in particular for Europe, and global stability since the Ukraine crisis. Needless to say, most European countries and notably NATO conclude that Russian policy, military strategy, and military practice in the Ukraine crisis challenge the European security and carry significant implications for NATO, therefore the Ukraine crisis force the EU and NATO to concentrate on measures against Russian strategy.[1] In reality, Russia has already given the signals of its intentions via the Military Doctrine 2010 and Defense Strategy 2013 that list destabilization of the near abroad, in other words buffer zone, and NATO or the EU expansion, including deployment of military forces, as most relevant military threats. Both documents highlight that “Russia faced the very real threat of being side-lined in international affairs.” [2] Furthermore MacKinnon suggests that in line with its new regime change strategy, the United States forced the former Soviet Union’s member states to establish their political institutions, provided funds for the opposition, and supported revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. Thus, the revolutions added to the Kremlin’s perception that “Washington’s chief objective might have been to change the regime in Russia as well.”[3] Likewise, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “NATO’s expansion by pulling more Russia’s neighboring countries into the alliance is unacceptable”.[4] Therefore it could be concluded from Russian point of view that everything should be done to prevent NATO and the EU expansion which can be characterized as the greatest threat to Russian security, and that’s why Russia must restore its status as a great power inside its own sphere of influence. It is the aim of this analytic paper to search why the EU and NATO have failed to manage the crisis emanating from Russian aggression and expansion in Ukraine, and to address the current strategic environment as well. I shall try to analyze the drivers and the reasons of NATO and the EU’s poor reaction against Russia, and finally I will emphasize why and how the roles of NATO and the European Security Strategy should be reconsidered in the light of energy security policy of the EU, and why NATO and the EU needs to improve their responsiveness rather than readiness.

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