Interest Groups and Get Out the Vote Drives

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cadigan
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Candidate Model ◽  
Voter Mobilization ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Multiple Interest ◽  
Get Out The Vote

Abstract This article analyzes voter mobilization and interest group activity within a citizen-candidate model. Interest groups influence the decisions of 'high cost’ voters by running a 'get out the vote’ campaign. Membership fees paid by citizens joining an interest group finance the vote drives. Because citizens choose whether to join an interest group, size is an endogenous feature of equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that smaller groups may have greater influence. Importantly, this result does not depend on the ability of smaller groups to overcome the free rider problem. Intuitively, because smaller groups may have a less diverse membership, they can advocate more extreme policy outcomes. An interest group’s influence is shown to depend on voting costs and the separation between candidate positions. The presence of multiple interest groups mitigates an interest’s influence, resulting in inefficiency.

The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in the United States, 1876–1917

1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey E. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Road ◽  
Telephone Companies ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Multiple Interest

Between 1876 and 1917, government philosophy toward telephone regulation began moving away from laissez-faire and toward some kind of involvement in economic affairs. However, while some early studies of regulation suggest business hostility to that policy, AT&T actively sought regulation, jogging government and the public in that direction. But this study is not just a restatement of the interest-group-capture theory, as offered by such economists as Stigler or historians as Kolko. Regulation resulted from the convergence of interests of many affected players, including residential and business telephone subscribers, the independent telephone companies that competed with AT&T, and the state and federal governments, as well as AT&T. I employ a multiple interest theory to account for telephone regulation, but unlike other studies using such a framework, I suggest that government is an independent actor with impact on the final policy outcome, and not merely an arena where private interests battle for control over policy outcomes, as is so common among other multiple interest studies of regulation.

scholarly journals Competing for Endorsements

1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M Grossman ◽  
Elhanan Helpman
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
General Public ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Simple Language ◽  
Group Members

Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. (JEL D72)

scholarly journals Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuyuki Sawada ◽  
Ryuji Kasahara ◽  
Keitaro Aoyagi ◽  
Masahiro Shoji ◽  
Mika Ueyama
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Size Effect ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Group Size Effect

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

How Much Do Interest Groups Influence State Economic Growth?

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 1297-1308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Brace ◽  
Youssef Cohen ◽  
Virginia Gray ◽  
David Lowery
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Exogenous Variables ◽  
State Data ◽  
State Economic Growth ◽  
Group Effects

In the March 1988 issue of this Review, Virginia Gray and David Lowery presented a respecification of Mancur Olson's model of economic growth and tested the revised model with U.S. state data. A special feature of the Gray-Lowery analysis is its more thorough measurement of interest group effects. These investigators found interest group influences quite different from those anticipated by Olson's model. Paul Brace and Youssef Cohen argue that the Gray-Lowery model misspecifies the determinants of state economic growth, overstating the role of interest group size and failing to incorporate crucial exogenous variables. Gray and Lowery join the issue and defend their specification.

scholarly journals Interest group perceptions on water policy reforms: insight from a water-stressed basin

Water Policy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 794-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Encarna Esteban ◽  
Ariel Dinar ◽  
José Albiac ◽  
Alfonso Calera ◽  
Marta García-Mollá ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Water Scarcity ◽  
Water Policy ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Water Policies ◽  
Group Perceptions ◽  
Water Users ◽  
Group Characteristics

Abstract Water policies have been implemented worldwide to face water stress. However, the existence of water users' groups with opposite interests and different political power results in the plain failure or low effectiveness of water policy reforms. A better understanding of users' perceptions regarding policy outcomes is important to avoid the failure of water policies and the intensification of water conflicts. This paper empirically examines the divergent perception of interest groups on the implementation of different policies dealing with water scarcity and their proactive involvement with water agencies. We have conducted a survey in the Jucar River Basin (a water-stressed basin in southeastern Spain) to analyze interest group opinions regarding water policy effectiveness and water institutions' performance in water management. Questionnaires were sent to the main irrigation districts and urban water utilities within the basin. The collected information gives a general picture of the behavior of opposite water interest groups in this basin. The analysis of the perceptions on water policy reform between the groups highlights the existence of significant differences between preferred measures to address water scarcity and lobbying capacity. These differences depend on the size of the group, the specific basin location, and other group characteristics.

Altruism, the free rider problem and group size

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 259-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Sweeney
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem
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