scholarly journals Interest group perceptions on water policy reforms: insight from a water-stressed basin

Water Policy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 794-810 ◽  
Author(s):  
Encarna Esteban ◽  
Ariel Dinar ◽  
José Albiac ◽  
Alfonso Calera ◽  
Marta García-Mollá ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Water Scarcity ◽  
Water Policy ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Water Policies ◽  
Group Perceptions ◽  
Water Users ◽  
Group Characteristics

Abstract Water policies have been implemented worldwide to face water stress. However, the existence of water users' groups with opposite interests and different political power results in the plain failure or low effectiveness of water policy reforms. A better understanding of users' perceptions regarding policy outcomes is important to avoid the failure of water policies and the intensification of water conflicts. This paper empirically examines the divergent perception of interest groups on the implementation of different policies dealing with water scarcity and their proactive involvement with water agencies. We have conducted a survey in the Jucar River Basin (a water-stressed basin in southeastern Spain) to analyze interest group opinions regarding water policy effectiveness and water institutions' performance in water management. Questionnaires were sent to the main irrigation districts and urban water utilities within the basin. The collected information gives a general picture of the behavior of opposite water interest groups in this basin. The analysis of the perceptions on water policy reform between the groups highlights the existence of significant differences between preferred measures to address water scarcity and lobbying capacity. These differences depend on the size of the group, the specific basin location, and other group characteristics.

scholarly journals Competing for Endorsements

1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gene M Grossman ◽  
Elhanan Helpman
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
General Public ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Interests ◽  
Group Leaders ◽  
Simple Language ◽  
Group Members

Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria. (JEL D72)

Interest Groups and Get Out the Vote Drives

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cadigan
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Candidate Model ◽  
Voter Mobilization ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Multiple Interest ◽  
Get Out The Vote

Abstract This article analyzes voter mobilization and interest group activity within a citizen-candidate model. Interest groups influence the decisions of 'high cost’ voters by running a 'get out the vote’ campaign. Membership fees paid by citizens joining an interest group finance the vote drives. Because citizens choose whether to join an interest group, size is an endogenous feature of equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that smaller groups may have greater influence. Importantly, this result does not depend on the ability of smaller groups to overcome the free rider problem. Intuitively, because smaller groups may have a less diverse membership, they can advocate more extreme policy outcomes. An interest group’s influence is shown to depend on voting costs and the separation between candidate positions. The presence of multiple interest groups mitigates an interest’s influence, resulting in inefficiency.

scholarly journals A review on water governance in Sri Lanka: the lessons learnt for future water policy formulation

Water Policy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. S. K. Chandrasekara ◽  
S. K. Chandrasekara ◽  
P. H. Sarath Gamini ◽  
J. Obeysekera ◽  
H. Manthrithilake ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sri Lanka ◽  
Water Availability ◽  
Water Scarcity ◽  
Water Policy ◽  
Water Governance ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Water Policies ◽  
Shared Data ◽  
Regular Review

Abstract Sri Lanka has no water scarcity within the country, and per capita, water availability is adequate to cater for the country's estimated peak population. Nevertheless, the frequent variability of spatial and temporal water availability and extreme events have built up a water scarcity in Sri Lanka, which has been observed during the last two to three decades. Therefore, effective and efficient water governance is most important in today's context, and regular review and amendment of policies, laws, and regulations are crucial to mitigate water scarcity. Although a few attempts were initiated, none of them succeeded. In this study, historical and present water governance mechanisms, including coordinating mechanisms and implementing water management agencies in Sri Lanka, were comprehensively reviewed. Further, the previously proposed water policies, their status and reasons for the failures of policies were discussed. Finally, the formulation of a novel institutional arrangement or altering the existing institutional arrangement with shared data and allocating non-shared responsibilities to each institution is suggested for better water governance in Sri Lanka.

Driving forces and patterns of water policy making in Egypt

Water Policy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Luzi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Water Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Driving Forces ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Water Policies

In studies on transboundary river management, it is often assumed that national water policies are made by ‘governments’ or ‘water ministries’ as unitary, rational decision-makers. This article analyzes actors, institutions, and decision-making processes in the Egyptian water sector and explores implications for the design and implementation of water policies. Rational choice is assumed to be only one possible pattern of water policy making, and is distinguished from other mechanisms driven by organizational routines or bargaining over stakeholders' interests. It is found that in Egypt, despite considerable planning capacities, many water policy outcomes are influenced by developments beyond the control of the water ministry. Water governance is also influenced by top-level strategic decision-making, conflicts of interest between sectors, enforcement priority given to policies that prioritize political stability and/or certain privileged interest groups, and intra-organizational resistance to institutional reform. Policies in the traditional core tasks of the water ministry, i.e. water supply and drainage provision, and important strategic decisions regarding water allocation priorities are mainly made in a ‘rational choice’ fashion by the respective authorities. Issues that have emerged more recently, such as water quality or demand management, are subject to interest bargaining between different stakeholder groups in both the planning and the implementation phases.

To inform, strategise, collaborate, or compete: what use do lobbyists make of lobby registers?

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-369
Author(s):  
Michele Crepaz
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Group Type ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
The Media ◽  
Public Scrutiny ◽  
Group Characteristics ◽  
External Scrutiny

Governments claim to establish lobbying registers with the intent of giving citizens and the media the opportunity to see who is lobbying whom and for what purpose. This external scrutiny is expected to help prevent undue influence and corruption. Scholars, however, have noted that transparency might also serve internal scrutinizers by providing information to the lobbyists themselves. This study employed a survey of more than 300 interest groups in Ireland to test this alternative to the ‘armchair scrutiniser’ assumption, whereby transparency serves the purpose only of public scrutiny. The analysis found that a small but well-defined group of organizations routinely accesses the website of the Irish lobbying register and ‘consumes’ the information during the advocacy process. Interest-group characteristics, such as group type and material resources, help explain these trends. This study is relevant for scholars interested in the effects of transparency and how the availability of information is linked to lobbying strategies.

scholarly journals Energy and Water Policies in Chile, Two Different Endings with Implications in the Water-Energy Nexus

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (11) ◽  
pp. 3286
Author(s):  
Roxana Bórquez ◽  
Rodrigo Fuster
Keyword(s):  
Water Policy ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Water Policies ◽  
Documentary Analysis ◽  
Five Factors ◽  
Water Energy Nexus ◽  
Term Energy ◽  
Policy Problems

Energy and water have faced important levels of conflicts in the last 20–25 years in Chile. However, the way that they have been politically addressed in the last decade differs. These differences emerge from how these fields have been historically configurated, impacting on how the policy problems and policy options have been framed. Using thematic analysis of 93 interviews and documentary analysis, this article analyzes by contrasting two participatory processes which nourish the formulation of the energy and water policies in Chile in 2014–2015. It seeks to understand the factors that may influence why the development, impact and inclusion of new voices in public policies related to water and energy have been different, and how that can impact the water–energy nexus. Five factors emerge as determinants in this difference: structure of use, number of actors, governance and institutional framework, elite conformation, and legal framework. These factors impacted the policy processes and the scope of the policy outcomes, generating two different results: a long-term energy policy, and a water policy that did not survive the presidential period. Thus, the water–energy nexus is under pressure as a result of the tension between power structures, social responses to environmental issues and decision-making, environmental limitations, and climate change stressors, creating greater vulnerability and conflicts.

scholarly journals Determinants of water lobbying: irrigators' behavior in a water-stressed basin

Water Policy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1107-1122
Author(s):  
Encarna Esteban ◽  
Ariel Dinar ◽  
José Albiac
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Water Policy ◽  
Empirical Application ◽  
Water Policies ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Design And Implementation ◽  
Lobbying Effort ◽  
Group Members

Abstract The design and implementation of water policies to address scarcity problems are largely shaped by the behavior of interest groups and their ability to influence policymakers. Different and opposed interests of stakeholders regarding policies trigger water conflicts and, frequently, lead to the failure of the implemented regulation. Departing from political economy theory, we empirically estimate the determinants that affect the level of lobbying effort and effectiveness by water interest groups for influencing water policy. The findings are based on data collected by a survey administered among different irrigators' groups, in a water-stressed river basin (the Jucar River Basin in Spain) that vie to increase their water allocations. Our results demonstrate how lobbying effort depends on the involvement of the interest groups, the energies exerted to sway water authorities, and on the variation among the group members. Lobbying effectiveness is a function of the effort exerted. Furthermore, both functions depend on the intrinsic characteristics of the group's members. While the empirical results corroborate several main statements of the theory of lobbying and interest groups, some deviations based on the empirical application remain.

Regulation of Water

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Water Policy ◽  
State Level ◽  
The State ◽  
Water Law ◽  
Water Regulation ◽  
Water Policies ◽  
Broad View ◽  
National Water

This chapter focuses on legal instruments that take a broad view of water regulation. There are, as yet, no framework statutory instruments at the state or Union level but drafts have been prepared and this chapter reproduces the latest draft National Water Framework Bill. The next section then moves on to water policies that have been adopted at the Union and state level for some years, highlighting here the National Water Policy, 2012. The last section focuses on an upcoming area of water law, inter-sectoral allocation of water, an issue that is not yet well covered in legal instruments. This section highlights some state-level instruments that seek to address the issue.

The Telephone Problem and the Road to Telephone Regulation in the United States, 1876–1917

1991 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey E. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Policy Outcome ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Road ◽  
Telephone Companies ◽  
Private Interests ◽  
Multiple Interest

Between 1876 and 1917, government philosophy toward telephone regulation began moving away from laissez-faire and toward some kind of involvement in economic affairs. However, while some early studies of regulation suggest business hostility to that policy, AT&T actively sought regulation, jogging government and the public in that direction. But this study is not just a restatement of the interest-group-capture theory, as offered by such economists as Stigler or historians as Kolko. Regulation resulted from the convergence of interests of many affected players, including residential and business telephone subscribers, the independent telephone companies that competed with AT&T, and the state and federal governments, as well as AT&T. I employ a multiple interest theory to account for telephone regulation, but unlike other studies using such a framework, I suggest that government is an independent actor with impact on the final policy outcome, and not merely an arena where private interests battle for control over policy outcomes, as is so common among other multiple interest studies of regulation.

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