scholarly journals El principio de universalización y la razón práctica (2a. parte)

1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (61) ◽  
pp. 3-41
Author(s):  
Osvaldo Guariglia
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Theoretical Study ◽  
Logical Structure ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Main Role ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Logical Scheme ◽  
Peculiar Form ◽  
Moral Judgements

There is no doubt that one of the issues which have been more discussed about in the contemporary ethics bibliography is that of the universalization principIe and its applications to specific cases, applications which involve sorne universalizability criteria. On discussing the problems for contemporary philosophy derived from this principie, there has been a tendency to intermingle, if not to mix up, the principle itselfwith the universalizability criteria which each author proposes to satisfy it, Opposed to this tendency, we propose to clearly separate the universalization principle from the said criteria, considering that the former provides a logical scheme which constitutes the support, the ultimate warrant, for particular moral judgements. With this procedure we intend to study the structure of such a principIe and the elements that are involved in its forrnulation; only after this examination can we have a more precise idea about what is needed in an universalizability criterion in order to use it without been exposed to strong counterexamples. In this paper I show, first, (I) a scheme of the universalization principIe in order to clarify not only its logical structure but the different concepts that must be specified in each case so that the principIe can be applied significantly. The analysis of all the elements involved in moral discourse —human individuals, different kinds of properties, aetions, obligations and prohibitions— will show to which extent the significative application of the universalization scheme presupposes a dense weave of previous semantic, pragmatic and logico-practic rules, that constitute the first level from which moral judgement afterwards arises. This analysis once completed, I will examine (II) the function of the principle in the field of moral judgements and its main role as ultimate rule of practical reason to which it grants its peculiar form of objectivity. For one concept that has been submerged in a deep crisis within contemporary philosophy is, undoubtedly, the concept of "practical reason". Indeed, while logic and epistemology were contributing with a certain model, in fact more and more discussed but still persistent, of "theoretical reason", what had been considered the traditional field of practical reason: human action, ethics and politics, remained imprisoned within the dilemma of either finding its place again as an object of theoretical study or being thrown forever to the realm of the unpredictable, the arbitrary, in short, the irrational. Briefly, on evaporating, together with the last remainders of philosophy of conscience,the architectural work of the three Critiques, the challenge offered by Hume when he denied all intervention of reason on moral was renewed by quite different courses. The reconstruction of a practical reason , undergone also from different positions and with propositions not always compatible, gathers together, with equal zeal, kantian heritage and its attempt to bring it at Ieast to the same level ofvalidity as reason in its theoretical use. The present paper tries to offer an examination of the irreplaceable contribution of the universalization principle to a reconstructive notion of practical reason as ultimate reason for valid moral judgements.

Rationality, practical

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Hampton
Keyword(s):  
Expected Utility ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Descriptive Theory ◽  
The Way

Whereas theoretical reason is that form of reason that is authoritative over belief, practical reason is that form of reason that applies, in some way, to action: by either directing it, motivating it, planning it, evaluating it or predicting it. Accounts of practical reason include theories of how we should determine means to the ends we have; how we should define the ends themselves; how we should act given that we have a multiplicity of ends; how requirements of consistency should govern our actions; and how moral considerations should be incorporated in our deliberations about how to act. Economics has provided, in recent times, what many regard as the most compelling portrait of practical reason, called ‘expected utility theory’ (hereafter ‘EU theory’). On this theory, rational action is that action which yields the highest expected utility, which is calculated by measuring the utility – or the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ – of the possible outcomes of the action, multiplying the utility of each outcome by the probability that it will occur, and, finally, adding together the results for all the possible outcomes of each action. The action that has the highest expected utility is the rational action. Other technical representations of practical reason have been explored in the branch of social science called ‘game theory’, which studies ‘strategic’ situations in which the action that is rational for any agent depends in part on what other agents do. A theory of practical reason can have one or more of several different goals. If it sets out how human beings actually reason, it functions as a descriptive theory of reasoning. If it sets out a conception of how our reasoning ought to proceed, it functions as a normative theory of reasoning. Theories of reason can also be about actions themselves: if a theory presents a conception of the way our actions should be intelligible or consistent or useful (regardless of the quality of the deliberation that preceded it), it functions as a (normative) theory of behavioural rationale. If it merely presents an account of consistent action that allows us to predict the behaviour of an agent whose previous actions fit this account of consistency, it functions as a descriptive theory. One might say that whereas theoretical reason is supposed to pursue truth, practical reason is supposed to pursue some sort of good or value in human action. Theories that take rational action to be that which achieves, furthers or maximizes (what is regarded as) good, are consequentialist or teleological theories. Theories that believe rational action must sometimes be understood as action that has an intrinsic value or ‘rightness’ regardless of how much good it will accomplish or manifest, are non-consequentialist or non-teleological conceptions of reason. If the theory defines reason as that which serves ends defined by something other than itself, it is an instrumental conception. If it allows reason to have a non-instrumental role, itself capable of establishing at least some of our ends of action, it is setting out a non-instrumental conception. Theories of practical reason that recognize the existence of a special moral reasoning procedure tend to represent that procedure as non-instrumental. Philosophers have disagreed about whether practical reason gives us a way of reasoning prior to choice that can actually motivate us to behave in the way that it directs. Many believe it lacks motivational power, so that it can only give us authoritative directives that must be motivated by something else (for example, by our desires). Finally, the study of practical reason also considers the variety of ways in which one can fall short of being rational; and issues about the nature and possibility of irrational ‘weakness of will’ have been central to this discussion.

Kant on Judging and the Will

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jill Vance Buroker
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Voluntary Activity ◽  
The Will ◽  
Direct Use

Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.

scholarly journals Homoseksualiteit: Die kerk, die tradisie en die Bybel – homofobie en sarkofobie en die evangelie

2004 ◽  
Vol 60 (1/2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yolanda Dreyer
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
The Bible ◽  
The Social ◽  
Dialectical Perspective ◽  
The Church ◽  
Church Tradition

Homosexuality: Church, tradition, and the Bible – homophobia, sarcophobia, and the gospelThe article demonstrates a trend in the current debate on the church’s attitude towards homosexuality, namely that exegetical results supersede authentic faith experiences of gays. It shows that this trend causes an untenable tension between the dialectical notions sola fidei and sola Scriptura. Such an unacceptable tension contributes to the social psychological phenomena of homophobia and sarcophobia. The article investigates this empirical approach (theoretical reason) to homo-sexuality from the dialectical perspective of a theological approach (practical reason). The latter includes an investigation of the epistemological processes behind exegetes’ diverse use of Scripture. The article aims to show that homophobia in society and church, and the sarcophobia of homosexuals can be challenged and healed if the church holds on to the dialectic between sola fidei and sola Scriptura and the dialectic between pastoral concerns and the engagement with the gospel of Jesus Christ.

scholarly journals Three interpretations of the Anthropocene

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 133-153
Author(s):  
Darrel Moellendorf
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Short Introduction

After a short introduction into the recent discourse on the Anthropocene, I will discuss three different interpretations of the Anthropocene: the Anthropocene as promethean, as destruction and as inegalitarian. These interpretations cannot simply be settled by the facts since they concern the direction in which things might develop. Therefore, I will argue, they are not mere predictions based on theoretical reason. Because of the very fact that they are bound up with fundamental human interests and human moral concerns, they involve prospection based on practical reason and prospection is itself deeply associated with hope. The final part of my paper aims to show that we are justified to hold hope in the epoch of the Anthropocene.

La pertinence de l'ontologie pour la théologie

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-57
Author(s):  
Paul Favraux
Keyword(s):  
Main Role ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Subjectivity ◽  
Causal Action

Ontology is still relevant for the reception of Christian revelation. Transcendental subjectivity, whose main role is to constitute, calls out for a deeper foundation. It is this deeper foundation that supplies an ontology of participation of all beings in Being and in God, as found in St Thomas and in some interpretations of his work (those of E. Gilson, A. Chapelle, A. Léonard). God's immanence in humanity and in creation, and human participation in Being and ultimately in God, enable us to conceive of a causal action upon the whole of humanity and upon the whole of creation, a causal action issuing from the death-resurrection of Christ. In the context of contemporary philosophy, marked too unilaterally by finitude and historicity, this ontology needs to be supplemented by an anthropological reflection on liberty—liberty donated to itself (C. Bruaire) rather than liberty uniquely devoted to an indefinite search of itself. This is the main point behind A. Chapelle's anthropology. Moreover, it is this sense of liberty that underlies at the same time a genuine pathway to ethics.

Practical reason and ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Onora O'Neill
Keyword(s):  
Human Activity ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Ethical Judgment ◽  
Direct Methods ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Plausible Account ◽  
Instrumental Reasoning ◽  
Working Out

Practical reason is reasoning which is used to guide action, and is contrasted with theoretical reason, which is used to guide thinking. Sometimes ‘practical reason’ refers to any way of working out what to do; more usually it refers to proper or authoritative, hence reasoned, ways of working out what to do. On many accounts practical reasoning is solely instrumental: it identifies ways of reaching certain results or ends, but has nothing to say about which ends should be pursued or which types of action are good or bad, obligatory or forbidden. Instrumental reasoning is important not only for ethics and politics, but for all activities, for example, in working out how to travel to a given destination. Other accounts of practical reason insist that it is more than instrumental reasoning: it is concerned not only with working out how to achieve given ends, but with identifying the ethically important ends of human activity, or the ethically important norms or principles for human lives, and provides the basis for all ethical judgment. No account of objective ethical values can be established without showing how we can come to know them, that is, without showing that some form of ethical cognitivism is true. However, ethical cognitivism is not easy to establish. Either we must show that some sort of intuition or perception provides direct access to a realm of values; or we must show that practical reasoning provides less direct methods by which objective ethical claims can be established. So anybody who thinks that there are directly objective values, but doubts whether we can intuit them directly, must view a plausible account of practical reason as fundamental to philosophical ethics.

Practical Reason and the Status of Moral Obligation

2007 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 197-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
External World ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Moral Skepticism ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Status ◽  
Moral Claims

The power of skepticism depends on the apparent possibility of rationally asking, for virtually any kind of proposition commonly thought to be known, how it is known or what justifies believing it. Moral claims are among those commonly subjected to skeptical challenges and doubts, even on the part of some people who are not skeptical about ordinary claims regarding the external world. There may be even more skepticism about the possibility of justifying moral actions, particularly if they are against the agent's self-interest. Both problems-how to justify moral claims and how to justify moral action - come within the scope of the troubling question “Why be moral?” Even a brief response to moral skepticism should consider both kinds of targets of justification, cognitive and behavioural, and should indicate some important relations between the two types of skeptical challenge. I will begin with the cognitive case- with skepticism about the scope of theoretical reason in ethics - proceed to practical skepticism, which concerns the scope of practical reason, and then show how an adequate account of rationality may enable us to respond to moral skepticism.

scholarly journals Aristotle and Ricœur on Practical Reason

Humanitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 151-167
Author(s):  
Gonçalo Marcelo
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Good Life ◽  
Practical Wisdom ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Life Forms ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Nichomachean Ethics ◽  
Life Worth Living

This paper analyzes the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, such as it appears in Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics, detailing what sort of model to grasp practical reason it entails: a practical wisdom. Setting it against the backdrop of a reflection on the prevalent uses and meanings of reason today, and the consequence these views have for a depiction of selfhood and human action, the paper shows how, amid the contemporary revival of Aristotelian practical philosophy, Paul Ricœur updates this phronetic model in Oneself as Another. The paper discusses the implications of such a thick account of selfhood and human action, such as it being a potential key to overcome some difficulties caused by Kantian moral philosophy, while it also calls, with and beyond Ricœur, for a refinement of the phronetic model by taking into account not only its thick intersubjective grounding but also the limits to rationality and the need to take the plurality of life forms that can count as being examples of a ‘life worth living’ (a good life).

scholarly journals „FAIDONAS“: SIELOS NEMIRTINGUMO ĮRODYMŲ STRUKTŪRA IR PRASMĖ

Problemos ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 63-81
Author(s):  
Skirmantas Jankauskas
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Ethical Behavior ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Logical Structure ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Ethical Thinking

Straipsnyje analizuojami ir interpretuojami Platono dialoge „Faidonas“ pateikti sielos nemirtingumo įrodymai. Platonas šiame dialoge siekia rekonstruoti sokratiškojo imperatyvo „Pasirūpink savo siela, kad ji taptų kuo geresnė“ prielaidas. Kadangi rūpestis siela kasdieniame gyvenime nepasiteisina, tai tenka ieškoti atpildo už tą rūpestį garantijų anapus šio gyvenimo, o tai ir numato sielos nemirtingumo prielaidą. Dialoge išskiriami keturi sielos nemirtingumo įrodymai – dialektinis, gnoseologinis, ontologinis bei aksiologinis. Rekonstruojama kiekvieno jū loginė struktūra ir prielaidos, kurias tematizuojant antikos mąstymo kontekstu atskleidžiamos kiekvieno įrodymo tiesioginės ir netiesioginės intencijos. Nagrinėjama ir antikoje populiarus požiūris, kad siela yra kūno daliū harmonija. Nurodoma, kad Platonas šį požiūrį aptaria ne tiek dėl savų konceptualinių sumetimų, kiek atiduodamas duoklę tokios sampratos populiarumui antikoje. Tačiau bene daugiausia dėmesio straipsnyje skiriama aiškintis platoniškajai pažinimo sampratai. Parodoma, kad esminius pažinimo kaip atsiminimo sampratos ypatumus lemia graikiškojo mąstymo sinkretiškumas, savo ruožtu anonimizuojantis pažinimo subjektą. Straipsnis pradedamas ir baigiamas etiniais akcentais. Konstatuojama, kad Platono „Faidonas“ yra bene pirmasis mėginimas teoriškai pagrįsti etinę žmogaus elgseną ir kad jame jau nurodyti tik gerokai vėliau I. Kanto suformuluoti praktinio proto postulatai.Reikšminiai žodžiai: pažinimas, atsiminimas, kasdienis mąstymas, etinis mąstymas, prasmė. PHAIDON”: STRUCTURE AND MEANING OF THE PROOFS OF IMMORTALITY OF SOULSkirmantas Jankauskas Summary The paper deals with the proofs of immortality of soul in Plato’s ‘Phaidon’. It is demonstrated here that in the dialogue, Plato attempts to reconstruct theoretical premises of the Socratic imperative ‘first and chiefly care about the greatest improvement of the soul’. The concern with the quality of soul has no warrants of reward in everyday life, therefore, it is necessary to search for such warrants beyond this life, which implies the prerequisite of the immortality of soul. Four proofs of the immortality of soul are distinguished in the dialogue: dialectical, gnoseological, ontological ant axiological. The logical structure and the premises of every proof are reconstructed. The premises are thematized in the context of Greek thinking, and in this way the direct and indirect intentions of every proof are revealed. The popular Antique concept of the soul as a harmony of the parts of body is analyzed as well. It is pointed out  that Plato deals with the concept not because of his own conceptual preoccupations but just paying a debt to the popularity of this concept in the Antique world. However, the focus of the paper centers upon the Platonic concept of knowledge. The author maintains that the essential features of the concept of knowledge as anamnesis are predetermined by the sincretic character of the Greek thinking that in its turn anonimizes the subject of knowledge. The paper begins and ends with ethical accents. It is stated here that ‘Phaidon’ could be treated as the first attempt to produce a theoretical foundation of ethical behavior and that therein the postulates of practical reason, as formulated much more later by I. Kant, are already distinguished. Keywords: knowledge, anamnesis, everyday thinking, ethical thinking, sense.

Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Guyer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
Theoretical Reason ◽  
Realistic Theory ◽  
Moral Feeling ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Insight Into

AbstractSchopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from pure if theoretical reason, while for Kant pure practical reason works only by effecting a feeling of respect (in the ‘Critical’ works) or by cultivating, i.e. affecting, natural dispositions to moral feeling (in the ‘post-Critical’ works). I argue that Kant's is the more realistic theory on this point.

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