scholarly journals Rereading Normal Science

2003 ◽  
Vol 35 (105) ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Dimitri Ginev

This paper considers the relevance of a class of hermeneutic concepts to the philosophical reading of normal scientific research. The author opposes the view that the notion of "normal science" can only be read in socio-psychological, sociological or ethnomethodological terms. By drawing parallels between Kuhn's original reading of puzzle-solving enterprise and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, a context of "Continental theories" for interpreting the dynamics of research practices is delineated. The rereading of normal science provides the opportunity for developing a hermeneutic alternative to the analytic philosophy of science.

Author(s):  
Evgeniy V. Maslanov ◽  

The article analyzes the functioning of normal science. It has conservative fea­tures and implies the restriction of research practices to solving puzzle, rarely reflects on the ontological assumptions of its own paradigm. Such functioning of normal science allows it to solve a large number of various scientific and sci­entific-technical problems. As a result, normal science is developing quite rapidly. At the same time, revolutionary features can be distinguished in its func­tioning. They are associated with the struggle of each specific normal science for its position in the field of science, in the desire, through the dissemination of the results of its research beyond the scientific community and active participa­tion in the examination, to enlist the support of extra-scientific actors. Alliances with extra-scientific actors allow normal sciences to actively participate in the struggle for the redistribution of public attention and the financing of scientific research. With the help of such alliances, they are trying to introduce the results of their research into industry and public life. The success of such implementa­tions leads to an active redistribution of positions in the field of science. In this case, the revolutionary element of normal science is associated not with the de­sire to reconsider the fundamental ideas underlying it, but in the desire to rebuild the system of relations within the field of science, to take a leading position in it. As a result, it is concluded that the successful functioning of normal science is associated with the desire to make permanent micro-revolutions in the field of science, subject to a conservatively protective attitude to the fundamental as­sumptions of its own paradigm.


Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Montuschi

AbstractSeveral and repeated attempts have been made to say what objectivity consists of and why it should be pursued in research. In the first part of this paper two main strategies are singled out, sharing the assumption that there is a way (or different ways) objectivity can be thought of in the abstract (which does not mean without content), and that it can be instantiated in context—and in enough contexts to justify the abstract case. But not only is this assumption open to the objection that objectivity so conceived does not admit of one clear definition (even a disjunctive one) that is appropriate in many or most contexts where we intend the term to do its work. It also does not seem to pay specific attention to what actually constitutes a context of practice, when we think of objectivity in some relation to such context. The aim of this paper is to question how context works both as a mechanism of meaning formation for the concept of objectivity, and as a practical framework for pursuing research objectively. To articulate a suitable notion of context some insight from recent literature in the philosophy of science is first introduced and then adapted to show how research practices successfully achieve objectivity as one of their aims. It will be argued that an idea of context that includes activities which (in a way to be qualified) are relevant and reliable towards a settled aim is the model of practice that makes objectivity a pursuable task in research. This contextual picture of objectivity, it will be suggested, might better serve the purpose of scientific research (including social research) than either of the two descriptive strategies outlined at the beginning of this paper can do.


HUMANIKA ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Slamet Subekti

This article discusses about philosophy of science according to Karl R. Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn. There are similarities and differences between their views about how progress and what function of science.Apparently both Popper and Kuhn agree that science does not proceed by induction. However Kuhn disagrees with the view that science progresses by falsifiability through conjectures and refutations, but occurance by paradigm shift. Popper and Kuhn’s disagreement amounted to a distinction between two functions within the practice of science, one of criticism (Popper) and one of puzzle solving (Kuhn).Science education implies the teaching and learning of science interesting and fruitful in one hand, and teachers should be role models to students in the other hand


Author(s):  
Jan Wolenski

Twardowski, one of the most distinguished of Brentano’s students, became famous for his distinction between the content and object of presentations. Twardowski, after his appointment as a professor of philosophy at the University of Lwów (Lvov), considerably limited his own philosophical research for the sake of teaching activities. He set himself an ambitious task: to create a scientific philosophy in Poland. Twardowski fully realized his aim, giving the first step towards the so-called Lwów–Warsaw School, a group of philosophers working in analytic philosophy – in particular, logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language. In spite of his concentration on teaching, Twardowski also made remarkable contributions to philosophy after coming to Lwów.


2005 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 11-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Ravetz

After centuries of optimism, science has become problematic and compromised. We can no longer assume that innovations are safe until proven dangerous. The ‘technocratic’ approach to science, with its reductionist methodology and its corporate control, is no longer appropriate. We need a ‘precautionary’ science that will be ‘post-normal’ in character. For this, we contrast ‘applied science,’ like the ‘puzzle-solving’ of Kuhn's ‘normal science’ and the ‘professional consultancy’ like the practice of the surgeon or engineer. Rather, we have a situation where ‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent.’ For high-quality decision-making, we need an ‘extended peer community’ who will bring their ‘extended facts’ to the dialogue. There are a number of initiatives that advance the post-normal programme, including the endeavours of Poul Harremoës and the conference on Uncertainty and Precaution in Environmental Management.


Author(s):  
Elie Geisler

This chapter describes the key attributes of normal science and the recently heralded post-normal science. Drawing from the philosophy of science and other literatures, the chapter argues that the subjugation of post-normal science to the social and economic urgencies and exigencies is only a matter of degree, since such relationship has existed ever since science had become “big science,” nurtured by society through public funding. The chapter provides examples from the healthcare sector. These examples show the confluence of topics and ailments that are given priority in research as those same areas considered urgent by the social and economic elites who influence the funding of science in healthcare and medicine.


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