Twardowski, Kazimierz (1866–1938)

Author(s):  
Jan Wolenski

Twardowski, one of the most distinguished of Brentano’s students, became famous for his distinction between the content and object of presentations. Twardowski, after his appointment as a professor of philosophy at the University of Lwów (Lvov), considerably limited his own philosophical research for the sake of teaching activities. He set himself an ambitious task: to create a scientific philosophy in Poland. Twardowski fully realized his aim, giving the first step towards the so-called Lwów–Warsaw School, a group of philosophers working in analytic philosophy – in particular, logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language. In spite of his concentration on teaching, Twardowski also made remarkable contributions to philosophy after coming to Lwów.

Author(s):  
Eduardo Mendieta

Karl-Otto Apel (b. 1922–d. 2017) was one of the most original, influential, and renowned German philosophers of the post–World War II generation. He is credited with what is known as the linguistification of Kantian transcendental philosophy, in general, and the linguistic transformation of philosophy in Germany, in particular. His name is closely associated with that of Jürgen Habermas, his junior colleague, whom he met as a graduate student in Bonn in the 1950s, and with whom he maintained a lengthy philosophical collaboration. He received his doctorate in 1950 with a dissertation titled Dasein und Erkennen: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Interpretation der Philosophie Martin Heideggers (translated as: “Dasein and knowledge: An epistemological interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s philosophy”). However, as early as the 1950s, Apel had become increasingly critical of the relativistic and historicist consequences of his phenomenological and hermeneutical work. In 1962, he presented his Habilitation at the University of Mainz, which was published in 1963 as Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico (translated as: “The idea of language in the traditions of humanism from Dante to Vico”). This book is a pioneering reconstruction of the Italian philosophy of language and how it laid the foundations for the different currents of the philosophy of language that would branch out in the modern philosophies of language. In 1965, Apel published “Die Entfaltung der ‘sprachanalytischen’ Philosophie und das Problem der ‘Geisteswissenchaften,’” which was translated into English as Analytic Philosophy of Language and the “Geisteswissenschaften” in 1967. This was the first work of Apel to be translated into English, but it is also emblematic of Apel’s pioneering engagement with “analytic” philosophy. In 1973, at the urging of Habermas, Apel published Transformation der Philosophie (Transformation of philosophy) in two volumes. A selection, mostly from the second volume, appeared in 1983 under the title Towards a Transformation of Philosophy. In this work Apel introduced the idea that would become the hallmark of his thinking: The Apriori of the Community of Communication, by which he meant that the conditions of possibility of all knowledge and interaction are already given in every natural language that belongs to a community of speakers, who are per force already entangled in normative relations, that can never be circumvented or negated lest one commit a performative self-contradiction. In 1975, Apel published Der Denkweg von Charles S. Peirce: Eine Einführung in den amerikanischen Pragmatismus (The intellectual path of Charles S. Peirce: An introduction to American pragmatism), which is made up of the lengthy introduction he had written for his two-volume German selection and translation of Peirce’s writings. His next most important book was Diskurs und Verantwortung: Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral (translated as: “Discourse and responsibility: The problem of the transition to a postconventional morality”), from 1988, a collection of essays in which Apel develops his own version of discourse ethics. Apel’s last three books are collections of essays: Auseinandersetzungen in Erprobung des transzendentalpragmatischen Ansatzes (1998) [Confrontations: Testing the transcendental-pragmatic proposal) (It should be noted that Auseinandersetzungen, one of Apel’s favorite words, could also be translated as “coming to terms” with a particular thinker. This is an important volume as in three extensive essays Apel discusses his differences with and departures from Habermas’s version of universal pragamatics.); Paradigmen der Ersten Philosophie: Zur reflexiven–transzendentalpragmatischen Rekonstruktion der Philosophiegeschichte (2011) (translated as: “Paradigms of first philosophy: Toward a reflexive-transcendental-pragmatic reconstruction of the history of philosophy”), and Transzendentale Reflexion und Geschichte (2017) (translated as: Transcendental reflection and history”).


Author(s):  
Michael Friedman

Logical positivism (logical empiricism, neo-positivism) originated in Austria and Germany in the 1920s. Inspired by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century revolutions in logic, mathematics and mathematical physics, it aimed to create a similarly revolutionary scientific philosophy purged of the endless controversies of traditional metaphysics. Its most important representatives were members of the Vienna Circle who gathered around Moritz Schlick at the University of Vienna (including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt Gödel, Hans Hahn, Karl Menger, Otto Neurath and Friedrich Waismann) and those of the Society for Empirical Philosophy who gathered around Hans Reichenbach at the University of Berlin (including Walter Dubislav, Kurt Grelling and Carl Hempel). Although not officially members of either group, the Austrian philosophers Ludwig Wittgenstein and Karl Popper were, at least for a time, closely associated with logical positivism. The logical positivist movement reached its apogee in Europe in the years 1928–34, but the rise of National Socialism in 1933 marked the effective end of this phase. Thereafter, however, many of its most important representatives emigrated to the USA. Here logical positivism found a receptive audience among such pragmatically, empirically and logically minded American philosophers as Charles Morris, Ernest Nagel and W.V. Quine. Thus transplanted to the English-speaking world of ‘analytic’ philosophy it exerted a tremendous influence – particularly in philosophy of science and the application of logical and mathematical techniques to philosophical problems more generally. This influence began to wane around 1960, with the rise of a pragmatic form of naturalism due to Quine and a historical-sociological approach to the philosophy of science due mainly to Thomas Kuhn. Both of these later trends, however, developed in explicit reaction to the philosophy of logical positivism and thereby attest to its enduring significance.


Philosophy ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-3

Mary Kate McGowanAssistant Professor of Philosophy at Wellesley College. She works in metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of science. Forthcoming articles include ‘Gruesome Connections’ in Philosophical Quarterly and ‘Privileging Properties’ in Philosophical Studies.Anthony SkillenRecently retired as lecturer in the Philosophy Department of the University of Kent at Canterbury.Charles D. TarltonProfessor of Political Science at the University of Albany. In recent years he has written on Locke, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. He is currently engaged in an analysis of the structural ambiguities of Rousseau's Discours sur l'origine et les fondaments de l'inegalité parmi les hommes.Stephen J. BoulterSenior Lecturer in Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University. His research areas include the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science and medieval philosophy.Gabriele De AnnaA tutor in the Philosophy Department at St Andrews and research fellow at the University of Padua, Italy. He has published papers in American, British and Italian journals and is the author of the forthcoming book, Realismo Metafisico e Rappresentazione Mentale (Padua: Il Poligrafo).Roy SorensenRoy Sorensen seeks Fame and Fortune as a Dartmouth College philosophy professor. He is the author of Blindspots, Thought Experiments and Pseudo-Problems, and most recently Vagueness and Contradiction.David BeiseckerAssistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He has published articles in the philosophy of mind and language, with an eye towards writing a book on the metaphysics of mind and meaning.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOEL ISAAC

W. V. Quine is widely regarded as one of the most important and influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Quine wrote and lectured on logic, philosophy of language, and epistemology throughout his long career, and was one of the American figures who did most to establish the analytic tradition of philosophy in the United States. Until recently, the historical development of both Quine's philosophy and the analytic tradition of which it is a part remained unexamined by historians and philosophers alike. In the last decade or so, however, analytic philosophers have begun to assess the history of their enterprise, and Quine's place within it. Building on this welcome development with the tools of intellectual history, this essay examines Quine's philosophical apprenticeship in the late 1920s and 1930s.The basic tenets of Quine's mature thought set in early in his studies. Most notably, he displayed in his student writings a commitment to science as the primary theory of the world within which philosophical inquiry should take place. Yet he found the uncertain direction of interwar American philosophy uncongenial to his views. During a year of postdoctoral research in Europe, Quine encountered the work of analytic philosophers and logicians such as Rudolf Carnap and Alfred Tarski. Their scientific program for philosophy captivated Quine, who returned to Harvard a champion of their work. For the rest of the 1930s, Quine was an indefatigable advocate of the analytic tradition; he brought news of European logic and scientific philosophy to American universities. His purpose in doing so was to move American philosophy towards science and away from what he saw as its metaphysical entanglements. The reception and transformation of analytic philosophy in the United States is shown to have involved a complex dynamic between foreign and domestic conceptions of philosophy.


This is the ninth volume of Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. As with earlier volumes, these essays follow the tradition of providing a non-sectarian and non-partisan snapshot of the subdiscipline of philosophy of religion. This subdiscipline has become an increasingly important one within philosophy over the last century, and especially over the past half century, having emerged as an identifiable subfield with this timeframe along with other emerging subfields such as the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. This volume continues the initial intention behind the series of attracting the best work from the premier philosophers of religion, as well as including work by top philosophers outside this area when their work and interests intersect with issues in the philosophy of religion. This inclusive approach to the series provides an opportunity to mitigate some of the costs of greater specialization in our discipline, while at the same time inviting wider interest in the work being done in the philosophy of religion.


Bertrand Russell. My mental development. A reprint of IX 82(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 1–20; also third edition, Tudor Publishing Company, New York 1951, pp. 1-20; also paper-bound reprint of the third edition, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1-20. - Hans Reichenbach. Bertrand Russell's logic. A reprint of IX 76(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 21–54; also ibid. 1951, pp. 21-54; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 21-54. - Morris Weitz. Analysis and the unity of Russell's philosophy. A reprint of IX 77(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 55–121; also ibid. 1951, pp. 55-121; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 55-121. - Kurt Göde. Russell's mathematical logic. A reprint of XI 75. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 123–153; also ibid. 1951, pp. 123-153; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 123-153. - James Feibleman. A reply to Bertrand Russell's introduction to the second edition of The principles of mathematics. A reprint of IX 77(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 155–174; also ibid. 1951, pp. 155-174; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 155-174. - G.E. Moore. Russell's “theory of descriptions.” A reprint of IX 78(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 175–225; also ibid. 1951, pp. 175-225; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 175-225. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 227–255; also ibid. 1951, pp. 227-255; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 227-255. - Philip P. Wiener. Method in Russell's work on Leibniz. A reprint of IX 82(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 257–276; also ibid. 1951, pp. 257-276; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 257-276. - Ernest Nagel. Russell's philosophy of science. A reprint of IX 79. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 317–349; also ibid. 1951, pp. 317-349; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 317-349. - Andrew Paul Ushenko. Russell's critique of empiricism. A reprint of IX 80. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 385–417; also ibid. 1951, pp. 385-417; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 385-417.

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496
Author(s):  
Ann S. Ferebee

Semiotica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Szubka

Abstract The paper begins with an account of the emergence of analytic philosophy of language in the twentieth century in the context of the development of logic and the linguistic turn. Subsequently, it describes two examples of analytic philosophy of language in its heyday when the discipline was conceived as first philosophy. Finally, it provides, by way of conclusion, a succinct outline of the current state of philosophy of language, marked by modesty and fragmentation. It is claimed that even if one retains optimism about the prospects of philosophy of language in the first century of the new millennium, it would be unreasonable to disagree with the opinion that the present-day philosophy of language is a highly specialized and diversified discipline and no longer so central for philosophical enterprise as it used to be.


Author(s):  
Philip Enros

An effort to establish programs of study in the history of science took place at the University of Toronto in the 1960s. Initial discussions began in 1963. Four years later, the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology was created. By the end of 1969 the Institute was enrolling students in new MA and PhD programs. This activity involved the interaction of the newly emerging discipline of the history of science, the practices of the University, and the perspectives of Toronto’s faculty. The story of its origins adds to our understanding of how the discipline of the history of science was institutionalized in the 1960s, as well as how new programs were formed at that time at the University of Toronto.


2021 ◽  
Vol 99 ◽  
pp. 01004
Author(s):  
Tatiana Tregubova

In the context of socio-pedagogical transformations of higher education organizations, the modernization of the system of teachers’ professional development becomes an integral component of the reforms. Today university teachers have to be ready for continuous development and advanced training throughout their lives. Thus, the study of the problem of university teachers’ professional development in Russia and abroad is very relevant and timely as a response to the modern requirements of civil society for the personality of the teacher. The need for professional development among university teachers is closely related to his (her) desire for more successful indicators in teaching activities. To do this, it is necessary to fulfill several pedagogical conditions, including the teacher's own awareness of the need for professional development; the interest of the university administration and the availability of resources to organize an effective professional development system, etc. The purpose of the article is to show some successful practices of the teachers’ professional development in Russian, Chinese and European universities which the author observed while visiting those universities within the realization the project “Enhancing teaching practice in the universities of Russia and China”. The article presents the possibilities of benchmarking in higher education, in particular, the use of the benchmarking technology as a method of studying the effective practices of organizing the teachers’ professional development in a modern university.


Dialogue ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 679-685
Author(s):  
Myles Brand

It is difficult to understand why this volume is named New Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. Some of the essays are better classified as metaphysics, some as philosophy of science, and at least one as philosophy of language. But no matter, the name of the volume is unimportant: it is the contents that count. And the contents are very interesting. The general quality of the papers is high, higher than is often found in contemporary journals. The articles all share the methodological trait of being well-argued, and perhaps it is this trait more than anything else that unifies the volume. In what follows, I shall comment briefly on two articles on action theory, and then even more briefly on the remaining six papers.


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