ALEXITHYMIC MENTALISING: THEORY OF MIND AND SOCIAL ADAPTATION

2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin A. Wastell ◽  
Alan J. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Intimate Relationships ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Social Adaptation ◽  
Social Knowledge ◽  
Theory Theory ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Appropriate Behavior

Alexithymic individuals are unable to enter into empathic intimate relationships and yet are capable of socially appropriate behavior outside of intimate relationships. The construct of theory of mind is outlined and used to explore a possible mechanism to account for social adaptiveness in alexithymia. This study tested the mentalising ability of subjects high on alexithymia. Alexithymic subjects' performance was no different from that of subjects drawn unsystematically from the same population. Alexithymic subjects were able to correctly complete the false belief task, indicating that, from a prediction point of view, the deficits in interpersonal processing were not in the area of belief estimation. The use of tacit social knowledge in a Theory Theory of Mind process is proposed as a means by which alexithymic individuals guide their social behavior. The implications of this result are discussed with respect to the measurement of mentalising ability.

scholarly journals Reading and Theory of Mind in Adolescents with Cochlear Implant

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 212-223
Author(s):  
Mario Figueroa ◽  
Sònia Darbra ◽  
Núria Silvestre
Keyword(s):  
Reading Comprehension ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cochlear Implant ◽  
Cochlear Implants ◽  
Group Performance ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task

Abstract Previous research has shown a possible link between reading comprehension and theory of mind (ToM), but these findings are unclear in adolescents with cochlear implants (CI). In the present study, reading comprehension and ToM were assessed in adolescents with CI and the relation between both skills was also studied. Two sessions were performed on two groups of adolescents aged between 12 and 16 years of age (36 adolescents with CI and 54 participants with typical hearing, TH). They were evaluated by means of a standardized reading battery, a false belief task, and Faux Pas stories. The results indicated that reading and cognitive ToM were more developed in the TH group than in adolescents with CI. However, early-CI and binaural group performance were close to the TH group in narrative and expository comprehension and cognitive ToM. The results also indicated that cognitive ToM and reading comprehension appear to be related in deaf adolescents.

scholarly journals Developmental and cognitive aspects of children’s disbelief comprehension through intonation and facial gesture

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (6) ◽  
pp. 596-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meghan Armstrong ◽  
Núria Esteve Gibert ◽  
Iris Hübscher ◽  
Alfonso Igualada ◽  
Pilar Prieto
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Task Performance ◽  
Belief State ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Comprehension Task ◽  
Unimodal Cues

This article investigates how children leverage intonational and gestural cues to an individual’s belief state through unimodal (intonation-only or facial gesture-only) and multimodal (intonation + facial gesture) cues. A total of 187 preschoolers (ages 3–5) participated in a disbelief comprehension task and were assessed for Theory of Mind (ToM) ability using a false belief task. Significant predictors included age, condition and success on the ToM task. Performance improved with age, and was significantly better for the multimodal condition compared to both unimodal conditions, suggesting that even though unimodal cues were useful to children, the presence of reinforcing information for the multimodal condition was more effective for detecting disbelief. However, results also point to the development of intonational and gestural comprehension in tandem. Children that passed the ToM task significantly outperformed those that failed it for all conditions, showing that children who can attribute a false belief to another individual may more readily access these intonational and gestural cues.

Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind

Cognition ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. B25-B31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bloom ◽  
Tim P German
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task

Complex language, complex thought?

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
Suzanne T.M. Bogaerds-Hazenberg ◽  
Petra Hendriks
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Production Task ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Complex Thought

Abstract It has been argued (e.g., by De Villiers and colleagues) that the acquisition of sentence embedding is necessary for the development of first-order Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute beliefs to others. This raises the question whether the acquisition of double embedded sentences is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, the development of second-order ToM: the ability to attribute beliefs about beliefs to others. This study tested 55 children (aged 7-10) on their ToM understanding in a false-belief task and on their elicited production of sentence embeddings. We found that second-order ToM passers produced mainly double embeddings, whereas first-order ToM passers produced mainly single embeddings. Furthermore, a better performance on second-order ToM predicted a higher rate of double embeddings and a lower rate of single embeddings in the production task. We conclude that children’s ability to produce double embeddings is related to their development of second-order ToM.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind Development in Adolescence and Early Adulthood: The Growing Complexity of Recursive Thinking Ability

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annalisa Valle ◽  
Davide Massaro ◽  
Ilaria Castelli ◽  
Antonella Marchetti
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Early Adulthood ◽  
Memory Task ◽  
False Belief ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Third Order ◽  
The Third ◽  
Thinking Ability ◽  
Recursive Thinking

This study explores the development of theory of mind, operationalized as recursive thinking ability, from adolescence to early adulthood (N= 110; young adolescents = 47; adolescents = 43; young adults = 20). The construct of theory of mind has been operationalized in two different ways: as the ability to recognize the correct mental state of a character, and as the ability to attribute the correct mental state in order to predict the character’s behaviour. The Imposing Memory Task, with five recursive thinking levels, and a third-order false-belief task with three recursive thinking levels (devised for this study) have been used. The relationship among working memory, executive functions, and linguistic skills are also analysed. Results show that subjects exhibit less understanding of elevated recursive thinking levels (third, fourth, and fifth) compared to the first and second levels. Working memory is correlated with total recursive thinking, whereas performance on the linguistic comprehension task is related to third level recursive thinking in both theory of mind tasks. An effect of age on third-order false-belief task performance was also found. A key finding of the present study is that the third-order false-belief task shows significant age differences in the application of recursive thinking that involves the prediction of others’ behaviour. In contrast, such an age effect is not observed in the Imposing Memory Task. These results may support the extension of the investigation of the third order false belief after childhood.

scholarly journals Language Can Obscure as Well as Facilitate Apparent-Theory of Mind Performance: Part 2—The Case of Dyslexia in Adulthood

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barlow C. Wright ◽  
Bernice A. L. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Female Gender ◽  
False Belief ◽  
The Other ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
Cognitive Domains ◽  
Processing Demands ◽  
Computer Based ◽  
Components Analysis ◽  
Affective Components

Many studies imply causal links between linguistic competencies and Theory of Mind (ToM). But despite Dyslexia being a prime example of linguistic deficits, studies on whether it is related to ToM have been relatively unforthcoming. In the first of 2 studies (N = 89), independently-diagnosed dyslexic adults and non-dyslexic adults were presented with false-belief vignettes via computer, answering 4 types of question (Factual, Inference, 1st-order ToM & 2nd-order ToM). Dyslexia related to lower false-belief scores. Study 2 (N = 93) replicated this result with a non-computer-based variant on the false-belief task. We considered the possibility that the apparent-issue with ToM is caused by processing demands more associated to domains of cognition such as language, than to ToM itself. Addressing this possibility, study 2 additionally utilised the ToM30Q questionnaire, designed largely to circumvent issues related to language and memory. Principal-Components analysis extracted 4 factors, 2 capturing perceptual/representational ToM, and the other 2 capturing affective components related to ToM. The ToM30Q was validated via its associations to a published measure of empathy, replication of the female gender advantage over males, and for one factor from the ToM30Q there was a correlation with an existing published index of ToM. However, when we considered the performance of dyslexic and non-dyslexic participants using the ToM30Q, we found absolutely no difference between them. The contrasting findings from our 2 studies here, arguably offer the first experimental evidence with adults, that there is in fact no ToM deficit in dyslexia. Additionally, this finding raises the possibility that some other groups considered in some sense atypical, failed ToM tasks, not because they actually have a ToM deficit at all, but rather because they are asked to reveal their ToM competence through cognitive domains, such as language and memory.

scholarly journals Association between Theory of Mind and Peer Problems

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-133
Author(s):  
Maham Abdullah ◽  
Sadaf Rehman ◽  
Dr Sumbal Nawaz ◽  
Dr Shamaila Asad ◽  
Samia Khalid
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Adjustment ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Social Adaptation ◽  
Peer Relationship ◽  
Peer Problems ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Relationship Of

The current study was designed to investigate the relationship between theory of mind (ToM) development and peer problems in Pakistani children (N=80). The non-probability purposive sampling technique with survey research design had been used for data collection. Pakistani children with age ranged 4-6 years (Mage = 5.29) were recruited who?took two false belief tasks.?To tap into peer relationship of these children, their parents completed?strength and difficulty?questionnaire. For demographic variables, descriptive statistics was used. Pearson product correlation and linear regression were used to test the hypothesis. Results revealed that performance of 6 years 6 months and older was above chance on all false belief tasks, supporting the universality of ToM development with different age ranges in different cultures. Also, theory of mind negatively predicted peer relationship?problems?of this sample, revealing real life implication of mentalizing for interaction in social world. Research indicated that false belief comprehension is key to better social adjustment and the participants of this study also showed that a child's understanding of mental state terms is critical for better social adaptation.

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