RADICAL LEFT PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS IN GREECE

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 167-181
Author(s):  
A.V. KUZNETSOVA ◽  

The purpose of this article is to trace the development and interaction of protest movements and radical left parties in Greece in 2008-2019. The beginning of the 21st century was marked by an outburst of social protest actions in a number of Western European countries, on the background of which left-wing radical parties strengthened and achieved certain electoral successes. The Greek SYRIZA became a vivid example of such a successful development, confirming the relevance of the study of left-wing radical movements and parties. The research methodology is based on the analysis of the transformation of SYRIZA's political rhetoric from the moment of its inception and after coming to power. Research results: firstly, the global financial crisis paved the way for SYRIZA's success in forming the first parliamentary coalition, in which the radical left party was the senior partner. Secondly, SYRIZA was successful through its productive collaboration with social movements, adapting its programming to meet the needs identified by protesters. Thirdly, despite its left-wing radical rhetoric, especially at the early stage of its existence, SYRIZA was able to adapt to the existing political system. Such a transformation of SYRIZA after coming to power demonstrates its desire not to destroy, but to rebuild the political system.

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 24
Author(s):  
Claudia Gabriela Baicu ◽  
Mar Wolfgang Mixa

The novelty of this paper is the comparative analysis of the Romanian and Icelandic banking systems. The study results reveal that despite the fact that Romania and Iceland are two different worlds, there are several similarities between the banking systems of these countries. They include a late development of banking systems, foreigners contributing a great deal to the development of the banking systems in the early stage of evolution. After the Second World War until the 1990s specialized banks operated in both countries. The banking systems of both countries prior to the 1990s were dominated by politics. Liberalization of banking and capital occurred both in Romania and Iceland after 1990; the bank privatization process took place during a similar period (1999-2006, Romania; 1998-2002, Iceland). Before privatization, banks in both countries lacked experience in a new banking “arena”. The global financial crisis greatly affected the two banking systems. Despite similarities, the evolution of the two banking systems was also marked by differences, notably the ownership origin of banks after privatization (foreign dominance in Romania; domestic owners in Iceland) and different business models developed by banks in the pre-crisis period.      


Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-207
Author(s):  
Bart Maddens

Voters probably do not take a series of relevant issues into consideration but rather vote on the basis of the few issues that happen to be on their minds at the moment of the decision. Issue salience, i.e. the availability of issue-schema's, is to a certain extent determined by the political communication during the election campaign. A content analysis of the debates during the 1991 campaign shows that the socio-economic issues, the ethnic issue and the immigrant issue were on top of the agenda. A similar analysis of the party political broadcasts and the ads in the national newspapers indicates that the parties tried to focus the campaign on the socio-economie issues (christian-democrats, socialists), the functioning of the political system (socialists, liberals) and to a much lesser extent on the environmental issue (greens) and the communal issue (left-wing and right-wing Flemish nationalists). Only the latter nationalist party attempted to prime the immigrant issue. Survey data show that this issue was exceptionally salient in the electorate, as were the ethnic issue and the political system issue.


LOGOS ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 14-25
Author(s):  
David Emblidge

Cody’s Books, in Berkeley, California, had its roots during the mid-1950s in the left-wing sympathies of its founders, the husband–wife team of Fred and Patricia Cody. Serving the University of California nearby, the much admired bookstore became a hangout and haven for intellectually curious students and faculty. In the social protest movements of the 1960s, the store functioned as a refuge from street violence as students and police clashed outside. When long-term employee Andy Ross bought the shop upon the Codys’ retirement, it was a thriving business but soon ran into challenges from encroaching chain stores and the emergence of online shopping. Ross responded variously: sometimes with ambitious, effective bookselling tactics, sometimes with ineffective resentment towards consumers who had abandoned the store. Attempts to survive through risky refinancing and the infusion of foreign investment money to support expansion into San Francisco all backfired. The last Cody’s branch closed ignominiously in 2008.


2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 640-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
John S. Ahlquist ◽  
Ben W. Ansell

Several recent studies link rising income inequality in the United States to the global financial crisis, arguing that US politicians did not respond to growing inequality with fiscal redistribution. Instead, Americans saved less and borrowed more to maintain relative consumption in the face of widening economic disparities. This article proposes a theory in which fiscal redistribution dampens the willingness of citizens to borrow to fund current consumption. A key implication is that pretax inequality will be more tightly linked with credit in less redistributive countries. The long-run partisan composition of government is, in turn, a key determinant of redistributive effort. Examining a panel of eighteen OECD democracies, the authors find that countries with limited histories of left-wing participation in government are significantly more likely see credit expansion as prefisc inequality grows compared to those in which the political left has been more influential.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Dasgupta

Technological change is typically biased, producing wealth that is distributed unequally across groups in society. When the relative losers of technological change lack the political power needed to pursue redistribution through the political system, they may turn to informal tactics of protest and redistribution, include violence. The argument is applied to the green revolution in India. The spread of a new crop technology, high-yielding variety (HYV) crops, improved agricultural productivity, but also generated rising inequality between landowners and the rural poor. Drawing on a panel dataset linking district-level estimates of HYV crop adoption to digitized crime records, this paper provides evidence that the spread of the new crop technology contributed to an epidemic of dacoity (banditry), an economic crime with elements of social protest against inequality. However, the spread of the new crop technology did not benefit left-wing parties electorally, suggesting that violence was not a precursor to but substitute for redistribution at the ballot box.


2019 ◽  
pp. 112-135
Author(s):  
Huw Macartney

This chapter covers the early 2000s in the UK as a backdrop to the legitimacy crisis that unfolded as the global financial crisis hit. It explains the institutional set-up and the regulatory mindset that prevailed during the 2000s. This helps to explain what changed as financial crisis hit. Using opinion poll data the chapter then explores the fall in public confidence in both banks and state managers as a means of tracking the legitimacy crisis. Then the chapter explores the austerity agenda and rising protests in the UK, before explaining the nascent populist response by UK state managers at the early stage of the financial crisis.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-252 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jón Gunnar Bernburg

The recent wave of protest associated with the global financial crisis provides opportunity to examine the link between economic crisis and collective action in the context of affluent democratic society. I study the mobilization of individual citizens in one of the first of these protests occurring in Iceland in January 2009. Using a survey representing the adult population of the Reykjavík area (N = 610), I examine the role of perceived economic loss and political attitudes in protest behavior (controlling for biographical availability). I find that perceived financial loss predicts both protest participation and support, but only if individuals believe their losses to be greater than the losses of others. Moreover, political attitudes congruent with the political opportunities emerging in the crisis (and the resulting collective action framing)—that is, having a left-wing political attitude and belief in extensive corruption— predict protest participation and support.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110389
Author(s):  
Sarah Wagner

The European Union has gained salience as an issue in political debate. Recent literature shows that successful radical right-wing parties are frequently in opposition to European integration. This article looks at how radical left-wing parties’ positions on EU integration affect their electoral support. It argues that radical left parties can mobilize voters in their favour through positioning in opposition to EU integration because this allows voters to combine their left-wing economic and anti-EU preferences. Using expert and individual-level survey data, this research demonstrates that radical left-wing parties that position themselves against EU integration are more likely to gain individuals’ vote choice. This finding is surprising, given that traditionally radical left-wing parties are defined through their economic, rather than their non-economic, positions. This article demonstrates that variation in positioning around non-economic issues such as EU integration can explain differences in voter support across radical left-wing parties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 120 (824) ◽  
pp. 93-99
Author(s):  
Erik Jones

In contrast with their halting response to the global financial crisis a decade ago, European policymakers acted quickly to mitigate the economic damage from the COVID-19 pandemic. They eased the way for governments to run deficits and increase their debt loads. In a breakthrough, the European Union agreed to a plan for common borrowing for a pandemic recovery fund. Although controversial in some countries, common debt would make it easier to address inequities among member states. But the plan was nearly derailed by objections from Poland and Hungary to a provision that would withhold funds from member states that violate the rule of law and other democratic norms, raising doubts about how transformative the borrowing precedent would prove to be.


Author(s):  
Sergey Sergeev ◽  
Alexandra Kuznetsova

Abstract Mass protest movements of the early 2010s, particularly the Occupy movement, stimulated the rise of radical left organizations globally. In Southern Europe, radical left parties celebrated their first electoral successes. In Russia, radical left organizations were also influenced by this upsurge of social protest movements and participated in the Bolotnaya protests in 2011–2012 but were marginalized and disintegrated shortly after, resuming their activities only by 2019. This article explores the radical left movements and groups in Russia and offers projections for their future. The Russian radical left is divided into three sub-groups: fundamentalist communists who identify with Stalin and the Soviet Union, libertarian socialists and communists (subdivided into neo-anarchists, autonomists, and neo-Trotskyists), and hybrid organizations (e.g., the Left Front). These organizations face two major constraints unknown to their Western counterparts. First, Russia’s authoritarian regime blocks opportunities for independent, particularly electoral, politics. This reveals itself in targeted repressions against left radicals and anarchists. Second, the dominance of the CPRF blocks any potential of strong left opposition. Unless these restrictions are lifted, radical left organizations in Russia will not be able to overcome their current crisis.


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