scholarly journals Does ownership structure matter? Evidence from Malaysian equity market

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ei Yet Chu ◽  
Kooi Guan Cheah

The paper examines the determinants of ownership structure characteristics of the 147 firms listed on main board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). Three dimensions of governance issues in firm theory:- asymmetric information, agency conflicts and risk as discussed in Putterman (1993) are used to assess the effects of ownership concentration. Ownership concentration is divided into dispersed, dominant minority, and majority controlled firms, while ownership identities are classified as family controlled, conglomerate, others institution, state, foreign and dispersed firms in explaining the above determinants of firm’s ownership. With the exception of leverage and year effects, we prove that ownership structure is able to extract cost and benefits from governance structure. We further provide evidence that ownership identities influence asymmetric information and risk

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 138
Author(s):  
Pier Luigi Marchini ◽  
Veronica Tibiletti ◽  
Alice Medioli ◽  
Gianluca Gabrielli

Ever since major accounting scandals and corporate collapses of the early 2000’s, the improved risk taking and the lax approach to risk management procedures, which are viewed as contributing factors to the market breakdown that occurred in the international market and, in particular, in the U.S. in 2007, have led to an increased awareness of the importance of managing risk on the part of listed companies. Risk management has gained importance in the definition of what it means to be the best and most efficient corporate governance structure and mechanism, as it can play a fundamental role in helping to achieve the company’s target. Also disclosure related to risk management is fundamental for the efficient functioning of capital markets since it helps to improve corporate transparency and to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. This paper aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and corporate risk-taking behavior and disclosure, as a tool for protecting shareholders, among Italian listed companies. The analysis is devoted to the Italian stock market because it is strongly characterized by a high ownership concentration and by the presence of a family ownership model; and this scenario makes the Italian one an interesting case to study. Based on a sample of 233 Italian listed companies, through a multivariate regression, we find that a high level of ownership concentration is positively related to a firms' low level of risk taking by the board of directors, so giving interesting insights to regulators and practitioners, as well as for further research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Angelo O. Burdeos

Prior studies examined the effect of corporate governance variables on discretionary current accrual, the most widely used measurement of earnings management. The principal-agent conflict implies that the size of the board, the percent of independent directors, CEO duality, and auditor prestige limit discretionary current accruals (DCA). This paper extends past studies by examining the effect of ownership structure on discretionary current accruals. The study determines the level of income-increasing earnings management of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Philippines and the factors that explain it. Particularly, the paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and largest shareholder ownership on discretionary current accruals. The study uses a final sample of 105 IPO firms in Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) from 2008 to 2018. Employing the modified Jones’s (1991) model to measure discretionary current accrual and multiple regression analysis, the study finds -4.19% discretionary current accrual on the average. It also reveals that the 2002 Philippine Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) is ineffective in curbing earnings management. In addition, there is an insignificant relationship between the size of the board, CEO duality, ownership concentration, largest shareholder ownership and auditor prestige, and earnings management. Furthermore, the paper finds a significant relationship between the percent of independent directors, industry sector, return on assets (ROA) and cash flow from operations and earnings management.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-146
Author(s):  
Thi Xuan Anh Tran ◽  
Quoc Tuan Le

Abstract This research examines the possible association between ownership structure and Vietnam listed companies’ dividend payout policy over the period of 2009 – 2015. We have investigated 642 listed firms in Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock exchange, using pannel data analysis. Ownership structure is described with two main sub-variables: ownership concentration and ownership composition. Specifically, the Herfindahl index (or H-index) was applied to measure the level of ownership concentration /dispersion for all major shareholders in the company, including the five biggest investors, corporate institutional investors, the ownership concentration level, and foreign investors. It has been observed that the H-index of all major shareholders has an average of less than 0.5 but the value of the H-index of institutional investors at 0.594 indicates that institutional investors are more likely to be concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors. The result showed linear relationship between institutional ownership and the dividend rate, but not statistically significant for the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payout ratio.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-228
Author(s):  
Godwin Emmanuel Oyedokun ◽  
Shehu Isah ◽  
Niyi Solomon Awotomilusi

This study examined the ownership structure's effect on the firms' value of quoted manufacturing firms (consumer goods) in Nigeria for 2010-2018. The total numbers of quoted consumer goods firms in the Nigeria stock exchange as of 31st December 2018 were twenty-one (21). A judgmental sampling technique was used to sample nineteen (19) consumer goods firms for the study. The study sought to examine whether ownership structure proxy by managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, foreign Ownership, and ownership concentration affect firms' values of quoted consumer goods in Nigeria. Data were collected from secondary sources through the annual reports and accounts of sampled consumer goods firms in Nigeria. The study adopted a panel regression technique as a tool of analysis. The result showed a negative effect of managerial ownership on firm value. While institutional Ownership, foreign Ownership, and Ownership concentration all positively affect the firm value of consumer goods firms in Nigeria. Therefore, the study recommends that the numbers of shares held by management should be reduced to increase the firm value of the listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria. 


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-68
Author(s):  
Anita Anita ◽  
Desrika Putri Amalia

This research was conducted to prove empirically the influence of social responsibility on financial performance moderated by the ownership structure of companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The variables contained in this study were ownership concentration, the proportion of tradeable shares, leverage, long-term debt, and company size. The proportion of tradeable shares and ownership concentration were moderating variables. Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange with a total sample of 384 companies were selected based on predetermined criteria. Eviews were programs used to test panel data taken from annual company reports published for 5 years. The results of the study after the data test stated that social responsibility has a significant positive effect while the proportion of tradeable shares and ownership concentration do not have a significant effect on performance. The moderating variables contained in this study positively influence corporate social responsibility toward financial performance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-55
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Laktionova ◽  
Olha Rudenok

Introduction. Significantly important factors that define the company's efficiency are the structure of proprietorship and capital structure. Therefore, the item of the relationship between these factors is reflected in the works of scientists. The necessary issue is the pick of correlation between own and borrowed funds since the optimum structure of capital leads to magnification of the market value based on company performance results. The relevance of deciding on the capital structure determines the feasibility of determining the effect of concentrated ownership on capital structure. In an unstable political, social, legal, and economic environment, ownership concentration turns into a compensatory mechanism that fills numerous institutional gaps. Concentrated possession enables it possible to influence the capital structure through agency costs. Aim and tasks. The main purpose of the article is to determine the link between concentration level of ownership and capital structure, between ownership structure and leverage. This paper substantiates the problem of “principal-agent” to identify problematic issues to further develop recommendations to strengthen appropriate market incentives. Results. The paper shows that the problem of the “principal-agent” exists independently of the rate of ownership concentration in the corporation. Agency costs are one of the determining factors in the composition of a corporation’s capital. This paper has clearly shown approaches to identifying the nature of the effect of ownership structure on the capital structure. It has been established how this influence is carried out, taking into account the mismatch of various groups of owners' interests and the effect of their “entrenching”, as well as the consequences of monitoring and expropriation with a highly concentrated structure of ownership. Conclusions. The choice of the ratio of own and borrowed funds depends on the actual ownership structure. Assumptions are made, the increase in the corporation's leverage owing to an increase in the blockholders shares. There is a reciprocal interconnection between leverage and agency costs. Because changing leverage is an instrument that helps to overcome agency conflicts and not just only proves is the result of their presence. The selected special characteristics gave grounds to conclude that the adjustment of the ratio of a company's debt to the value of its equity also depends on the goal of management solutions, as well as the current facility and prospects of the corporation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Surya Bahadur G. C. ◽  
Ravindra Prasad Baral

The paper attempts to analyze relationships among corporate governance, ownership structure and firm performance in Nepal. The study comprises of panel data set of 25 firms listed at Nepal Stock Exchange (NEPSE) covering a period of five years from 2012 to 2016. The econometric methodology for the study consists primarily of least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, fixed and random effects panel data models and two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. The study finds bi-directional relationship between corporate governance and performance. Among corporate governance internal mechanisms; smaller board size, higher proportion of independent directors, reducing ownership concentration, improving standards of transparency and disclosure, and designing appropriate director compensation package are important dimensions that listed firms and regulators in Nepal should focus on. Ownership concentration is found to have positive effect on performance; however, it affects corporate governance negatively. This study raises understanding and provides empirical evidence for endogenous relationship between corporate governance and performance and offers support for principal-principal agency relationship. The results of this study lead to several practical implications for listed firms as well as policymakers of Nepal in promoting sound corporate governance practices and codes. For listed companies, the improvement in compliance with a code of corporate governance or voluntary adoption of best practices can provide a means of achieving improved performance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (06) ◽  
pp. 2050058
Author(s):  
MUHAMMAD ZULFIQAR ◽  
KHALID HUSSAIN

A performance-based CEO compensation plan can help organisations incorporate an innovative culture. Concentrated ownership structure can enable shareholders to play a key role in the strategic decision-making of a company by exercising their statutory rights. Purpose of this paper is to understand the moderating impact of ownership concentration on the nexus of CEO compensation and firm innovation relationship. Data about all A-share non-financial companies listed at the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange is obtained from CSMAR database of China. Panel data analysis by using year and industry effects indicates that CEO compensation positively and significantly affects organisational innovation. Furthermore, ownership concentration as measured by top 5 shareholders strengthens this relationship. Findings of this study can help investors, policymakers and creditors to understand the importance of CEO compensation towards innovation in the presence of a concentrated ownership structure. Chinese economy is the fastest growing developing economy and therefore, Chinese contextual findings may be selected as a benchmark for other developing countries.


2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per-Olof Bjuggren ◽  
Helena Bohman

The relationship between ownership, control and firm value is the subject matter studied. The study is essentially empirical. Data about the most actively traded non-financial companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is used. A comparison is made between the years 1999 and 2001. What do the relationships between firm value and different ownership characteristics like ownership concentration, foreign ownership and inside ownership look like? Do these characteristics differ between the booming year of 1999 and the recession year of 2001? Is there a relation between stock price and ownership structure? These are the three main questions addressed in the study.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Matari ◽  
Ali Saleh Al_arussi

This study attempts to investigate the effect of the ownership structure characteristics (ownership concentration, managerial ownership and government ownership) on firm performance (ROA) among non-financial Omani companies during 2012-2014. For achieving the objective of this study, 81 firms were taken as a sample to test the above relations. The sampling was obtained from annual report of the companies for three years with a total sampling equal to 243 firms. Multiple regression analysis was employed to test the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable. In addition, this study tried to fill the gap in the existing literature concerning the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the developing countries such as Oman. This study found a positive and significant association between ownership concentration and government ownership to firm performance (ROA). The study provides some suggestions for future researchers before the conclusion.


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