scholarly journals A review of the two main competing models of corporate governance: the shareholdership model versus the stakeholdership model

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Ikechukwu Nwanji ◽  
Kerry E. Howell
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
American System ◽  
Stakeholder Groups ◽  
Stakeholder Model ◽  
Competing Models ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Model Versus ◽  
The Impact

This paper reviews the impact of the shareholdership and stakeholdership models in guiding managers through the most appropriate way of delivering business objectives. The shareholder model is the traditional Anglo-American system of corporate governance, which focuses on the maximisation of shareholder wealth, while the stakeholder model is considered to be exemplified by the German system of corporate governance and focuses on meeting the needs and expectations of a wider range of stakeholder groups. The results from this study indicate that a combination of both models could enable management to deliver the needs of stakeholders groups, while in the long term maximizing wealth for the shareholders

scholarly journals Determinants of Capital Structure within the Context of Corporate Governance in Egypt

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (8) ◽  
pp. 26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanaa A. El-Habashy
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Structure ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Western Countries ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Capital Structure

This study aims to investigate the characteristics of corporate governance that impact the capital structure decisions in listed firms in Egypt, to test the efficiency of the research results conducted in the developed Western countries in an emerging economy. A sample of 240 observations from the most active non-financial companies collected in the period 2009-2014 was used for hypothesis testing. Multiple regression models (OLS) were used for data analysis. Seven variables are used in measuring the attributes of corporate governance; they are the managerial ownership, institutional shareholding, shares owned by a large block, board size, board composition, separation of CEO/Chair positions and audit type. Four ratios were calculated for measuring the capital structure, they are long-term and short-term debt to assets, total debt to assets and debt to equity. The results suggest that corporate governance attributes have a significant impact on the capital structure decisions of listed Egyptian companies. In addition, firm-specific factors such as profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities, corporate tax, firm size and non-debt tax shields influence the choice of capital structure in Egypt. The results showed the same relationship with what was obtained in developed Western countries. The paper offers some contribution in the literature and helps to understand the impact of corporate governance on Egypt's capital structure as an emerging economy.

Corporate governance mechanisms and R&D intensity in OECD courtiers

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (5) ◽  
pp. 863-885
Author(s):  
Aws AlHares
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Oecd Countries ◽  
Least Square ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to investigate the impact of ownership structure and board structure on risk-taking as measured by research and development (R&D) Intensity in OECD countries. Design/methodology/approach A panel data of 300 companies from Anglo American and European countries between 2010 and 2016 were used. The ordinary least square multiple regression analysis procedure is used to examine the relationships. The findings are robust to alternative measures and endogeneities. Findings The results show that institutional ownership, board size, independent directors and board diversity are negatively related to risk-taking, with greater significance among Anglo American countries than among Continental European countries. In contrast, the results show that director ownership is statistically insignificant. Originality/value This study extends and contributes to the extant corporate governance (CG) literature, by offering new evidence on the effect of ownership and board structure on risk-taking between two different traditions. The findings will help regulators and policy-makers in the OECD countries in evaluating the adequacy of the current CG reforms to prevent management misconduct and scandals. These findings are relevant for companies aiming to adopt the most suitable governance mechanisms to pursue their R&D objectives and for policymakers interested in promoting R&D investment.

scholarly journals The 1949 sterling crisis and British policy towards European integration

1985 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Newton
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Marshall Plan ◽  
Public Records ◽  
The Public ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Impact

Most commentators on the 1949 sterling crisis have viewed it as an episode with implications merely for the management of the British economy. This paper, based on the public records now available, discusses the impact of the crisis on British economic foreign policy. In particular it suggests that the crisis revealed deep Anglo-American differences, centring on the nature of the Marshall Plan, on the international value of the sterling area, and on the proper relationship between the United Kingdom and Western Europe, Ultimately the British succeeded in resolving these disagreements: but this triumph ironically implied both the defeat of British aims in post-war European reconstruction and a long term delusion that great power status could be maintained on the basis of a special relationship-with the United States.

CEO incentive compensation and earnings management

2016 ◽  
Vol 54 (10) ◽  
pp. 2447-2461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madi Almadi ◽  
Philip Lazic
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Institutional Settings ◽  
Legal Enforcement ◽  
Anglo American ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of CEO incentive-based compensation on earnings management, taking into account the influence of institutional settings and corporate governance systems. Design/methodology/approach Using archival data of 3,000 British, Australian, German, and Austrian firm-years between 2005 and 2014, the study applies fixed-effect estimator to reduce risks of endogeneity bias. Findings The findings reveal that institutional factors influence the relationship between CEO incentive-based compensation and earnings management. Particularly, firms from countries within the Anglo-American model (the UK and Australia), which provide greater protection for investor, stricter legal enforcement, and higher quality of corporate governance, tend to have lower level of earnings management. However, besides corporate governance quality, it is relevant to consider weaker investor protection and legal enforcement to motivate earnings management in firms from countries within the Euro-Continental model (Germany and Austria). Originality/value The study suggests that robust implementation of corporate governance, derived from either model, helps in restraining CEO opportunistic behavior. Importantly, more qualified institutions have higher impact on the relative adequacy of CEO incentive-based pay formulas in mitigating earnings management concerns. This can be extended by future research through comparative studies using other contexts or influential institutions.

Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 933-956 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslava Straska ◽  
H. Gregory Waller
Keyword(s):  
Good Governance ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Long Term Studies

AbstractWe survey theoretical and empirical research on antitakeover provisions, focusing on the relation between antitakeover provisions and shareholder value. We divide the empirical studies based upon the evidence that they provide: short-term event studies, studies on performance and policy changes around adopting antitakeover provisions or passing state antitakeover laws, studies on the impact of antitakeover provisions on takeovers, studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm characteristics, and long-term studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm performance or policies. We also discuss the place of antitakeover provisions in the current debate about “good governance” practices.

scholarly journals The Impact of Corporate Governance on Company Performance: A Study among Medium and Large Enterprises in Kosovo

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 207-212
Author(s):  
Saxhide Mustafa ◽  
Hajdin Berisha ◽  
Shyqyri Llaci
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Company Performance ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Market Experience ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Proper Balance ◽  
Large Enterprises

Abstract An effective corporate governance system is established to ensure proper balance of long-term interests of different stakeholders (primarily: owners, employees and management) and improve company's performance and its competitive position in the market. This paper provides a theoretical discussion and empirical evidence on the interdependence between corporate governance and company performance among medium and large enterprises in Kosovo. A questionnaire survey was employed for data collection purposes. The study included a sample of 87 managers from 87 medium and large enterprises. Results indicate that effects of corporate governance on the performance tend to be greater in larger companies. Regarding the determinants, the theoretical expectations are confirmed. Results confirm that the size of the company, the level of investment, export activities and company life expectancy are statistically significant determinants of the adoption of corporate governance practices. As a result, larger companies with large scales of investment and longer market experience tend to adopt more corporate governance practices. The study suggests that corporate governance will inevitably affect companies’ performance and further research is needed in this context.

scholarly journals The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance revisited: where do we stand?

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Hilger
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Business Models ◽  
Corporate Performance ◽  
Holistic Approach ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Usa ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

How is corporate governance measured, and what is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance? This paper aims to shed light on these questions by providing an overview of the most important research findings in this area with a focus on the USA and Germany. My analysis gives rise to the following remarks. First, studies examining the impact of singles governance mechanisms are inconclusive and mixed in their findings, and especially the question of causality is still unanswered. Second, when a holistic approach is used, the proposition that good corporate governance enhances long-term performance is supported. However, corporate governance practices alone cannot assure long-term corporate performance and good standards of corporate governance are no substitute for the solidity of business models.

Corporate Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jackie Krafft ◽  
Jacques-Laurent Ravix
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Positive Relationships ◽  
Shareholder Primacy ◽  
Innovative Performance ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
The Impact

Little attention has been devoted to the impact of corporate governance practices on firms’ innovative performance. This chapter reviews the literature to show that there is theoretical ambiguity. There is the argument that corporate governance and new forms of finance realign managers’ interests, with greater efficiency for all types of investments. However, some argue that innovative R&D has distinctive characteristics, like high risk and long-term horizon, that may modify the efficiency effect. The issue has generated many studies where the long tradition of positive relationships between governance and efficiency is now contrasted by some recent empirical evidence suggesting a negative relationship. The chapter argues that shareholder primacy or owner activism in corporate governance and new forms of finance represent a potential mismatch with innovation.

Sustainable Corporations in Non-Financial Sectors Through Optimal Design of Executive Pay

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 715-748
Author(s):  
David Hansen
Keyword(s):  
Limited Liability ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Incentive Pay ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Business Economics ◽  
Wealth Maximization ◽  
Shareholder Wealth Maximization ◽  
The Impact

It is commonplace in current legal scholarship that pay packages for executives that were not tied to the impact of these executives' policies on shareholder wealth maximization often caused harm to shareholder interests and their companies, especially in the long term. The no-pay-without-performance postulate is as old as the first global economic crisis of the 20thcentury – the deep depression. Since then, this postulate has been repeated and substantiated innumerous times by the majority of experts in corporate law and business economics, but without real success. There are, however, commentators who deny the existence of a link between skewed incentive pay, excessive risk-taking, and financial losses. They instead insist on the superiority of the traditional director-centric model of corporate governance, which would allegedly preserve the balance that has generally worked well between the limited role and limited liability of shareholders and the active role, fiduciary duties, and potential liability of managers, which allegedly renders additional executive pay regulation unnecessary.

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