scholarly journals Disappearing knowledge

2016 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-883
Author(s):  
Ivan Nisavic
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Direct Consequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

Following the exposition of the basic standpoints of contextualism in relation to invariantistic position, which takes the concept of knowledge in its rigorous and fixed meaning, the text continues to deal with the analysis of the concept of knowledge offered by David Lewis, with a goal to solve common epistemological problems, one of those being the lottery paradox. Accepting fallibilism as the only plausible option regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Lewis claims that, with the postulated rules that allow us to properly eliminate alternative possibilities, it is possible to resolve the previously mentioned paradox. If we want to base knowledge on probability, and not on certainty, and to directly stipulate it with the context in which it is being imposed or expressed, than it is obvious that knowledge will depend on whether the requirements for knowledge are high or low. Thus, in one case it might occur that we have knowledge, and in the other that we do not, even though nothing is changed except the conversational conditions that are already ?in the game?. Such, elusive knowledge, that gets lost, De Rose labels ?now you know it, now you don?t? and considers it to be a direct consequence of Lewis?s analysis. As such, the analysis should not be accepted.

Advanced Topics: Acceptance Rules

1990 ◽  
Author(s):  
John L. Pollock
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Original Version ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Acceptance Rule ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Lottery Paradox ◽  
Probability Theorist ◽  
Made In

There once was a man who wrote a book. He was very careful in his reasoning, and was confident of each claim that he made. With some display of pride, he showed the book to a friend (who happened to be a probability theorist). He was dismayed when the friend observed that any book that long and that interesting was almost certain to contain at least one falsehood. Thus it was not reasonable to believe that all of the claims made in the book were true. If it were reasonable to believe each claim then it would be reasonable to believe that the book contained no falsehoods, so it could not be reasonable to believe each claim. Furthermore, because there was no way to pick out some of the claims as being more problematic than others, there could be no reasonable way of withholding assent to some but not others. “Therefore,” concluded his friend, “you are not justified in believing anything you asserted in the book.” This is the paradox of the preface (so named because in the original version the author confesses in the preface that his book probably contains a falsehood). The paradox of the preface is more than a curiosity. It has been used by some philosophers to argue that the set of one's warranted beliefs need not be deductively consistent, and by others to argue that you should not befriend probability theorists. If (Al) is to be a correct acceptance rule it must be capable of explaining what is involved in the paradox of the preface. The lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface seem superficially similar, so it might be supposed that a resolution of one will automatically generate a resolution of the other in some trivial manner. But in fact, the opposite is true. It is the principle of collective defeat that makes possible the resolution of the lottery paradox, but it is the principle of collective defeat that is responsible for the creation of the paradox of the preface.

scholarly journals Cohen’s and Lewis’ solutions to the lottery paradox

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-137
Author(s):  
Milan Jovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
David Lewis ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Modal Interpretation ◽  
Relevant Alternatives ◽  
Epistemological Problem ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

The lottery paradox is considered to be one of the biggest problems concerning fallibilism in epistemology. This paper offers a presentation and critical analysis of two different contextualistic solutions to that paradox. The first part of the paper deals with the lottery paradox and Stewart Cohen?s proposed solution. The second part is a presentation of David Lewis? solution to that epistemological problem. The two analyses offered serve to show that Cohen is (while Lewis is not) committed to the claim that the same solution can be used for both: the lottery paradox and for the problem of skepticism. In the final part of the paper the main focus is on the question whether the same explanation of how conversational mechanisms work can really serve to explain these two problems of contemporary epistemology. It is argued, mainly on the basis of modal interpretation of the relevant alternatives approach, that there is a significant difference in structure between these two problems, and that they, therefore, deserve different treatment.

scholarly journals Lewis’s contextual solution to the Lottery paradox and the Gettier problem

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Marija Rekovic
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Conversational Contextualism ◽  
Skeptical Paradox ◽  
The Lottery Paradox ◽  
The Gettier Problem

The main topic of this paper is conversational contextualism, one of the most dominant versions of epistemic contextualism, endorsed by David Lewis. Proponents of conversational contextualism, including Lewis, argue that the key advantage of this view lies in its unique way of analyzing and solving the most prominent epistemological problems. Among those problems are the skeptical paradox, the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The first part of the paper is concerned with the general features of conversational contextualism. In the second part of the paper the author highlights the main hypotheses of conversational contextualism, proposed by Lewis, as an attempt to solve the Gettier problem and the Lottery paradox. The last part of the paper analyzes the pros and cons of the Lewisian solutions to the aforementioned problems. The key part in that analysis is the Cohen?s criticism of those solutions.

scholarly journals How (not) to be a fallibilist: Lottery paradox and two types of epistemic contextualism

2014 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-120
Author(s):  
Nenad Filipovic
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Epistemic Contextualism ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
The World ◽  
Conversational Contextualism ◽  
Inferential Contextualism ◽  
Knowledge Claims ◽  
Michael Williams ◽  
The Lottery Paradox

There is one common thing among lotteries from all over the world: there is small number of winning tickets and considerably bigger number of losing tickets. Therefore, the probability that a ticket wins a lottery is quite low, usually so low that we think that it is almost sure the ticket loses. But, we would never say that we know that a ticket will lose, until we see results of the lottery in, for example, some newspapers. And the probability of newspapers making a mistake does not seem to affect our knowledge claims. But why is that, since newspapers could make a mistake more often than a ticket wins? This question presents trouble for fallibilism, which claim that S could know that p, even when the probability that p is less than 1. Contextualist theories give their typical brand of solution: we have a change of context between the two cases, and in one case standard for knowledge claims are higher than the standard in the other case. Because of that, one can know that S lost the lottery when she reads it in newspapers. In this paper, I will present analysis of the lottery paradox, and two types of epistemic contexutalism: simple conversational contextualism and inferential contextualism. I will also present two of the most popular solution based on simple conversational contextualism, made by Lewis and Cohen. Finally, I will introduce some problems for such solutions, and show that the problems could solved if we apply strategy and explanation of inferential contextualism, type of contextualism proposed by Michael Williams.

Electron Diffraction Analysis of Microtwin Structures in Regrown (III) Silicon

1982 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 460-461
Author(s):  
P. Ling ◽  
R. Gronsky ◽  
J. Washburn
Keyword(s):  
Electron Diffraction ◽  
Ion Implantation ◽  
Diffraction Analysis ◽  
Diffraction Pattern ◽  
Direct Consequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electron Diffraction Analysis ◽  
Defect Microstructures ◽  
Ion Implanted

The defect microstructures of Si arising from ion implantation and subsequent regrowth for a (111) substrate have been found to be dominated by microtwins. Figure 1(a) is a typical diffraction pattern of annealed ion-implanted (111) Si showing two groups of extra diffraction spots; one at positions (m, n integers), the other at adjacent positions between <000> and <220>. The object of the present paper is to show that these extra reflections are a direct consequence of the microtwins in the material.

Lewis' Indexical Argument for World-Relative Actuality

Dialogue ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard M. Gale
Keyword(s):  
David Lewis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Abstract Entity ◽  
Modal Realism ◽  
Possible World ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Reductio Ad Absurdum ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

David Lewis has shocked the philosophical community with his original version of extreme modal realism according to which “every way that a world could possibly be is a way that some world is”. Logical Space is a plenitude of isolated physical worlds, each being the actualization of some way in which a world could be, that bear neither spatiotemporal nor causal relations to each other. Lewis has given independent, converging arguments for this. One is the argument from the indexicality of actuality, the other an elaborate cost-benefit argument of the inference-to-the-best explanation sort to the effect that a systematic analysis of a number of concepts, including modality, causality, propositions and properties, fares better under his theory than under any rival one that takes a possible world to be either a linguistic entity or an ersatz abstract entity such as a maximal compossible set of properties, propositions or states of affairs. Lewis' legion of critics have confined themselves mostly to attempts at a reductio ad absurdum of his theory or to objections to his various analyses. The indexical argument, on the other hand, has not been subject to careful critical scrutiny. It is the purpose of this paper to show that this argument cannot withstand such scrutiny. Its demise, however, leaves untouched his argument from the explanatory superiority for his extreme modal realism.

To what question is the Badiouan notion of the subject an answer? On the dialectical elaboration of the concept in his early work

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-120
Author(s):  
Jan-Jasper Persijn
Keyword(s):  
Direct Consequence ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Academic World ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
Political Field ◽  
Political Implications ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The One ◽  
Work Up

Alain Badiou’s elaboration of a subject faithful to an event is commonly known today in the academic world and beyond. However, his first systematic account of the subject ( Théorie du Sujet) was already published in 1982 and did not mention the ‘event’ at all. Therefore, this article aims at tracing back both the structural and the historical conditions that directed Badiou’s elaboration of the subject in the early work up until the publication of L’Être et l’Événément in 1988. On the one hand, it investigates to what extent the (early) Badiouan subject can be considered an exceptional product of the formalist project of the Cahiers pour l’Analyse as instigated by psychoanalytical discourse (Lacan) and a certain Marxist discourse (Althusser) insofar as both were centered upon a theory of the subject. On the other hand, this article examines the radical political implications of this subject insofar as Badiou has directed his philosophical aims towards the political field as a direct consequence of the events of May ’68.

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