scholarly journals Why Rosenberg and Kaplan's attempt to reconcile physicalism and antireductionism concerning biology is unsatisfactory

2008 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18
Author(s):  
Slobodan Perovic
Keyword(s):  
Causal Power ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Molecular Systems ◽  
Law Of Nature ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Biological Laws ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
Physical Laws

A. Rosenberg and D. Kaplan argue that their account of the Principle of Natural Selection (PNS), as a law of physical systems (including those systems studied by biology) underived from familiar physical laws, provides the precisely explanatory autonomy of biology sought after by antireductionists, without violating the principles of reductive physicalism. I argue, however, that the possibility of the PNS being an underived law of physical systems may be neutral to the explanatory autonomy of biology. In fact, if wedded with reductive physicalism (the possibility considered by these authors), it may yield only a very limited explanatory autonomy of biology, no stronger than the quasi-autonomy generally ascribed to it by reductionists. In the physicalist world, the PNS is operational and thus discoverable at the higher ontological levels (those concerning living cells, individuals, groups, populations and species), because the operation of a law concerning higher-level systems is grounded in its operation at the lower levels (atoms and molecules). Consequently, in terms of the explanatory criterion, a generalization discovered by biologists may be established as a law only if its status is confirmed in the form of its applicability to molecular and other systems studied by chemistry and physics. Otherwise, there is a danger that it could be a 'just so story.' The authors' narrow understanding both of antireductionism and biological laws as reducible to those concerning molecular systems provides only an illusory vindication of the explanatory autonomy: in the case of the PNS, although biologists happened to be the first to utilize it, their research concerning cells, individuals, populations and species could not possibly have established it as a law. This results, at best, in the inter-theoretic irreducibility of molecular biology as a discipline of physical science. I argue that a substantial explanatory autonomy of biology concerns the causal powers of biological systems at multiple levels, where the PNS, or any other biological law, is a basic law of nature in that it is concerned with the entities whose causal power is irreducible to that of the lower-level entities. Thus, only if confirmable at the levels higher than the molecular, could the generalizations discovered by biologists reflect such autonomy.

Computation and cognition: issues in the foundations of cognitive science

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zenon W. Pylyshyn
Keyword(s):  
Tacit Knowledge ◽  
Degrees Of Freedom ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Symbolic Representations ◽  
Natural Domain ◽  
Human Functioning ◽  
Biological Laws ◽  
Post Hoc ◽  
Level Of Analysis

AbstractThe computational view of mind rests on certain intuitions regarding the fundamental similarity between computation and cognition. We examine some of these intuitions and suggest that they derive from the fact that computers and human organisms are both physical systems whose behavior is correctly described as being governed by rules acting on symbolic representations. Some of the implications of this view are discussed. It is suggested that a fundamental hypothesis of this approach (the “proprietary vocabulary hypothesis”) is that there is a natural domain of human functioning (roughly what we intuitively associate with perceiving, reasoning, and acting) that can be addressed exclusively in terms of a formal symbolic or algorithmic vocabulary or level of analysis.Much of the paper elaborates various conditions that need to be met if a literal view of mental activity as computation is to serve as the basis for explanatory theories. The coherence of such a view depends on there being a principled distinction between functions whose explanation requires that we posit internal representations and those that we can appropriately describe as merely instantiating causal physical or biological laws. In this paper the distinction is empirically grounded in a methodological criterion called the “cognitive impenetrability condition.” Functions are said to be cognitively impenetrable if they cannot be influenced by such purely cognitive factors as goals, beliefs, inferences, tacit knowledge, and so on. Such a criterion makes it possible to empirically separate the fixed capacities of mind (called its “functional architecture”) from the particular representations and algorithms used on specific occasions. In order for computational theories to avoid being ad hoc, they must deal effectively with the “degrees of freedom” problem by constraining the extent to which they can be arbitrarily adjusted post hoc to fit some particular set of observations. This in turn requires that the fixed architectural function and the algorithms be independently validated. It is argued that the architectural assumptions implicit in many contemporary models run afoul of the cognitive impenetrability condition, since the required fixed functions are demonstrably sensitive to tacit knowledge and goals. The paper concludes with some tactical suggestions for the development of computational cognitive theories.

Causation and laws in biology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohan Matthen
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Population Level ◽  
Subject Area ◽  
Structural Determinants ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Philip Kitcher ◽  
Biological Laws ◽  
Physical Laws

Physicalism appears to undermine the autonomy of ‘special sciences’ such as biology, and to leave little room for proprietary biological laws or causation. Mendel’s ‘Laws’ are so-called because they are fundamental to the subject-area, but since they describe causal processes that are wholly physical in nature, they seem to reduce to physical laws, given certain propositions about the composition of DNA. The same goes for other principles of the biological sciences. This argument has been challenged by Hilary Putnam, on the grounds that good explanations, for instance in mathematical terms, could range more widely than any given physical realization. Putnam argues that mathematics could thus have an autonomous role in science despite physicalism. Putnam’s insight has been applied to classical genetics by Philip Kitcher. A gene is a unit of inheritance that passes unchanged from parent to offspring according to certain rules. It is these rules that are essential to understanding inheritance, not details of interaction in the DNA substrate. Putnam and Kitcher here employ a notion similar to Aristotle’s ‘formal causes’ – functional and structural determinants of biological characteristics that are somewhat independent of material constitution. There are other conceptions of laws to be found in philosophy of science. Some think that they are propositions with the capacity to impart axiomatic structure to what is known about a domain. The principle of natural selection plays this role in biology, though it is a priori. Again, some think that laws are necessary truths: on cladistic systems of classification, the proposition that the common raven is a bird is arguably a law under this understanding. The nature of causal patterns in natural selection has been a matter of some discussion recently. The view that individual-level causes are sufficient to explain selection-outcomes is tempting to the reductionist, but distorts the explanatory aims of evolutionary theory. Clearly, evolutionary theory requires population-level causes. On the other hand, it has been questioned whether natural selection itself should be understood as a ‘force’ acting on a population, somewhat in the same manner as gravitation acts on a body. Statistical views of natural selection seek alternatives to this way of understanding selection. Finally, what are biological entities? Some ontologies admit no priority among collections of atoms – the argument is that an organism, for instance, is nothing more than such a collection. Many biologists, however, treat of composite entities as internally organized complex systems. On this view, cells, organisms, populations, and ecosystems have privileged ontological status.

Cyber-Physical Manufacturing Systems

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 427-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawn M. Tilbury
Keyword(s):  
Manufacturing Systems ◽  
Computer Numerical Control ◽  
Cyber Physical Systems ◽  
Numerical Control ◽  
Programmable Logic ◽  
Programmable Logic Controllers ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Multiple Levels ◽  
Networking Technologies ◽  
Logic Controllers

Cyber-physical systems, in which computation and networking technologies interact with physical systems, have made great strides into manufacturing systems. From the early days, when electromechanical relays were used to automate conveyors and machines, through the introduction of programmable logic controllers and computer numerical control, computing and networking have become pervasive in manufacturing systems. By increasing the amount of automation at multiple levels within a factory and across the enterprise, cyber-physical manufacturing systems enable higher productivity and higher quality as well as lower costs.

scholarly journals What limits limits?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong-Chun Liu ◽  
Kun Huang ◽  
Yun-Feng Xiao ◽  
Lan Yang ◽  
Cheng-Wei Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Research Field ◽  
Related Research ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
Fundamental Physical

Abstract Physical systems are usually constrained by a variety of limits originating from fundamental physical laws. Breaking a limit typically represents a breakthrough in the related research field. We review different limits in physical systems and discuss the scenarios of “breaking the limit” in three categories, which clarify some mis-interpretations and ambiguities in the literatures.

scholarly journals Dennett’s Account of Mind versus Kim’s Supervenience Argument

1970 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Marczuk
Keyword(s):  
Causal Powers ◽  
Reductive Physicalism ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Mental Events

This paper challenges Daniel Dennett’s attempt to reconcile the performance of mind and brain within a physicalist framework with Jaegwon Kim’s argument that a coherent physicalist framework entails the epiphenomenalism of mental events. Dennett offers a materialist explanation of consciousness and argues that his model of mind does not imply reductive physicalism. I argue that Dennett’s explanation of mind clashes with Jaegwon Kim’s mind-body supervenience argument. Kim contends that non-reductive physicalism either voids the causal powers of mental properties, or it violates physicalist framework. I conclude that Dennett’s account of mind does not escape or overcome Kim’s mind/body supervenience problem. If Kim’s argument does not prove Dennett’s explanation of mind to be either a form of reductive materialism, or a logically inconsistent view, it is due to the ambiguity of concepts involved in Dennett’s theory.

Not Observed Ontology

2020 ◽  
pp. 37-43
Author(s):  
Oleg V. Avchenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Physical Space ◽  
Space Time ◽  
Ordinary Space ◽  
Quantum Objects ◽  
Biological Laws ◽  
Experimental Works ◽  
Small Change ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Real Area

Two narratives – natural science and religious, intersect in the area of ​​unobserv­able ontology – an immaterial, transcendental, but real area that paradoxically exists outside and inside ordinary physical space-time. It is assumed that mathe­matical constructs, physical laws, physical constants, quantum objects, and even biological laws can be associated with this area. It is argued that physical laws are not invented by man, but are discovered, since they contain physical con­stants measured in special experimental works. Universal constants were not invented for reasons of convenience – physics accepts them as an inevitable con­sequence of the coincidence of the results of all special measurements. Observa­tional data are presented that indicate an extremely small change in fundamental constants or even their constancy over the entire time of the existence of the Uni­verse, although this interesting problem cannot be considered finally solved. The ontology of quantum objects is considered within the framework of Seval­nikov's polyiontic paradigm, according to which two modes are distinguished – potential and actual. The potential existence of quantum objects is described by the Schrödinger wave function, and the actual one appears during the transition from the spectrum of possible states to the only observable one. It is emphasized that potential being does not belong to the classical space, but is in an unobserv­able ontology. The observed state, on the contrary, is already in ordinary space – time and can be recorded by the device. This determines the existence of a spe­cial transcendental layer of reality, along with the material, which may indicate a certain duality in the structure of the Universe. Then it should be assumed that our Universe is not a universal, but a multiverse – a set of different worlds onto­logically having a different nature. In addition, the polyiontic paradigm leads to the idea that, at the quantum level, matter can be derived from information hid­den in an unobservable ontology.

scholarly journals Asset deterioration analysis using multi-utility data and multi-objective data mining

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 211-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. A. Savic ◽  
O. Giustolisi ◽  
D. Laucelli
Keyword(s):  
Data Mining ◽  
Polynomial Regression ◽  
Single Case ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Physical Systems ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Evolutionary Polynomial Regression ◽  
Physically Based ◽  
Physical Laws

Physically-based models derive from first principles (e.g. physical laws) and rely on known variables and parameters. Because these have physical meaning, they also explain the underlying relationships of the system and are usually transportable from one system to another as a structural entity. They only require model parameters to be updated. Data-driven or regressive techniques involve data mining for modelling and one of the major drawbacks of this is that the functional form describing relationships between variables and the numerical parameters is not transportable to other physical systems as is the case with their classical physically-based counterparts. Aimed at striking a balance, Evolutionary Polynomial Regression (EPR) offers a way to model multi-utility data of asset deterioration in order to render model structures transportable across physical systems. EPR is a recently developed hybrid regression method providing symbolic expressions for models and works with formulae based on pseudo-polynomial expressions, usually in a multi-objective scenario where the best Pareto optimal models (parsimony versus accuracy) are selected from data in a single case study. This article discusses the improvement of EPR in dealing with multi-utility data (multi-case study) where it has been tried to achieve a general model structure for asset deterioration prediction across different water systems.

scholarly journals The Roots of Occasionalism? Causation, Metaphysical Dependence, and Soul-Body Relations in Augustine

Vivarium ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tamer Nawar
Keyword(s):  
Causal Power ◽  
Causal Powers ◽  
Causal Influence ◽  
Dependence Relations ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Metaphysical Dependence

Abstract It has long been thought that Augustine holds that corporeal objects cannot act upon incorporeal souls. However, precisely how and why Augustine imposes limitations upon the causal powers of corporeal objects remains obscure. In this paper, the author clarifies Augustine’s views about the causal and dependence relations between body and soul. He argues that, contrary to what is often thought, Augustine allows that corporeal objects do act upon souls and merely rules out that corporeal objects exercise a particular kind of causal power (that of efficient or sustaining causes). He clarifies how Augustine conceives of the kind of causal influence exercised by souls and bodies.

Is Non‐reductive Physicalism Viable within a Causal Powers Metaphysic?

2010 ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy O'Connor ◽  
John Ross Churchill
Keyword(s):  
Causal Powers ◽  
Reductive Physicalism
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