scholarly journals Apparatuses and counter-apparatuses (Agamben’s understanding of profanation)

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 133-142
Author(s):  
Branko Romcevic

In this paper I am starting with Foucault?s notion of apparatus (dispositif), showing its genealogy, its ?growth? from the concept of positivity (from Archaeology of Knowledge), in order to demonstrate its double-sidedness: on the one hand, functions of subjugation, and on the other, chance for emancipation. Gilles Deleuze was the first to announce such adjustment of that notion, identifying foucauldian apparatus as controling force, as well as the one that can liberate human beings. Giorgio Agamben transposed that division into the difference between sacred and profane, claiming that apparatus works like the act of sacrifice, and that the opposing act of profanation can be understood as the work of counter-apparatus. Following Agamben?s analysis, language, in its poetic function (in its possibility of enjambement), is the one of the most powerfull counter-appparatuses.

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 617-642
Author(s):  
Antonio Di Chiro

In this essay we will try to analyze the thought of the philosopher Giorgio Agamben on the pandemic. The aim of the work is twofold. On the one hand, we will try to demonstrate that Agamben’s positions on the pandemic are not to be understood as mere extemporaneous statements, but as integral parts of his philosophy. On the other hand, we will try to show how these positions are based on a deeply paranoid and anti-scientific vision, since Agamben believes that the effects of the epidemic have been exaggerated by the centers of power in order to create a “state of exception” that allows to crumble social life and to use the fear of poverty as a tool to dominate society. We will try to demonstrate that it is precisely starting from the critique of Agamben’s positions that it is possible to rethink a philosophy and a politic to come and a new reorganization of social and intimate relations between human beings.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-154
Author(s):  
Józef Bremer

The present coronavirus pandemic has confronted each of us individually and our society at large with new existential and theoretical-practical challenges. In the following article I present a look at the pandemic from the point of view of biopolitics (Michael Foucault, Giorgio Agamben) and psychopolitics (Byung-Chul Han). The reflections on biopolitics and psychopolitics, on top of the terms they used, make us aware of the fragility of human life on the one hand, and on the other hand, they encourage us to look for historical equiva­lents to our current struggle with the pandemic. For me, such an equivalent would be the culture of Romanticism: for example, works by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Schiller, Juliusz Słowacki, and Friedrich von Schelling. Starting from a short description of the Romantic era, I proceed to my goal which is to show how, during the pandemic, fundamental questions asked by biotechnology and psychopolitics come to the fore as questions about us, human beings, and our individual and social survival.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.


1930 ◽  
Vol 51 (5) ◽  
pp. 769-776 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max B. Lurie

Under conditions closely simulating the natural modes of tuberculous infection in man normal guinea pigs have acquired tuberculosis by being exposed under two degrees of crowding to tuberculous cage mates in ordinary cages, where the food became soiled with excreta, bearing tubercle bacilli, and in special cages, with wire-mesh floors, where this source of infection was almost entirely eliminated. Guinea pigs were also exposed in the same room but not in the same cage with tuberculous animals. It was found that the relative tuberculous involvement of the mesenteric and tracheobronchial nodes showed a gradation of change from an almost completely alimentary infection to a completely respiratory infection. The disease involved the mesenteric nodes predominantly in the crowded ordinary cages, with much less or no affection of the tracheobronchial nodes. It was similarly, but less markedly, enteric in origin in the less crowded ordinary cages, the mesenteric nodes again being larger than the tracheobronchial nodes, but the difference in size was not so great. In the more crowded special cages the relative affection of these two groups of nodes alternated, so that in some the mesenteric, in some the tracheobronchial nodes were more extensively tuberculous. A disease characterized by less or no affection of the mesenteric nodes and by extensive lesions of the tracheobronchial nodes was seen in the less crowded special cages. Finally there was a massive tuberculosis of the tracheobronchial nodes with usually no affection of the mesenteric nodes in the frankly air-borne tuberculosis acquired by guinea pigs exposed in the same room but not to tuberculous cage mates. This gradation in the rô1e played by the enteric and respiratory routes of infection, as first the one and then the other becomes the more frequent channel of entrance for tuberculosis, would indicate that the penetration of tubercle bacilli by the one portal of entry inhibits the engrafting of tuberculosis in the tissues by way of the other portal of entry. It is apparent that in the special cages the opportunities for inhaling tubercle bacilli are at most equal to if not much less than in the ordinary cages; for in the latter dust from the bedding, laden with tubercle bacilli, is stirred up almost constantly by the animals, whereas in the special cages there is no bedding at all, and therefore, presumably, no more tubercle bacilli in the air than may occur in any part of the room. Nevertheless the route of infection was predominantly the respiratory tract in the special cages, especially in the less crowded, apparently because the enteric route had been largely eliminated. The greater predominance of the respiratory route amongst guinea pigs that acquired tuberculosis in the less crowded ordinary cages as compared to the lesser significance of this route in the more crowded ordinary cages would point in the same direction. These observations are in harmony with our knowledge that tuberculosis once implanted in an organism confers a certain degree of immunity to the disease. It is noteworthy that in a study of human autopsy material Opie (3) has found that when healed lesions are present in the mesentery focal tuberculosis in the lungs is seldom found, and that when first infection occurs by way of the lungs it tends to prevent the engrafting of the disease by way of the intestinal tract.


1998 ◽  
Vol 30 (04) ◽  
pp. 1027-1057 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Picard

Modelling malaria with consistency necessitates the introduction of at least two families of interconnected processes. Even in a Markovian context the simplest fully stochastic model is intractable and is usually transformed into a hybrid model, by supposing that these two families are stochastically independent and linked only through two deterministic connections. A model closer to the fully stochastic model is presented here, where one of the two families is subordinated to the other and just a unique deterministic connection is required. For this model a threshold theorem can be proved but the threshold level is not the one obtained in a hybrid model. The difference disappears only when the human population size approaches infinity.


1878 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 633-671 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Macfarlane

The experiments to which I shall refer were carried out in the physical laboratory of the University during the late summer session. I was ably assisted in conducting the experiments by three students of the laboratory,—Messrs H. A. Salvesen, G. M. Connor, and D. E. Stewart. The method which was used of measuring the difference of potential required to produce a disruptive discharge of electricity under given conditions, is that described in a paper communicated to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1876 in the names of Mr J. A. Paton, M. A., and myself, and was suggested to me by Professor Tait as a means of attacking the experimental problems mentioned below.The above sketch which I took of the apparatus in situ may facilitate tha description of the method. The receiver of an air-pump, having a rod capable of being moved air-tight up and down through the neck, was attached to one of the conductors of a Holtz machine in such a manner that the conductor of the machine and the rod formed one conducting system. Projecting from the bottom of the receiver was a short metallic rod, forming one conductor with the metallic parts of the air-pump, and by means of a chain with the uninsulated conductor of the Holtz machine. Brass balls and discs of various sizes were made to order, capable of being screwed on to the ends of the rods. On the table, and at a distance of about six feet from the receiver, was a stand supporting two insulated brass balls, the one fixed, the other having one degree of freedom, viz., of moving in a straight line in the plane of the table. The fixed insulated ball A was made one conductor with the insulated conductor of the Holtz and the rod of the receiver, by means of a copper wire insulated with gutta percha, having one end stuck firmly into a hole in the collar of the receiver, and having the other fitted in between the glass stem and the hollow in the ball, by which it fitted on to the stem tightly. A thin wire similarly fitted in between the ball B and its insulating stem connected the ball with the insulated half ring of a divided ring reflecting electrometer.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-61
Author(s):  
Michael Poznic ◽  
Rafaela Hillerbrand

Climatologists have recently introduced a distinction between projections as scenario-based model results on the one hand and predictions on the other hand. The interpretation and usage of both terms is, however, not univocal. It is stated that the ambiguities of the interpretations may cause problems in the communication of climate science within the scientific community and to the public realm. This paper suggests an account of scenarios as props in games of make-belive. With this account, we explain the difference between projections that should be make-believed and other model results that should be believed.


Dialogue ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-429
Author(s):  
David Braybrooke

A central feature of David Gauthier's impressively searching version of social contract theory is the principle of maximin relative advantage. Given certain assumptions—more than he originally thought—this principle may be described as calling for maximum equal advantage, which is easier to talk about; and I shall refer to the principle under this description. Maximum equal relative advantage is equivalent to minimum equal relative concession; hence the principle of maximum equal relative advantage has a twin and mirror, the principle of minimum equal relative concession. Relative advantage and relative concession are ratios with the same denominator, the difference for a given agent between the maximum utility (umax) that she might get from the societyt o be contracted for and the minimum utility (umin) that would give her an incentive to cooperate in establishing the society and in keeping it up. The numerator for the one ratio—relative advantage—is the difference between the utility that she is actually going to gain from society (ua) and her minimum cooperative utility (umin). The numerator for the other ratio—relative concession—is the difference between her maximum utility (umax) and the utility that she is going to get (ua), in other words, the amount of utility that she foregoes in not getting her maximum.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steffen Dalsgaard

This article refers to carbon valuation as the practice of ascribing value to, and assessing the value of, actions and objects in terms of carbon emissions. Due to the pervasiveness of carbon emissions in the actions and objects of everyday lives of human beings, the making of carbon offsets and credits offers almost unlimited repertoires of alternatives to be included in contemporary carbon valuation schemes. Consequently, the article unpacks how discussions of carbon valuation are interpreted through different registers of alternatives - as the commensuration and substitution of variants on the one hand, and the confrontational comparison of radical difference on the other. Through the reading of a wide selection of the social science literature on carbon markets and trading, the article argues that the value of carbon emissions itself depends on the construction of alternative, hypothetical scenarios, and that emissions have become both a moral and a virtual measure pitting diverse forms of actualised actions or objects against each other or against corresponding nonactions and non-objects as alternatives.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>


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