scholarly journals Politics and the limits of philosophy: Bernard Williams on realism in political theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-101
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

Bernard Williams?s papers collected in the volume In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument had a great influence on contemporary normative political theory. Williams not only revived the topic of realism in political theory, but also defended the approach of political realism that he contrasts to the approach of political moralism. This paper will focus on the distinction between political realism and political moralism. Moreover, the question of legitimacy will be considered in the light of this distinction. After examination of the distinction between political realism and political moralism, we will be in a position to address the main question that this paper aims to answer: does political realism set any limits on political philosophy?

Author(s):  
Andre Santos Campos

Historical analyses of the relations between political theory and time often hinge on two claims. The first is that political theorists have until recently put less emphasis on the future than the past when debating political legitimacy and obligation. The second is that the history of political theory draws a fundamental distinction between theories that invoke time to legitimate political structures and theories that reject temporal considerations in favor of timeless principles. This chapter disputes these two claims by maintaining that competing languages of legitimacy harbor different and interrelated conceptions of temporality. A survey of time conceptions in the history of political philosophy shows that normative political theory is inherently multitemporal, involving double regard for the past and the future. And, since even tenseless principles of legitimacy often depend on temporally related forms of formulation and application, considerations about time seem inescapable in normative political theory.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 135-146
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

In this paper I will explore the importance of making the difference between the reasonable and the rational for normative political theory. The starting point of my analysis is Rawls?s distinction between the rational and the reasonable in his later political philosophy. For Rawls one of the main characteristics of reasonable persons is that they are able to offer the justifications for their actions, but also for fair principles of cooperation, in terms of reasons that all can accept. There are many criticisms of this view of reasonable persons and its role within normative political theory. My main concern, however, is whether the presupposition of reasonableness is necessary if one already assumes that all individuals are rational. I will argue that not only the reasonable, but the relationship between the reasonable and the rational is crucially important for normative political theory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 661-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerio Fabbrizi

The renewed interest on political realism can offer a new reading of the traditional dichotomy between normative and realist conception of constitutionalism. The purpose of this article is to analyse this renewed discussion, especially by focusing on the relationship between “political realism” and “political constitutionalism,” in the light of some theorists and authors—such as Richard Bellamy and Jeremy Waldron. After a brief introduction in which political realism will be discussed, especially through Bernard Williams’ reinterpretation, the article proposes a rereading of democratic constitutionalism from the classical dichotomy between normativism and realism in political theory. The focus will be set on three key issues: 1. Richard Bellamy’s constitutional theory in a realist perspective; 2. An insight of legal constitutionalism under a normative banner; 3. A brief conclusion in which the risks of a majoritarian and populist constitutionalism will be discussed.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Grafstein

Though liberalism has been widely criticized for its attempt to frame a detached judgment of society based on an asocial conception of individuals, insufficient attention has been paid to the particular social and political relationships this search for an Archimedean point presupposes. Using collective choice theory, I show that liberalism has adopted two distinct kinds of Archimedean points reflecting different and unjustified presuppositions about the true institutional relation between politics and society. Liberalism's Archimedean search is not merely unsuccessful but biased in a way that is significant even for positions critical of liberalism. It is possible, I argue, to have a normative political theory that avoids an asocial conception of individuals without falling victim to liberalism's specific biases concerning institutional relations. The implications for both Rawlsian- or Nozickian-style liberalism are discussed, including the possibility of a political philosophy that avoids their “analytical extremism.“


2021 ◽  
pp. 147488512110015
Author(s):  
James Vitali

Jeremy Bentham is usually seen as an anti-realist political thinker, or a proponent of what Bernard Williams has termed ‘political moralism’. This article questions that prevalent view and suggests instead that there are good grounds for considering Bentham a political realist. Bentham’s political thought has considerable commonalities with that of the sociologist and political realist Max Weber: both agree that politics is a unique domain of human activity defined by its association with power; that consequently, ethical conduct is unavoidably inflected by power in politics; that a commitment to truth in politics can only ever be contingent; and that politics has a set of basic conditions that it would be not only misguided but dangerous to attempt to transcend. Whilst it is often held that Bentham advanced a reductive framework for understanding politics, in fact, his utilitarianism was a far more realistic approach to political ends and means than has generally been acknowledged, and one that contemporary political theory realists would benefit from taking seriously.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Xavier Scott

This paper examines the transition in political philosophy between the medieval and early-modern periods by focusing on the emergence of sovereignty doctrine. Scholars such as Charles Taylor and John Rawls have focused on the ability of modern-states to overcome conflicts between different religious confessionals. In contrast, this paper seeks to examine some of the peace-promoting features of Latin-Christendom and some of the conflict-promoting features of modern-secular states. The Christian universalism of the medieval period is contrasted with the colonial ventures promoted by the Peace of Westphalia. This paper’s goal is not to argue that secularism is in fact more violent than religion. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the major role that religion played in early modern philosophy and the development of sovereignty doctrine. It argues against the view that the modern, secular state is capable of neutrality vis-à-vis religion, and also combats the view that the secular nature of modern international law means that it is neutral to the different beliefs and values of the world’s peoples. These observations emphasize the ways in which state power and legitimacy are at the heart of the secular turn in political philosophy. 


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document