The ABA Should Not Delay on Pay-to-Play: Regulating the Political Contributions of Lawyers to Government Officials Who Award Legal Contracts

1997 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 1523
Author(s):  
Malcolm A. Heinicke
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Government Officials

Orthodox arrangement of the Pochaiv Lavra in the second third of the XIX century.

2021 ◽  
pp. 13-41
Author(s):  
Ella Volodymyrivna Bystrytska
Keyword(s):  
Local Level ◽  
The Political ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Political Motivation ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Russian Empire ◽  
Xix Century

Abstract: A series of imperial decrees of the 1820s ordering the establishment of a Greco-Uniate Theological Collegium and appropriate consistories contributed to the spread of the autocratic synodal system of government and the establishment of control over Greek Uniate church institutions in the annexed territories of Right-Bank Ukraine. As a result, the Greco-Uniate Church was put on hold in favor of the government's favorable grounds for the rapid localization of its activities. Basilian accusations of supporting the Polish November Uprising of 1830-1831 made it possible to liquidate the OSBM and most monasteries. The transfer of the Pochaiv Monastery to the ownership of the Orthodox clergy in 1831 was a milestone in the liquidation of the Greco-Uniate Church and the establishment of a Russian-style Orthodox mono-confessionalism. On the basis of archival documents, the political motivation of the emperor's decree to confiscate the Pochayiv Monastery from the Basilians with all its property and capital was confirmed. The transfer to the category of monasteries of the 1st class and the granting of the status of a lavra indicated its special role in strengthening the position of the autocracy in the western region of the Russian Empire. The orders of the Holy Synod outline the key tasks of ensuring the viability of the Lavra as an Orthodox religious center: the introduction of continuous worship, strengthening the personal composition of the population, delimitation of spiritual responsibilities, clarifying the affiliation of the printing house. However, maintaining the rhythm of worship and financial and economic activities established by the Basilians proved to be a difficult task, the solution of which required ten years of hard work. In order to make quick changes in the monastery, decisions were made by the emperor and senior government officials, and government agencies were involved at the local level, which required the coordination of actions of all parties to the process.

Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies

2013 ◽  
Vol 65 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonardo R. Arriola
Keyword(s):  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Financial Reforms ◽  
Poor Countries ◽  
Financial Autonomy ◽  
Electoral Coalitions ◽  
Multiethnic Societies

Under what conditions can opposition politicians with ethnic constituencies form electoral coalitions? In Africa's patronage-based political systems, incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure the endorsement of politicians from other ethnic groups. Opposition politicians, however, must rely on private resources to do the same. This article presents a political economy theory to explain how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital influences the formation of multiethnic opposition coalitions. It shows that the opposition is unlikely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages where incumbents use their influence over banking and credit to command the political allegiance of business—the largest potential funder of opposition in poor countries. Liberalizing financial reforms, in freeing business to diversify political contributions without fear of reprisal, enable opposition politicians to access the resources needed to mimic the incumbent's pecuniary coalition-building strategy. A binomial logistic regression analysis of executive elections held across Africa between 1990 and 2005 corroborates the theoretical claim: greater financial autonomy for business—as proxied by the number of commercial banks and the provision of credit to the private sector—significantly increases the likelihood of multiethnic opposition coalitions being formed.

The Value of Implicit Political Connections

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
David Broadstock ◽  
Xiaoqi Chen ◽  
C. S. Agnes Cheng ◽  
Wenli Huang
Keyword(s):  
Work Experience ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Top Management Team ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
The Political ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
The Government

ABSTRACT We investigate whether the aggregated political relations of a firm's top management team (TMT) add value to the firm's performance. We distinguish between the political relations that arise from TMT's own work experience, which are termed direct political connections (DPC), and the relations that TMT develops from working for the same institution with the government officials, which are termed implicit political connections (IPC). We find that IPC are positively associated with firm performance and that they often have a stronger effect than DPC do. We also find that the effect of IPC on firm value is stronger in SOEs and in firms located in under-developed provinces. Moreover, we find that after the anti-corruption campaign, the effect of DPC decreases but the effect of IPC does not significantly change. Overall, our results suggest the importance of investigating a firm's aggregated political connections, especially its IPC. JEL Classifications: G32; D72; J33; L33. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Democracy, Political Participation, and Latin America’s Poorest Citizens

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Carew Boulding ◽  
Claudio A. Holzner
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Latin American ◽  
The Political ◽  
Poor People ◽  
Civil Society Organization ◽  
High Poverty ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Core Questions ◽  
Very High

This chapter introduces the core questions the book seeks to answer. What explains the political participation of poor people? What changed during the past two decades to enable such widespread participation by poor people? How have some Latin American democracies reduced gaps in participation across income and wealth groups? What role does clientelism play in mobilizing the poor? Despite persistently high poverty rates and high economic inequality, poor people in Latin America participate in politics at very high levels. This chapter lays out this puzzle and introduces the main argument of the book: that civil society organization, political parties, and competitive elections have an enormous impact on whether or not poor people turn out to vote, protest, and contact government officials. This chapter also briefly summarizes the research design and plan of the rest of the book.

The Political Contributions of Big Business in Japan

Asian Survey ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
pp. 465-473
Author(s):  
Frank C. Langdon
Keyword(s):  
The Political ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Big Business

scholarly journals The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian enterprises and business associations

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 395-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrei Govorun ◽  
Israel Marques ◽  
William Pyle
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
The Political ◽  
Business Enterprise ◽  
Business Associations ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Business Association ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Do So

A business enterprise interested in influencing the design, adoption or enforcement of a particular law, rule or regulation often confronts a choice. Does it lobby officials directly? Or does it do so indirectly, using a collective action group as an intermediary? We draw on data from a large, 2010 survey of enterprises across the Russian Federation to demonstrate that the propensity to engage in intermediated lobbying increases with region-level political competition. Our explanation builds on recent evidence confirming Mancur Olson's claim (1982) that less encompassing actors tend to lobby for more distortionary policies. We hypothesize that with greater political competition government officials become more responsive to encompassing voices (i.e. associations of businesses as opposed to single firms), since the electoral costs of being captured by narrower interests becomes greater. Evidence from a complementary survey of regional business association managers points in the same direction; the relative attention paid by officials to lobbying efforts by encompassing associations increases with political competition.

Morena pressure on Mexico’s INE raises democracy risks

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
General Council ◽  
The Political ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Political Opposition ◽  
New Members ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Government ◽  
General Secretary ◽  
Chamber Of Deputies

Subject Government-INE tensions. Significance The National Electoral Institute (INE) on February 6 ratified Edmundo Jacobo Molina as its general secretary for another six-year term. The decision, taken with the support of eight of the INE’s eleven-member General Council, has reignited tensions between the government of President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) and the INE leadership, particularly Council President Lorenzo Cordova. Several government officials have accused Cordova and his fellow councillors of undemocratic behavior for having brought forward the vote, which was originally scheduled for April 10 -- six days after the Chamber of Deputies is due to appoint four new members to the Council. Impacts The fact that AMLO’s name will not be on the ballot in next year’s legislative elections could be a disadvantage for Morena. In its current weakened state, the political opposition is unlikely to put up an effective fight to uphold the INE’s independence. The four new INE Council members appointed in April will help organise elections in 2024 and 2027, as well as the 2021 midterms.

Maltese ruling party may survive murder scandal

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
The Political ◽  
Government Contracts ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Content Type ◽  
State Institutions ◽  
Business Confidence ◽  
To Come ◽  
Ruling Party

Significance The investigation into the assassination of prominent journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia has taken a dramatic turn with the interrogation of senior Maltese government officials, the arraignment of a prominent business tycoon and the prime minister’s announcement that he will resign in January. Impacts Investigation of Caruana Galizia’s murder and large-scale corruption on government contracts will continue apace with unpredictable results. State institutions’ independence and government corruption will remain in the international spotlight. Malta will continue to come under significant scrutiny in EU institutions. Investigations into lucrative government contracts signed under the Labour administration will gain momentum and others may be opened. The political crisis will prove detrimental to business confidence.

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