Industrial Structure and Party Competition in the New Deal: A Reply to Webber

1991 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Industrial Structure ◽  
Statistical Design ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Investment Theory ◽  
New Material ◽  
Capital Intensive ◽  
The New Deal

This paper is a response to Webber's (1991) critique of Thomas Ferguson's (1983, 1984, 1986) essays on the New Deal and his “investment theory” of political parties. It argues that Webber's evidence is invalid and that his statistical design is conceptually flawed. The sample is defective: it includes many people it should not and it excludes others who should have been reckoned in, notably many Texas oilmen. His procedure for ascertaining corporate partisanship is inadequate, since, among other problems, it excludes large payments made to the 1936 Democratic campaign by firms such as Standard Oil of New Jersey and General Electric. The campaign finance data he relies upon are also far less complete than he implies. An entirely new data analysis is presented, incorporating not only Webber's data, but much new material from archives. The results confirm Ferguson's central thesis about the 1936 election: contributions to the Democrats in 1936 do indeed come from firms that are more internationally-oriented and capital-intensive than those contributing to the Republicans.

From Normalcy to New Deal: industrial structure, party competition, and American public policy in the Great Depression

1984 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ferguson
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
World War I ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Industrial Structure ◽  
National Income ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Labor Militancy ◽  
The New Deal

Industrial partisan preference may be formally modeled as the joint consequence of pressures from labor and the differential impact of the world economy on particular businesses. This “basic” and static model, when extended to cover the money market, can be used to examine questions of political development, including the effects of fluctuations in national income on political coalitions. American institutions and public policy during the New Deal are used to test the theory against empirical evidence, much of it from new primary sources. The rise of the New Deal coalition is traced to changes in the American industrial structure deriving from the boom of the 1920s and the reversal of the U.S. financial position that resulted from World War I, in addition to the well-known labor militancy of the 1930s. The effect of these changes was the rise of a (Democratic) political coalition dominated by capital-intensive, multinationally dominant firms and industries with a strong interest in free trade and a historically unprecedented ability to cope with major industrial upheavals without resort to force. The major public policy initiatives of the New Deal are reexamined from this standpoint.

Business, the Democratic Party, and the New Deal: An Empirical Critique of Thomas Ferguson's “Investment Theory of Politics”

1991 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 473-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Webber
Keyword(s):  
New Deal ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Contributions ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Investment Theory ◽  
Material Interests ◽  
Dominant Parties ◽  
Capital Intensive ◽  
The New Deal

This paper contributes to the continuing debate on how structures of economic power are connected to political processes in the United States by examining a widely respected theory concerning the financial support for the two dominant parties during the New Deal. Thomas Ferguson's “investment theory of politics” purports to demonstrate that capital-intensive, internationalist firms supported the Democrats while the labor-intensive, nationalist firms supported the Republicans. Campaign finance contributions for the 1936 Presidential election were used as an empirical indicator of the political preferences and material interests of business firms. It was found that there was little evidence to support Ferguson's claims. While there were firms where all political contributions went to the Republicans, it was highly unusual to have firms that contributed only to Democrats. There was also a total absence of Democratic industries. It is suggested that other variables need to be considered in determining the material bases of the major political parties, particularly the Democratic.

scholarly journals The Structure of Party Competition in the South: The Case of Florida

2004 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 41-65
Author(s):  
Jonathan Knuckey
Keyword(s):  
New Deal ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Politics ◽  
Party Competition ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Level Data ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The New Deal ◽  
Important State ◽  
Weak Party

Although Florida has evolved from a one-party system into an intensely competitive two-party system, many studies of the state’s partisan and electoral politics continue to stress the importance of candidate-centered voting and weak party attachments, characteristics of a dealigned party system. This paper argues that such conclusions, based primarily on studies that employ individual-level data, are misleading. The paper examines the structure of the party vote across different political offices utilizing aggregate-level election returns at the county level through principal components factor analysis. Findings indicate that the New Deal vote alignment was disrupted at the presidential level in the 1960s, and a new stable alignment emerged in 1972. Consistent with the notion of a “top-down” or “creeping” realignment, the Post-New Deal alignment penetrated elections for U.S. Senate and governor from 1986 onwards, but came to structure cabinet office elections more gradually, with a culmination of this realignment in the 1990s. Overall, the paper argues that studies relying exclusively on individual-level data to examine Florida’s partisan and electoral politics have overlooked a great deal of structure and stability underlying the vote in this politically important state.

VI. Political Parties and Elections

1943 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80
Author(s):  
Clarence A. Berdahl
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
New Deal ◽  
American Politics ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Third ◽  
The New Deal

Even before the actual outbreak of the war in Europe, there were indications of uneasiness among our politicians over the approaching storm. The Democrats, in their platform of 1936, and in speeches and actions of President Roosevelt (especially his “quarantine” speech of October, 1937), showed themselves somewhat more aware than the Republicans that the United States might somehow be involved; but, in the end, both parties united on the neutrality policy designed to keep us isolated and therefore presumably safe from the aggressions already clearly under way. Before the national conventions of 1940, however, Dunkirk and the fall of France made seriously possible the conquest of England and the surrender of the British navy, and the consequent danger to the United States began to influence materially the course of American politics. Within the Democratic party the third-term tradition was forgotten and Mr. Roosevelt was renominated, largely because of the war situation and his experienced leadership in respect to the problems involved. The Democratic party not only continued to stand aggressively for the New Deal, but had somehow become a “war party,” in the sense of anticipating possible war for the United States and preparing for it both by increasing our own defenses and by aiding those countries already resisting aggression.

Verán ustedes las chozas más humildes. El discurso de pobreza en la diplomacia pública cardenista dirigida a Estados Unidos

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-281
Author(s):  
Sylvia Dümmer Scheel
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Public Diplomacy ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Government ◽  
Lazaro Cardenas ◽  
The New Deal

El artículo analiza la diplomacia pública del gobierno de Lázaro Cárdenas centrándose en su opción por publicitar la pobreza nacional en el extranjero, especialmente en Estados Unidos. Se plantea que se trató de una estrategia inédita, que accedió a poner en riesgo el “prestigio nacional” con el fin de justificar ante la opinión pública estadounidense la necesidad de implementar las reformas contenidas en el Plan Sexenal. Aprovechando la inusual empatía hacia los pobres en tiempos del New Deal, se construyó una imagen específica de pobreza que fuera higiénica y redimible. Ésta, sin embargo, no generó consenso entre los mexicanos. This article analyzes the public diplomacy of the government of Lázaro Cárdenas, focusing on the administration’s decision to publicize the nation’s poverty internationally, especially in the United States. This study suggests that this was an unprecedented strategy, putting “national prestige” at risk in order to explain the importance of implementing the reforms contained in the Six Year Plan, in the face of public opinion in the United States. Taking advantage of the increased empathy felt towards the poor during the New Deal, a specific image of hygienic and redeemable poverty was constructed. However, this strategy did not generate agreement among Mexicans.

Confluencia geopolítica entre Cárdenas y Roosevelt:

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-254
Author(s):  
Andreu Espasa
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Spanish Civil War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Crisis ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
Bilateral Relations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The New Deal

De forma un tanto paradójica, a finales de los años treinta, las relaciones entre México y Estados Unidos sufrieron uno de los momentos de máxima tensión, para pasar, a continuación, a experimentar una notable mejoría, alcanzando el cénit en la alianza política y militar sellada durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El episodio catalizador de la tensión y posterior reconciliación fue, sin duda, el conflicto diplomático planteado tras la nacionalización petrolera de 1938. De entre los factores que propiciaron la solución pacífica y negociada al conflicto petrolero, el presente artículo se centra en analizar dos fenómenos del momento. En primer lugar, siguiendo un orden de relevancia, se examina el papel que tuvo la Guerra Civil Española. Aunque las posturas de ambos gobiernos ante el conflicto español fueron sustancialmente distintas, las interpretaciones y las lecciones sobre sus posibles consecuencias permitieron un mayor entendimiento entre los dos países vecinos. En segundo lugar, también se analizarán las afinidades ideológicas entre el New Deal y el cardenismo en el contexto de la crisis mundial económica y política de los años treinta, con el fin de entender su papel lubricante en las relaciones bilaterales de la época. Somewhat paradoxically, at the end of the 1930s, the relationship between Mexico and the United States experienced one of its tensest moments, after which it dramatically improved, reaching its zenith in the political and military alliance cemented during World War II. The catalyst for this tension and subsequent reconciliation was, without doubt, the diplomatic conflict that arose after the oil nationalization of 1938. Of the various factors that led to a peaceful negotiated solution to the oil conflict, this article focuses on analyzing two phenomena. Firstly—in order of importance—this article examines the role that the Spanish Civil War played. Although the positions of both governments in relation to the Spanish war were significantly different, the interpretations and lessons concerning potential consequences enabled a greater understanding between the two neighboring countries. Secondly, this article also analyzes the ideological affinities between the New Deal and Cardenismo in the context of the global economic and political crisis of the thirties, seeking to understand their role in facilitating bilateral relations during that period.

Transformations: The New Deal through the 1950s

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Woloch
Keyword(s):  
Women Workers ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
Labor Standards ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Single Sex ◽  
Fair Labor Standards Act ◽  
The 1950S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The New Deal

This chapter traces the changes in federal and state protective policies from the New Deal through the 1950s. In contrast to the setbacks of the 1920s, the New Deal revived the prospects of protective laws and of their proponents. The victory of the minimum wage for women workers in federal court in 1937 and the passage in 1938 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which extended labor standards to men, represented a peak of protectionist achievement. This achievement rested firmly on the precedent of single-sex labor laws for which social feminists—led by the NCL—had long campaigned. However, “equal rights” gained momentum in the postwar years, 1945–60. By the start of the 1960s, single-sex protective laws had resumed their role as a focus of contention in the women's movement.

The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Landon R. Y. Storrs
Keyword(s):  
New Deal ◽  
Red Scare ◽  
Loyalty Program ◽  
Federal Employee ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Policy Ideas ◽  
Political Views ◽  
Consumer Movements ◽  
The Right ◽  
The New Deal

The loyalty investigations triggered by the Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s marginalized many talented women and men who had entered government service during the Great Depression seeking to promote social democracy as a means to economic reform. Their influence over New Deal policymaking and their alliances with progressive labor and consumer movements elicited a powerful reaction from conservatives, who accused them of being subversives. This book draws on newly declassified records of the federal employee loyalty program—created in response to fears that Communists were infiltrating the U.S. government—to reveal how disloyalty charges were used to silence these New Dealers and discredit their policies. Because loyalty investigators rarely distinguished between Communists and other leftists, many noncommunist leftists were forced to leave government or deny their political views. This book finds that loyalty defendants were more numerous at higher ranks of the civil service than previously thought, and that many were women, or men with accomplished leftist wives. Uncovering a forceful left-feminist presence in the New Deal, the book shows how opponents on the Right exploited popular hostility to powerful women and their “effeminate” spouses. The loyalty program not only destroyed many promising careers, it prohibited discussion of social democratic policy ideas in government circles, narrowing the scope of political discourse to this day. This book demonstrates how the Second Red Scare undermined the reform potential of the New Deal and crippled the American welfare state.

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